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I. INTRODUCTION
In November of 1988 the State of Nebraska Water Management
Board completed its Report on the Water and Water Rights Transfer
Study. The study was authorized by statute.' The Water Management
Report included a chapter that briefly reviewed the current legal
framework for water transfers in Nebraska and other western states.2
The bulk of the study, however, focused on the ecological and techno-
logical underpinnings of water and water rights transfers. With that
focus and within the parameters of its task, the Water Management
1. NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 25-15, 118 to 15, 120 (1987). 1987 Neb. Laws, L.B. 146.
2. State of Nebraska Water Management Board, Report on the Water and Water
Rights Transfer Study 13-18 (1988). The Report contains recommendations for
several changes in water transfer policy in Nebraska, including five draft statutes
that would implement the recommendations of the Board. For a brief discussion
of each draft bill, see Aiken, Selling Nebraska's Water: Water Sales, Transfers
and Fnports, in NEBRASKA PoLIcY CHOICES 89 (1988).
Among changes recommended by the Water Management Board are the
following-
1. Broaden surface water transfer policy. Current law provides that
surface water cannot be transferred to a different river basin or put to a
use that differs from the use prior to the transfer. See NEB. REV. STAT.
§§ 46-290 to 294 (1988). Under recommendations of the Board, surface
water could be transferred across basin or state lines and put to any ben-
eficial use.
2. Apply a single set of rules to all proposed transfers, whether in-basin
or out-of-basin, in-state or out-of-state, and without regard to the present
or future use to be made of transferred water. Normally, application for
a transfer permit would have to be accompanied by an environmental
assessment. Currently, separate transfer policies exist for interbasin
transfers of surface water (see NEB. REV. STAT. § 46-288 (1988)); in-
terbasin transfers of groundwater (see NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 46-638 to 650,
46-675 to 690 (1988) and R. HARNSBERGER & N. THORSON, NEBRASKA
WATER LAw AND ADflNISTRATION §§ 5.17 & 5.18 (1984)); interstate
transfers of surface water (see NEB. REv. STAT. § 46-233.01 (1988)); and
interstate transfers of groundwater (see NEB. REV. STAT. § 46-613.01
(1988)).
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Board did not address the federal constitutional dimensions of water
transfer issues.
In 1989 the Nebraska Unicameral enacted LB 710:
The Legislature acknowledges the study on water transfers prepared by
the Water Management Board but finds that the statutory mandate for the
study did not require a legal analysis of the United States Supreme Court's
decision in Nebraska ex rel. Douglas v. Sporhase, 458 U.S. 941 (1982), or a
policy analysis of the water management alternatives constitutionally avail-
able to states under that decision. The Legislature finds that a consideration
of such alternatives is necessary before legislation is enacted regulating water
transfers and exports.
This Article essentially reproduces the longer of two versions of a
report prepared by the College of Law for the Nebraska Legislature
pursuant to LB 710. Its focus is on transfers of groundwater out-of-
state and the constitutional options available to Nebraska or other
states to regulate such transfers in light of the decision of the United
States Supreme Court in Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel. Douglas.3 In
Sporhase, the Supreme Court held that water is an article of interstate
commerce and that a Nebraska statute violated the Commerce Clause
of the Constitution of the United States because its effect was to pro-
hibit the transfer of water to other states. Put as succinctly as possi-
ble, Sporhase means that state laws, even regarding natural resources,
generally will be invalidated if they discriminate in favor of state resi-
dents or interests.4
Prohibition of state discrimination against out-of-state interests is
the core concept of Commerce Clause jurisprudence. It has been the
prevailing interpretation of the Commerce Clause for nearly 200
years, and it is highly unlikely that this prevailing interpretation will
change substantially when membership on the Supreme Court
changes.5
The Sporhase Court, however, also recognized that a state retains a
great degree of regulatory control over natural resources, and particu-
larly over water. For purposes of this Article, then, the paramount
question that we address is the way in which Nebraska may exercise
regulatory control over decisions affecting the management, export,
and transfer of its groundwater consistent with the Commerce Clause
and other constitutional constraints.
This Article is neither intended nor designed to return to matters
dealt with in the 1988 Water Management Report. Nor is it intended
to advocate particular policy choices for legislative adoption. Rather,
3. 458 U.S. 941 (1982).
4. See Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333 (1977).
The Court's aversion to such discrimination extends to schemes that are not pri-
marily even economic. See Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978).
5. Matthews, The Supreme Cour4 the Commerce Clause, and Resources, 12 ENVTL.
MGMT. 413 (1988).
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it is an overview of governing federal constitutional constraints on
state water law and policy, an exploration of ways that a state may act
consistent with those constraints, and a description of the potential
benefits and burdens of particular policy options. Our purposes are to
provide a clear framework within which legislatures may choose to
operate, and to identify and describe a full panoply of constitutionally
available policy options.
While our focus is on interstate groundwater transfers, the consti-
tutional validity of a state's regulation of interstate transfers is in part
dependent on a state's regulation of intrastate uses and transfers.
Moreover, an interstate transfer of water may be structured in a way
that does not require water to physically move across state lines. Con-
sequently, successful and efficient regulation of groundwater transfers
is related to, and in part dependent on, the regulation of surface water
transfers. Therefore, we also have briefly considered the relationship
between ground water and surface water and have discussed in some
depth the relationship of intra- and inter-state legislative solutions.
This Article is written as a comprehensive whole. Each Part, how-
ever, is self-contained, with enough background information that a
user may focus on a specific question without the need to read the
entire Article. In its entirety, this Article contains a lengthy exposi-
tion of the issues to which LB 710 directed our attention as well as
background research information that we hope will aid in the drafting.
The background information includes, for example, a complete history
of the Sporhase litigation and the statute that spawned it, a discussion
of the legal issues surrounding water transfers, a discussion of legisla-
tion enacted in other states dealing with out-of-state water transfers,
and detailed analyses of important cases decided by the Supreme
Court of the United States.
II. SPORHASE v. NEBRASKA : AN ANALYSIS OF THE CASE
AND NEBRASKA'S RESPONSE TO IT
A. The Law Prior to Sporhase
Historically, states assumed that they could regulate interstate
commerce in natural resources because they owned those resources.
The leading early Supreme Court decision was Geer v. Connecticut.6
Geer upheld the constitutionality of a state law that prohibited inter-
state transfer of game birds killed within Connecticut. The Geer
Court reasoned that wildlife was the common property of all citizens
of a state and, therefore, Connecticut owned game birds "as a trust for
the benefit of the people."7 As owner of the birds, the state could val-
idly prohibit or condition their capture. The Geer Court viewed the
6. 161 U.S. 519 (1896), overruled by Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322 (1979).
7. 161 U.S. 519, 529 (1896).
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Connecticut prohibition on export of game birds as a valid legislative
condition on the privilege of capturing the birds, a condition that took
effect before the birds were reduced to private possession. Thus, the
Court dismissed arguments that the statute was inconsistent with the
Commerce Clause by noting that no article of interstate commerce
was affected by the statute.
In 1908, twelve years after Geer, the Supreme Court decided Hud-
son County Water Co. v. McCarter.8 Prior to Sporhase v. Nebraska ex
rel. Douglas,9 Hudson County was the only Supreme Court opinion
that directly addressed the power of a state to prevent interstate water
transfers.O
In Hudson County a water company contracted to divert water
from the Passaic River in New Jersey and deliver it to New York City.
New Jersey, reciting its need to preserve fresh water for the health
and prosperity of its citizens, enacted a statute forbidding water trans-
fers out of state. Shortly thereafter, New Jersey's Attorney General,
Robert McCarter, successfully brought an action to enjoin the pro-
posed water transfer. The water company appealed to the United
States Supreme Court. Attorney General McCarter argued that the
injunction should be sustained because the proposed interstate trans-
fer was inconsistent with the settled law of riparian water rightsl and
would cause great harm to New Jersey. Writing for the Supreme
Court, Justice Holmes wrote a short and memorable opinion stating
that:
We are of the opinion... that the constitutional power of the State to insist
that its natural advantages shall remain unimpaired by its citizens is not de-
pendent upon any nice estimate of the extent of present use or speculation as
to future needs.... [New Jersey] finds itself in possession of what all admit to
be a great public good, and what it has it may keep and give no one a reason
for its will. 12
Just three years after its decision in Hudson County, however, the
8. 209 U.S. 349 (1908).
9. 458 U.S. 941 (1982).
10. Hudson County involved the transfer of surface water; the Sporhase facts in-
volved groundwater. Much of the reasoning of Sporhase, however, applies both to
groundwater and surface water. See Comment, Commerce Clause Scrutiny of
Montana's Water Export Statutes, 7 PUB. LAND L. REV. 97, 104-05 (1986).
11. At common law, a landowner who owned land abutting a stream acquired what
are called riparian water rights. Water acquired as part of a riparian right gener-
ally could not be used on land that did not abut the stream, nor could such water
be transferred out of the watershed. Annotation, Transfer of Riparian Right to
Use Water to Nonriparian Land, 14 A.L.R. 330 (1921); R. HARNSBERGER & N.
THORSON, supra note 2, at 35-36 (1984). In Hudson County, Justice Holmes noted
that lower court opinions had rested on the rule that a riparian owner has no
right to divert waters for more than a reasonable distance from the body of the
stream, or for other than well-known ordinary purposes, or in excess of a nar-
rowly limited amount.
12. Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349, 356-57 (1908).
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Supreme Court began to change its view regarding Commerce Clause
scrutiny of state attempts to regulate interstate transfers of natural
resources. In West v. Kansas Natural Gas Co. 13 the Court invalidated
an Oklahoma law that prohibited the interstate transport of gas pro-
duced within Oklahoma. Oklahoma argued that its interest in pre-
serving natural resources gave it the power to prohibit all transfers of
natural gas out of state. The Court disagreed. It limited Hudson
County by stating that under a state's police power' 4 only the initial
possession of natural resources may be restricted for conservation pur-
poses;' 5 once the resource is in private hands, prohibitions on transfer
need to be evaluated under the Commerce Clause to decide whether
they constitute an undue burden on interstate commerce.
In 1970 the Court decided Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc.,'6 and an-
nounced a new balancing test to be used for evaluating the constitu-
tionality of state legislation affecting interstate commerce. The Bruce
Church test is as follows:
Where the statute regulates even-handedly to effectuate a legitimate local
public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are only incidental, it
will be upheld unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly exces-
sive in relation to the putative local benefits. If a legitimate local purpose is
found, then the question becomes one of degree. And the extent of the bur-
den that will be tolerated will of course depend on the nature of the local
interest involved, and on whether it could be promoted as well with a lesser
impact on interstate activities.1 7
Finally, in 1979 the Court decided Hughes v. Oklahoma,'S making
it clear that state regulation of natural resources was not exempt from
Commerce Clause scrutiny. The facts in Hughes were simple and un-
disputed. Oklahoma set up a scheme to license commercial enter-
prises that wanted to seine, transport, or sell minnows. No limit was
placed on the number of minnows a licensed person could take from
state waters. However, another Oklahoma statute provided that no
"person may transport or ship minnows for sale outside the state
which were seined or procured within the waters of this state."1 9 The
13. 221 U.S. 229 (1911). See also Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553 (1923)
(Court declared unconstitutional a West Virginia Act designed to retain for the
benefit of West Virginia consumers natural gas that without the statute would go
to consumers in other states through channels of interstate commerce). Justice
Holmes dissented in both cases; in the later case he asserted his reliance on his
opinion in Hudson County. Id, at 600.
14. The police power is the inherent power of a state to enact legislation concerning
the health, safety, peace, good order, morals, and general well being of the com-
munity. It is, in short, the power to regulate within the bounds established by
state and federal constitutions.
15. West v. Kansas Natural Gas Co., 221 U.S. 229 (1921).
16. 397 U.S. 137 (1970).
17. Id. at 142.
18. 441 U.S. 322 (1979).
19. Id. at 323 n.1.
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prohibition did not apply to persons transporting three dozen or less
minnows or to the "sale and shipment of minnows raised in a regu-
larly licensed commercial minnow hatchery."2o The collective effect
of the two statutes was to prohibit commercial quantities of non-
hatchery bred Oklahoma minnows from being sold in other states. No
limitation was placed on the disposition of hatchery-bred minnows, on
the procurement or sale of natural minnows within Oklahoma, or on
transportation of natural minnows out of state for purposes other than
sale.
William Hughes, who had operated a commercial minnow business
in Texas for thirty years, purchased a shipment of minnows from a
minnow dealer licensed to do business in Oklahoma. He was charged
with violating the Oklahoma statute by transporting minnows from
Oklahoma to his place of business at Wichita Falls, Texas, near the
Oklahoma state line. He defended by arguing that the Oklahoma stat-
utes violated the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution.
At his trial, the facts were stipulated; he was found guilty and fined
$200. After the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals upheld the con-
viction, Hughes appealed to the Supreme Court of the United States.
In finding in favor of Hughes, the Supreme Court repudiated its
opinion in Geer v. Connecticut,21 and expressly rejected the theory of
state ownership of natural resources. The Court found that the
Oklahoma statute discriminated against interstate commerce. The
opinion concluded by stating: "The fiction of state ownership may no
longer be used to force those outside the State to bear the full costs of
'conserving' . . . when equally effective nondiscriminatory conserva-
tion measures are available."22
Justice Brennan, writing for the Court, continued:
Far from choosing the least discriminatory alternative, Oklahoma has chosen
to 'conserve' its minnows in the way that most overtly discriminates against
interstate commerce. The State places no limits on the numbers of minnows
that can be taken by licensed minnow dealers; nor does it limit in any way
how these minnows may be disposed of within the State. Yet it forbids the
transportation of any commercially significant number of natural minnows
out of the State for sale. [The Oklahoma statute] is certainly not a 'last ditch'
attempt at conservation after nondiscriminatory alternatives have proved un-
feasible. It is rather a choice of the most discriminatory means even though
nondiscriminatory alternatives would seem likely to fulfill the State's pur-
ported legitimate local purpose more effectively. 2 3
The Court in Hughes expressly rejected a general natural re-
sources exception to Commerce Clause review and subjected natural
resources to the Bruce Church test for constitutionality. The two
20. Id.
21. 161 U.S. 519 (1896).
22. Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 332, 337 (1979).
23. Id. at 338.
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cases-Hughes and Bruce Church-thus effectively set the stage for
the United States Supreme Court to consider the arguments of Joy
Sporhase and Delmar Moss.
B. The Sporhase Case
1. The Facts
In 1972, Joy Sporhase went to a farm auction near Lamar, Ne-
braska, with his partner and son-in-law, Delmar Moss. They intended
to buy cattle, but became interested in the land when the highest bid
stood at only $145 per acre. Unable to pass up a bargain, Sporhase
offered $146 an acre and acquired the land. The farm covered 640
acres-140 acres in Colorado and the other 500 acres across the state
line in Nebraska.24
The farm had a well on the Nebraska side, located fifty-five feet
from the state boundary. In 1971, the former owner had registered the
well with the Nebraska Department of Water Resources, writing on
the registration that he intended to pump water to irrigate his land on
both sides of the state line. No one questioned him about his inten-
tion, and the well was routinely assigned number G-33893 on January
8, 1971.25
Several years later, Sporhase and Moss built a $47,000 sprinkler
system to take water from the Nebraska well to their corn and bean
fields in Colorado. Sporhase first applied to Colorado for a permit to
drill a well on the Colorado side, but he was turned down by Colorado
officials on August 23, 1977. Colorado denied the permit because they
determined that the aquifer was already overused in the area.2 6
Neither Sporhase nor Moss nor any of the prior owners of the land
ever complied with Nebraska law by applying for a permit to transfer
groundwater across the border.27 The Nebraska statute prohibited
transfers of groundwater from Nebraska to states that did not permit
their groundwater to be transferred to Nebraska. Because Colorado
prohibited all out-of-state groundwater transfers, Sporhase could not
have obtained a transfer permit from Nebraska officials.
2. Origin of the Nebraska Groundwater Export Statute
In 1966, the Executive Board of the Legislative Council appointed a
thirteen member committee to study a number of water issues and to
prepare recommendations. Three subcommittees were formed, in-
cluding one on priority of use. The subcommittee on priority of use
24. The Washington Post, Sept. 12, 1982, § AL, at 8.
25. As dry land, the 140 acre tract in Colorado was worth $56,400; as irrigated land,
$168,000.
26. Colorado Groundwater Commission file No. AD-6826.
27. NEB. REV. STAT. § 46-613.01 (1978).
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met in Omaha on April 21, 1966, for an informal round-the-table dis-
cussion with Frank Trelease, Dean of the University of Wyoming Col-
lege of Law, and Ray Moses, a prominent Colorado water law lawyer
and former attorney for the Colorado Water Conservation Board.28
Eventually, the subcommittee recommended that Nebraska enact a
groundwater export statute.29
The recommendations were enacted into law in 1967. The new
statute made minor amendments to the well registration law so as to
require all wells except domestic ones to be registered. More impor-
tantly, the statute for the first time regulated the taking of ground-
water for use in an adjoining state. Prior to the statute, there was no
express statutory authority for interstate groundwater transfers. The
new statute authorized such transfers, but only if the state gave its
specific approval. The new statute also included a reciprocity clause.
The reciprocity clause contained in the Nebraska statute re-
sponded to similar language found in a Kansas statute.30 With a paral-
lel reciprocity clause in Nebraska law, Nebraska municipalities and
residents could continue to import water from Kansas.31 Similarly,
Nebraska groundwater could continue to be exported to Kansas-but
with one important difference; groundwater exports now required ex-
plicit Nebraska approval. Thus, Nebraska could exercise a measure of
control over exports of groundwater to Kansas, while at the same time
affording Nebraska residents an opportunity to use Kansas ground-
water. Because of the proximity of Nebraska importers to the Kansas
line, the Nebraska legislature's response to the Kansas law was a pru-
dent one.
In its entirety, the new Nebraska statute read:
Any person, firm, city, village, municipal corporation or any other entity in-
tending to withdraw ground water from any well or pit located in the State of
Nebraska and transport it for use in an adjoining state shall apply to the De-
partment of Water Resources for a permit to do so, but the Department of
Water Resources shall not grant such a permit nor shall the applicant with-
draw ground water from any well or pit located in the State of Nebraska with-
out specific authorization by the Legislature, and then only in cases where the
28. Others at the meeting were Richard Harnsberger, a co-author of this Article, Vin-
cent Dreeszen of the University's Conservation and Survey Division, an attorney
representing the Metropolitan Utilities District of Omaha, the Director of Utili-
ties for the City of Lincoln, and the Director of the State Department of Water
Resources.
29. Interestingly, the proposed Nebraska statute initially was not viewed as a bar to
interstate exports of water, but rather as a facilitator of interstate exports.
30. See Brief of Appellee at 29, Sporhase v. Nebraska ex reL Douglas, 458 U.S. 941
(1982)(No. 81-613). Before the vote on LB 415, Senator Ely stated that the
amendment would allow a particular Nebraska community to obtain a water sup-
ply from a nearby Kansas source rather than having to develop a Nebraska
source that was 20 miles distant. This option otherwise had been barred by the
Kansas reciprocity clause.
31. Id at 29-30.
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state in which the water is to be used shall grant reciprocal rights to withdraw
and transport ground water from that state for use in the State of Nebraska.
3 2
In 1969 the legislature began to reorganize more than 150 single
purpose districts into what are now the state's twenty-four natural re-
sources districts. At that time the statute governing groundwater ex-
ports3 3 was amended to give the Director of Water Resources further
guidance when issuing permits to withdraw and transport water
across state lines:
Any person, firm, city, village, municipal corporation or any other entity in-
tending to withdraw ground water from any well or pit located in the State of
Nebraska and transport it for use in an adjoining state shall apply to the De-
partment of Water Resources for a permit to do so. If the Director of Water
Resources finds that the withdrawal of the ground water requested is reason-
able, is not contrary to the conservation and use of ground water, and is not
otherwise detrimental to the public we~far4 he shall grant the permit if the
state in which the water is to be used grants reciprocal rights to withdraw and
transport ground water from that state for use in the State of Nebraska.3 4
One of the principal reasons for specifying these additional criteria
was a fear of water shortages in some areas of the state.3s Another
was to guarantee further reciprocal, beneficial uses of Nebraska and
Kansas groundwater by citizens of both states.36 The amended statute
was the subject of the litigation in the Sporhase case.
3. The Litigation in Nebraska
In 1976, the Nebraska Department of Water Resources warned
Sporhase that proceedings would be commenced against him and
32. 1967 Neb. Laws 415, § 5.
33. NEB. REv. STAT. § 46-613.01 (1978).
34. 1969 Neb. Laws 1357 (emphasis added).
35. Hearing on LB. 1357Before the Agriculture and Recreation Committee, 19 (May
1, 1969)(Statement of Purpose by Senator Kremer).
36. Floor Debate on LB 1357, 4313-14 (August 25, 1969)(Statement by Senator
Ziebarth):
The Legislature at Kansas is willing to have this reciprocal agreement,
the Governors of both states are in favor of it, but it was real difficult to
get the local people involved to see eye to eye... Superior needs water
from the Kansas area. The Kansas area has plenty of water, but we do
not have the proper law to take the water from Kansas and give it to the
City of Superior. Other communities in Kansas would like to withdraw
water from Nebraska, so what we are asking here if the Director of the
Department of Water Resources... finds that the withdrawal of water
in Nebraska to go into Kansas is reasonable and not contrary to conser-
vation, in other words, if it does not harm the water rights of the Ne-
braska people, he will grant this and also the Director of the Water
Resources of Kansas will then direct the use of water in Kansas to the
City of Superior, so it is a reciprocal agreement that has to be in our
statutes before the Kansas conservation or the Water Resources districts
will grant the use of this water to the City of Superior.
See also Brief of the Appellee, Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel Doulgas, 458 U.S. 941
(1982).
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against Moss unless they stopped pumping water and using it in Colo-
rado without a Nebraska permit. When Sporhase and Moss failed to
apply for a permit, suit was brought by the Nebraska Attorney Gen-
eral to enjoin the transportation of groundwater across the border into
Colorado. The trial judge held that even if groundwater were an arti-
cle of commerce, the Nebraska statute did not impose an unreasonable
burden on interstate commerce.
The Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed on other grounds.37 It held
that groundwater in the state is not an article of commerce and thus is
not subject to review under the Commerce Clause of the United States
Constitution.
Chief Justice Krivosha wrote a concurring and dissenting opinion.
He agreed with the majority's conclusion that establishing legislative
criteria to control the transfer of groundwater from Nebraska to an
adjoining state did not violate the Commerce Clause.38 He found
fault, however, with the reciprocity clause of the Nebraska statute.
The reciprocity clause operated as an absolute prohibition on inter-
state groundwater transfers-a prohibition that ignored both need and
availability of supplies. Presaging the eventual opinion of the United
States Supreme Court, Chief Justice Krivosha felt that such a provi-
sion could not withstand Commerce Clause scrutiny.
In due course Sporhase and Moss appealed to the United States
Supreme Court. Eleven amicus curiae briefs were filed in the case.3 9
All but one opposed the position of the two farmers.40
4. The United States Supreme Court Opinion
The Supreme Court's opinion, written by Justice Stevens, began by
dividing the challenge to Nebraska's statute into three questions:
(1) whether groundwater is an article of commerce and therefore sub-
ject to the Commerce Clause; (2) whether the Nebraska statute im-
posed an impermissible burden on interstate commerce; and
(3) whether Congress had granted the states permission to engage in
groundwater regulation that otherwise would be impermissible under
the Commerce Clause.41
37. State ex reL Douglas v. Sporhase, 208 Neb. 703, 305 N.W.2d 614 (1981).
38. Id. at 712, 305 N.W.2d at 620.
39. Amicus Curiae briefs are filed by persons who are not parties to a lawsuit but
who have an interest in the legal issues to be resolved. Separate amicus briefs
were filed by the state of California; the state of New Mexico; the states of Colo-
rado, Kansas, Missouri, Nevada, North Dakota, South Dakota, Utah, and Wyo-
ming;, four New Mexico irrigation districts; the city of El Paso, Texas; the
National Wildlife Federation; the National Agricultural Lands Center and Kan-
sas City Southern Industries. (The arnicus briefs are available on Lexis except
for the El Paso arnicus brief).
40. Only the El Paso amicus brief urged reversal.
41. Sporhase v. Nebraska ex reL Douglas, 458 U.S. 941, 943 (1982).
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a. Water as an Article of Commerce
Nebraska tried to avoid Commerce Clause scrutiny by relying on
the United States Supreme Court's 1908 Hudson County42 opinion, an
opinion that the Nebraska Supreme Court cited as controlling the
Sporhase result. In response, Justice Stevens observed that Hudson
County was concerned with "just compensation,"4 3 not the Commerce
Clause. (In fact, Hudson County addressed the Commerce Clause in
only three sentences.) Justice Stevens added that the underpinning
for Hudson County was Geer v. Connecticut44 , the case that had been
expressly overruled in Hughes v. Oklahoma.45
Having determined that Sporhase was not controlled by Hudson
County, Justice Stevens then considered Nebraska's reliance on a the-
ory of state ownership of water to uphold the constitutionality of its
statute. Nebraska attempted to distinguish the Sporhase facts from
prior United States Supreme Court cases that dealt with natural re-
sources other than water. The state argued that, under Nebraska law,
water is treated differently from other natural resources. According
to the state, an overlying owner who withdraws groundwater in Ne-
braska has a lesser ownership in the resource than the captor of birds
in Connecticut, minnows in Oklahoma, or the person who withdraws
groundwater in a state, like Texas, that recognizes the English, or
common law, rule of absolute ownership of groundwater. In each of
these latter situations, intrastate trade in natural resources is permit-
ted upon capture of the resource, whereas in Nebraska, according to
the state, there was no equivalent market for groundwater.46 The
42. Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349 (1908).
43. The fifth amendment to the Constitution of the United States provides that pri-
vate property shall not "be taken for public use, without just compensation." U.S.
CONST. amend. V.
44. 161 U.S. 519 (1896).
45. 441 U.S. 322 (1979).
46. It should be noted that groundwater in Nebraska is not tied absolutely to overly-
ing land. So long as other owners over an aquifer are not injured, water may be
transferred away from the area. See Aiken, Nebraska Ground Water Law and
Administration, 59 NEB. L. REv. 917, 986-87 (1980). See also Tarlock, So Its Not
"Ours"- Why Can't We Still Keep It? A First Look at Sporhase v. Nebraska, 18
LAND & WATER L. REV. 137, 163-65 (1983).
Nebraska's groundwater law has developed in a piecemeal fashion over the
years. By statute intrastate transfers of groundwater by municipal governments
are allowed. See Municipal and Rural Domestic Ground Water Transfers Permit
Act, NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 46-638 to 650 (1988). For Justice Stevens' discussion of
Nebraska's arrangements whereby groundwater is withdrawn from rural areas
and transferred to urban areas, see Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel Douglas, 458 U.S.
941, 951-52 (1982).
The state's laws are complicated further by legislation authorizing regulations
by the Department of Water Resources for both control and management areas.
See Nebraska Ground Water Management and Protection Act, NEB. REV. STAT.
§§ 46-656 to 674.20 (1988).
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Supreme Court recognized that Nebraska's greater ownership argu-
ment was not irrelevant to Commerce Clause analysis. The Court
nevertheless held that Nebraska's legal treatment of groundwater
could not absolutely remove Nebraska groundwater from close Com-
merce Clause scrutiny. In the final analysis, the Court determined
Nebraska's argument was based on a legal fiction of state ownership.47
The state next argued that water is essential for human survival
and therefore should be managed at the state and local levels. While
Justice Stevens acknowledged the necessity of water for survival and
the desirability of local control, he noted that more than eighty per-
cent of the water supply in the United States is used for agricultural
purposes and that the markets supplied by irrigated farms are world-
wide. He concluded that the interstate and worldwide dimension of
water use means that there is a significant federal interest under the
Commerce Clause in both the use and allocation of water.48 Justice
Stevens added that a "significant federal interest in conservation as
well as in fair allocation of this diminishing resource"49 arose because
Sporhase and Moss drew water from the Ogallala aquifer.5 0 Justice
Stevens observed that the Ogallala aquifer is multistate in character-
underlying the Sporhase-Moss land in Nebraska and Colorado, as well
as parts of Texas, New Mexico, Oklahoma, and Kansas.5 1 Finally, Jus-
tice Stevens worried that if groundwater were held not to be an article
of commerce, then Congress would be powerless to deal with a poten-
tial national problem of overdrafts.52
b. An Impermissible Burden on Interstate Commerce
Although the Supreme Court concluded that water is an article of
commerce, it also stated clearly that this finding did not foreclose a
state from all regulation of water-whether the regulation governed
water use within a state's boundaries or in interstate commerce. To
47. Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel Douglas, 458 U.S. 941, 951 (1982).
48. Id. at 952-53. The discussion of federal power to establish a national water policy
was unnecessary to the majority decision. This gratuitous discussion was particu-
larly troubling to the dissenting judges. It is deducible that the majority wanted
to signal Congress that there would be no constitutional impediment if it decided
to take a leading role in managing groundwater use. The Court may also have
been warning the states that, although there are political obstacles to federal con-
trol of groundwater, Congress has power under the Commerce Clause to do so.
49. Id. at 953.
50. Id.
51. Id. For a comprehensive study of the Ogallala aquifer, see HIGH PLAINS ASSOCI-
ATES: CAMP DRESSER & MCKEE, BLACK & VEATCH, ARTHUR D. LITTLE INC., Six-
State High Plains-Ogallala Aquifer Regional Resources Study-A Report to the
U.S. Department of Commerce and The High Plains Study Council (March 1982).
52. Sporhase v. Nebraska ex reL Douglas, 458 U.S. 941, 954 (1982): "Ground water
overdraft is a national problem and Congress has the power to deal with it on that
scale."
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the contrary, the Court stated expressly that state interests "in con-
serving and preserving scarce water resources are not irrelevant in the
Commerce Clause inquiry."53 Thus, both scarcity of the water supply
and conservation efforts are factors to be considered in deciding
whether a state's water regulations impose an unreasonable burden on
interstate commerce. 54
The Supreme Court devoted five pages of its opinion to the ques-
tion whether the Nebraska statute could survive Commerce Clause
scrutiny. Although the Commerce Clause grants Congress the power
to legislate, the United States Supreme Court has long recognized a
negative implication of that grant of power. According to the Court,
failure of Congress to exercise its regulatory power implies a pur-
poseful Congressional design to leave interstate commerce unregu-
lated, both by itself and by the states. Thus, the pivotal question in
Sporhase was whether, and to what extent, Nebraska had authority to
regulate the movement of water across its borders when Congress had
not exercised its own regulatory power. Stated more precisely, did
dormant congressional power under the Commerce Clause, even if not
used, preclude Nebraska from enforcing a reciprocal groundwater ex-
port statute? To answer this question, Justice Stevens, in the second
part of the Sporhase opinion, turned to the formulation of Commerce
Clause principles first articulated in Bruce Church.55
To pass constitutional muster under the Bruce Church test, a stat-
ute that burdens interstate commerce must serve a legitimate local
interest and operate even-handedly on both interstate and intrastate
commerce. If it does, the Court then weighs the beneficial local ef-
fects to be produced against the burden imposed on interstate com-
merce. State legislation will be upheld only when it incidentally
burdens or discriminates against interstate commerce; state legislation
that imposes burdens on commerce that are clearly excessive in rela-
tion to local benefits is invalid. Where burdens are not clearly exces-
sive in relation to the local benefits, the constitutionality of a statute
then depends on the character of the local interest and whether it
could be promoted equally well by means having a lesser impact on
interstate activities.
Justice Stevens decided that the first three conditions of the Ne-
braska statute-"that the withdrawal of the groundwater requested is
reasonable, is not contrary to the conservation and use of ground-
water, and is not otherwise detrimental to the public interest," ad-
vance "[t]he State's interest in conservation and preservation of
ground water"-and thus pass muster under the Bruce Church test.
He gave four reasons for his conclusion that a "facial examination of
53. Id. at 953.
54. Id.
55. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970).
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the first three conditions . . . does not, therefore, indicate that they
impermissibly burden interstate commerce." 56 First, a state's power
to regulate water in times of shortage is at the core of its police
power.57 Second, a "legal expectation" had arisen from actions by
Congress and by the Court in deferring to the states in the allocation
of water.5 8 Third, Nebraska's claim of public ownership supported a
limited preference for its own citizens even though the claim did not
remove groundwater entirely from the reach of the Commerce
Clause.5 9 Fourth, because of Nebraska's conservation efforts, the
state's groundwater has some indicia of a good publicly produced and
owned in which a state may favor its own citizens in times of
shortage.6 0
However, the final statutory provision, the reciprocity clause,
failed under Bruce Church.61
c. The Reciprocity C(ause
Justice Stevens held that the reciprocity clause "operates as an ex-
plicit barrier to commerce."6 2 In view of this finding, the state had the
burden to prove that there was a "close fit" between the clause and its
asserted purpose.63 As there was no evidence that the means chosen, a
reciprocity requirement, was narrowly tailored to achieve justifiable
state ends, namely, conservation and preservation, 64 the state failed to
meet its burden.
Interestingly, the Sporhase opinion goes on to explain in some de-
tail under what circumstances a reciprocity provision (or other state
restriction) might be upheld.
If it could be shown that the State as a whole suffers a water shortage, that the
intrastate transportation of water from areas of abundance to areas of
shortage is feasible regardless of distance, and that the importation of water
from adjoining States would roughly compensate for any exportation to those
States, then the conservation and preservation purpose might be credibly ad-
vanced for the reciprocity provision. A demonstrably arid state conceivably
might be able to marshall evidence to establish a close means-end relationship
between even a total ban on the exportation of water and a purpose to con-
serve and preserve water.
65
But Nebraska did not claim any evidence of that nature existed; and as
the reciprocity requirement was not narrowly tailored, it could not
56. Sporhase v. Nebraska ex reL Douglas, 458 U.S. 941, 957 (1982).
57. Id. at 956.
58. Id.
59. Id.




64. Id. at 957-58.
65. Id. at 958.
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survive the test of "strictest scrutiny" that is reserved for facially dis-
criminatory legislation.66
d. Congressional Authorization
The last question faced by the Sporhase Court was whether Con-
gress had granted the states permission to enact groundwater legisla-
tion, legislation that otherwise would be impermissible under the
negative Commerce Clause. Nebraska had argued that Congress had
authorized such statutes in the past by deferring to state water law in
thirty-seven federal statutes and by acquiescing to numerous state
compacts that allocated water. Justice Stevens answered that the neg-
ative implications of the Commerce Clause remain in effect unless
Congress expressly states an "intent and policy" that state legislation
should be free from attack under the Commerce Clause. As there was
no evidence in the case indicating such express congressional consent,
the reciprocity clause could not be saved on a theory of congressional
authorization.67
5. The Supreme Court Dissent
Justices Rehnquist and O'Connor, the two members of the Court
from the West, dissented from the majority opinion in Sporhase.6S
They were especially upset with the majority's dictum regarding the
power of Congress to legislate with respect to withdrawal of the na-
tion's groundwater, and their concerns were correct ones. Although
both the dissenting justices agreed that Congress can regulate ground-
water withdrawals on a showing that overdrafts have a substantial
economic effect on interstate commerce, they felt that such a conclu-
sion was wholly unnecessary in order to decide the case. Congress had
not acted, the extent of its power was not in issue, and the entire dis-
cussion of the matter was gratuitous.
On the merits, the dissenters first recognized the traditional au-
thority of states over resources found within their borders. They then
concluded that, while a state may not discriminate in the application
of its law, a state does have the power as a quasi-sovereign to preclude
water from attaining the status of an article of commerce. They went
to great lengths to show that Nebraska did not permit either an intra-
state or interstate market to operate in water. Rather, they argued,
Nebraska recognized only a usufructuary 69 right in the landowners,
66. Id.
67. Id. at 960.
68. Id. at 961.
69. A usufructuary right is a right defined by use rather than possession. Nebraska
groundwater is not susceptible to absolute ownership as specific tangible prop-
erty. In other words, a groundwater property right in Nebraska is a right to use
water only; there is no private ownership of water in place beneath the soil.
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and, with the single exception of municipal water systems, prohibited
the removal of groundwater from the overlying land. The pivotal
point of the dissent was that "[c]ommerce cannot exist in a natural
resource that cannot be sold, rented, traded, or transferred, but only
used."7 o
In connection with Commerce Clause analysis, the majority and
the dissenting justices agreed that a state may not discriminate against
interstate commerce if it permits water to be reduced to private pos-
session, permits an intrastate market to exist in that resource, and
then either bars interstate commerce completely or grants a commer-
cial preference to its own citizens. The difference between the major-
ity and dissent was that the majority decided water was an item of
commerce and then went on to consider whether even nondiscrimina-
tory restrictions on water transfers burden commerce. The dissenters,
by contrast, found there was no item of commerce involved. They
therefore never reached the questions relating to burdens on com-
merce under the Bruce Church test.
6. The Case Back in Nebraska.
On remand, the Nebraska Supreme Court held that the reciprocity
provision was severable from the rest of the statute and that the re-
maining provisions were valid.7 1 The Director of Water Resources
subsequently found that the Sporhase-Moss application complied with
Nebraska's out-of-state diversion law because the withdrawal was rea-
sonable, it accorded with the conservation and use of groundwater,
and it was not detrimental to the public interest. On May 10, 1983, the
Director issued an export permit that was conditioned on Sporhase
and Moss complying with all control area regulations of the Upper
Republican Natural Resources District.72 In granting the permit, the
Director rejected a proposed regulation submitted by the district that
would have restricted use of groundwater to the control area. Had the
proposal been approved, an interesting issue would have arisen-the
restriction would have applied evenhandedly to both intrastate and in-
terstate groundwater and thus would arguably be consistent with the
Supreme Court's Sporhase ruling.
7 Conclusion
A number of conclusions can be drawn from the Sporhase
decisions.
70. Sporhase v. Nebraska ex reL Douglas, 458 U.S. 941, 963 (1982).
71. State ex reL Douglas v. Sporhase, 213 Neb. 484, 329 N.W.2d 855 (1983).
72. Order, In the Matter of Application TA-1, filed by Joy Sporhase and Delmar
Moss for a Permit to Transport Ground Water from Nebraska to Colorado, under
the provisions of NEB. REV. STAT. § 46-613.01 (1978)(statute amended 1988).
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First, at the state level, the position of the Nebraska Supreme
Court is clear. Groundwater is publicly owned and:
[t]he public, through legislative action, may grant to private persons the right
to the use of publicly owned waters for private purpose; but... the public may
limit or deny the right of private parties to freely use the water when it deter-
mines that the welfare of the state and its citizens is at stake.7 3
As a matter of state property law, groundwater in Nebraska is not the
exclusive property of overlying land owners. Rather, it is public prop-
erty that can be extensively regulated, probably even to the point of
prohibiting all new well installations or other uses.
Second, the United States Supreme Court Sporhase holding is ex-
ceedingly narrow because only the reciprocity provision in the Ne-
braska statute was found to be unconstitutional under the Commerce
Clause.
Third, even though the United States Supreme Court had before it
in Sporhase only the question of groundwater regulation, the Court's
reasoning undoubtedly applies to surface water as well.74
Fourth, the United States Supreme Court Sporhase decision has
had a negligible effect on Nebraska water law. On February 11, 1983,
the Nebraska Supreme Court held that the reciprocity provision was
severable from the remainder of the statute. Thus, the remainder of
the statute continued in effect and governed groundwater transfers
until the statute was amended by the legislature in 1984.75
Fifth, in important dictum, the United States Supreme Court reaf-
firmed leadership of the states in the area of water resources adminis-
tration while going out of its way to make clear that no constitutional
obstacles prevent the Congress from exercising exclusive control of
groundwater management.
Sixth, the Court made it clear that the Bruce Church test allows a
state to prefer its own citizens in times of severe water shortage. Even
a total ban on exports might be sustained, but the evidence to sustain
such action would have to establish a close means-end relationship be-
tween the ban and the purpose to conserve and preserve water
resources.
7 6
More attacks on statutes prohibiting water transfers may be ex-
pected in the federal courts,77 and the states would do well to keep in
mind that the starting point for Commerce Clause analysis by the
United States Supreme Court is the principle that our economic unit is
73. State ex reL. Douglas v. Sporhase, 208 Neb. 703, 707-08, 305 N.W.2d 614, 618 (1981).
74. See suprm note 10.
75. 1984 Neb. Laws 1060.
76. Sporhase v. Nebraska ex reL Douglas, 458 U.S. 941, 958 (1982).
77. See, e.g., City of El Paso v. Reynolds, 563 F. Supp. 379 (D.N.M. 1983); City of El
Paso v. Reynolds, 597 F. Supp. 694 (D.N.M. 1984).
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the nation, "a federal free trade unit."Ts As Justice Cardozo said in
Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc.,79 "[The Constitution] was framed upon
the theory that the peoples of the several states must sink or swim
together, and that in the long run prosperity and salvation are in
union and not division."8 0
C. Nebraska Statutory Responses to Sporhase
In 1984, the Unicameral amended the groundwater export statute
to respond to the dicta in Sporhase. The section now provides:
The Legislature recognizes and declares that the maintenance of an ade-
quate source of ground water within this state is essential to the social stabil-
ity of the state and the health, safety, and welfare of its citizens and that
reasonable restrictions on the transportation of ground water from this state
are a proper exercise of the police powers of the state. The need for such
restrictions, which protect the health, safety, and general welfare of the citi-
zens of this state, is hereby declared a matter of legislative determination.
Any person, firm, city, village, municipal corporation, or any other entity
intending to withdraw ground water from any well or pit located in the State
of Nebraska and transport it for use in another state shall apply to the Depart-
ment of Water Resources for a permit to do so. In determining whether to
grant such permit, the Director of Water Resources shall consider:
(1) Whether the proposed use is a beneficial use of ground water;
(2) The availability to the applicant of alternative sources of surface or
ground water;
(3) Any negative effect of the proposed withdrawal on surface or ground
water supplies needed to meet reasonable future demands for water in the
area of the proposed withdrawal; and
(4) Any other factors consistent with the purposes of this section that the
director deems relevant to protect the interests of the state and its citizens.
Issuance of a permit shall be conditioned on the applicant's compliance
with the rules and regulations of the natural resources district from which the
water is to be withdrawn. The applicant shall be required to provide access to
his or her property at reasonable times for purposes of inspection by officials
of the local natural resources district or the Department of Water Resources.
The director may include such reasonable conditions on the proposed use
as he or she deems necessary to carry out the purposes of this section.8 1
78. Hood & Sons v. DuMond, 333 U.S. 525, 538 (1949).
79. 294 U.S. 511 (1935).
80. Id. at 523. Before adoption of the Constitution, the united states was a plural
common noun with an exaggerating adjective. Afterwards and henceforth it
would be declared The United States, composite proper noun, capitalized and sin-
gular. HENKIN, The Constitution and Foreign Affairs, in ESSAYS ON THE CONSTI-
TUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 115 (M. Harmon ed. 1978). It is this concept of a
country, rather than a group of separate states divided into different trade areas,
that the Court invokes to nullify state laws that are basically protectionist
measures.
81. 1984 Neb. Laws 1060 (codified at NEB. REV. STAT. § 46-613.01 (1988)). The amend-
ment probably was unnecessary as, under Sporhase, the statute absent the reci-
procity clause likely was constitutional.
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In 1989 Senators Dierks, Lamb and Scofield introduced LB 715.82
LB 715, if enacted, would specify additional criteria for the Director of
Water Resources to consider before granting permission for out of
state transfers of water. Among the additional criteria would be a
mandate to consider future beneficial uses within Nebraska. In addi-
tion, the Director would be required to consider whether the proposed
use is in the public interest. Under the statute, the application is
"deemed in the public interest if the overall benefits to Nebraska are
greater than the adverse impacts to Nebraska and if the granting of
the application will result in positive net economic benefits to
Nebraska."83
Using potential future uses as a factor to be considered before per-
mitting transfers of water out of state is of doubtful constitutionality.
In 1984, the United States Supreme Court considered when future
uses of water can justify restrictions on transfers out of state. In Colo-
rado v. New Mexico 84, Colorado asserted its future need for the waters
of Vermejo River, a small tributary of the Rio Grande, as reason for
restricting water use by downstream New Mexico residents.
In rejecting Colorado's argument, Justice O'Connor, writing for
the majority, commented on what a state needs to show if it wants the
Court to recognize rights based on future uses. While the Court's
analysis was in the context of an equitable apportionment, it seems
that its reasoning will apply similarly in cases involving a Bruce
Church balancing of interests under the Commerce Clause.
First, the state must prove by clear and convincing evidence that it
has settled on a definite, or at least a tentative, plan or design for fu-
ture use. Elaborating, the Court stated that:
[it] may be impracticable to ask the State proposing a diversion to provide
unerring proof of future uses and concomitant conservation measures that
would be taken. But it would be irresponsible of us to apportion water to uses
that have not been, at a minimum, carefully studied and objectively evaluated,
not to mention decided upon. Financially and physically feasible conservation
efforts include careful study of future, as well as prudent implementation of
current, water uses.
8 5
Thus, Nebraska likely could not hold water for future use absent
hard facts, not suppositions or opinions, about future water needs and
supplies. It is our opinion this would require a comprehensive state
plan plus definite policy directives at the state level. In connection
with groundwater, as distinguished from surface waters, Nebraska ex-
ercises too little authority over well users to come even close to prov-
ing by clear and convincing evidence that there is a comprehensive
state plan in place for the use and conservation of groundwater.
82. LB 715, 91st Leg., 1st Sess. (1989).
83. Id. at § 2(4)(g).
84. 467 U.S. 310 (1984).
85. Id. at 320.
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In future cases, the Supreme Court likely will ask far harder ques-
tions that it did several decades ago in evaluating state statutes that
restrict interstate water transfers. Moreover, burdensome state legis-
lation will not be saved by neutral expressions of legislative purpose.
Although state legislation often contains self-serving recitations of
legislative purposes, courts have no obligation to accept those stated
purposes. On the contrary, the position of the Supreme Court is that
it "must determine for itself the practical impact of the law."86
III. WATER, WATER RIGHTS AND WATER TRANSFERS:
STATE POWER AND JURISDICTION AFTER
SPORHASE
A. Water Supplies and Demands
Nebraska is blessed with abundant supplies of fresh water. As re-
ported in the Water and Water Rights Transfer Study,87 Nebraska res-
ervoirs have a storage capacity of over 3.4 million acre feet, average
annual streamflow discharge from the state exceeds seven million
acre feet, and groundwater in storage exceeds two billion acre feet.88
An additional eighty-six million acre feet of water fall on the state
each year as precipitation.8 9
To put these figures into perspective, at current consumption rates,
Nebraska groundwater in storage could supply the supplemental
water needs of the Metropolitan Water District of Southern California
for 2000 years. Average annual streamflow discharge from Nebraska
is approximately equal to the amount of water that the upper basin
states on the Colorado River must supply annually to the thirsty states
of California, Nevada, and Arizona in the lower basin. Enough water
can be stored in Nebraska reservoirs to meet the public water supply
needs of Arizona for seven years. Nebraska is clearly the envy of the
West when it comes to the availability of water. It is not unreasonable
to expect that less fortunate states will cast longing glances at Ne-
braska when it comes time to augment their own local supplies. In
border areas, this has already occurred.9 0 Abundant water supplies
alone, however, are not enough to encourage interstate water trans-
fers. Often, water can only be transferred at great cost, particularly if
the transfer is to a higher elevation. Costs of water transfers were
86. See Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 336 (1979).
87. STATE OF NEBRASKA WATER MANAGEMENT BOARD, REPORT ON THE WATER AND
WATER RIGHTS TRANSFER STUDY 13-18 (1988).
88. Id. at 13-18.
89. Id. at 13.
90. Eleven interstate transfer permits have been issued by the Nebraska Department
of Water Resources.
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studied in the Water and Water Rights Transfer Study.9' The study
demonstrated that economic barriers likely will be a significant deter-
rent to many who might otherwise seek to develop Nebraska water
resources to meet interstate demands.
Although cost is often a significant deterrent to large scale water
transfers, the value of water in use in Nebraska is not a significant
deterrent. Most water used in Nebraska is used for agriculture. Na-
tional studies indicate that for eighty percent of agricultural uses, the
value of water in use does not exceed $40 per acre foot.92 By contrast,
water for household use has been valued at $200 per acre foot and
water for hydroelectric generation has been valued at $600 per acre
foot.93 In water scarce areas, water for recreation has been estimated
to yield benefits of from $700 to $1100 per acre foot.94 Clearly these
values indicate a potential to transfer water out of agriculture and into
more highly valued uses elsewhere if transfer costs are not prohibi-
tive. Even if transfers were costless, however, agriculture would con-
tinue as the most significant user of water in the West, because a ten
percent reduction in agricultural water use could accommodate a one-
hundred percent increase in all other uses.95
B. Surface and Ground Water
All water is part of the hydrologic96 cycle, in which the sun's en-
ergy causes moisture to move from the oceans to the atmosphere, to
the land, and back to the oceans. All water, therefore, is interrelated
and interdependent. 9 7 Its physical state (liquid, solid, or gaseous), as
91. STATE OF NEBRASKA WATER MANAGEMENT BOARD, REPORT ON THE WATER AND
WATER RIGHTS TRANSFER STUDY 30-37 (1988).
92. Young, Local and Regional Economic Impacts, in WATER SCARCITY: IMPACTS ON
WESTERN AGRICULTURE 244 (E. Engelbert with A. Scheuring eds. 1984). An "acre
foot" is the quantity of water required to cover one acre to a depth of one foot; it
is equivalent to 43,560 cubic feet or 325,851 gallons.
93. D. GIBBONS, THE ECONOMIC VALUE OF WATER (1986).
94. Ward, Economics of Water Allocation to Instream Uses in a Fully Appropriated
River Basin: Evidence From a New Mexico Wild River, 23 WATER RESOURCES
RES. 381 (1987).
95. Agriculture accounts for over 90% of the consumptive water use in the western
states, a percentage that has remained fairly constant over time. While urban
users attach a higher value to a small quantity of water than do any other users,
they don't take much water. See M. KELSO, W. MARTIN & L. MACK, WATER SUP-
PLIES AND ECONOMIC GROWTH IN AN ARID ENViRONMENT. AN ARZONA CASE
STUDY 30-32 (1973).
96. In Greek, "hydro" means "water" and "loge" means "knowledge of." Hydrology,
therefore, is the study of water. L. LEOPOLD & W. LANGBEIN, A PRIMER ON
WATER 3 (1960).
97. For a more detailed and comprehensive treatment of the interrelated nature of
all water, and the legal consequences that logically should flow from that interre-
latedness, see R. HARNSBERGER & N. THORSON, NEBRASKA WATER LAW AND AD-
MINISTRATION (1984); H. THOmAS, THE CONSERVATION OF GROUND WATER 247-48
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well as its location, changes as it moves through the cycle. 98
Water is found above, on, or beneath every point on the surface of
the earth. Surface water is all water that is visible on the land-in-
cluding lakes, ponds, and rivers; groundwater, put most simply, is all
water in the land that cannot be seen.
In the early nineteenth century, at the time water law as we still
know it today developed, there was little understanding or informa-
tion regarding the composition and behavior of ground and surface
water. Different rules developed for the legal treatment of ground as
compared to surface water. These different rules make little sense
today, create anomalies in legal results, and hinder efforts for compre-
hensive and concerted water planning and conservation policies.99
A discussion of substantive water law issues and policy is obviously
(1951); Clark, Groundwater Management Law and Local Response, 6 ARIZ. L.
REV. 178, 188 (1965); Piper & Thomas, Hydrology and Water Law: What Is Their
Future Common Ground?, in WATER RESOURCES AND THE LAW 10-11 (1958). For
a discussion of water classifications, see W. HUTCHINS, SELECTED PROBLEMS IN
THE LAW OF WATER RIGHTS IN THE WEST 1 (1942); W. HUTCHINS, 1 WATER RIGHTS
LAws IN THE NINETEEN WESTERN STATES 21-101 (1971); Clark, Plan and Scope of
the Work, in 1 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS § 3 (R. Clark ed. 1967); Davis, Intro-
duction to Water Law of the Eastern States, in 7 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS
§§ 602, 603 (R. Clark ed. 1976); MISSOUR RIVER BASIN COM'N, PLATTE RIVER
BASIN-NEBRASKA LEVEL B. STUDY, LEGAL AND INSTITUTIONAL 7 (March 1975)
(technical paper).
98. In many locations in Nebraska, if groundwater were red, streams would be pink.
Similarly, if groundwater were poisoned, the streams would also be poisoned.
Groundwater in Nebraska, however, percolates slowly, generally moving only
about 300 feet annually. Even in areas of greater groundwater movement, such as
the Frenchman's Creek/Enders Reservoir area near Imperial, groundwater
moves no more than 1300 feet per year and averages only 900 feet per year. In
contrast streamflow down the Platte River moves approximately 25 miles per
day. As a result, when junior headgates are closed at the western border of the
state, water reaches senior users west of Kearney in about ten days. The negligi-
ble movement of groundwater, however, means that it would seldom be feasible
to close junior wells to get water to senior wells, or to a stream, even if Nebraska
adopted a prior appropriation system for groundwater. In contrast to surface
water management which regulates juniors for the benefit of seniors, effective
groundwater reservoir management usually requires that all withdrawals be reg-
ulated to minimize well interference. While lawyers may shut down wells com-
pletely, hydrologists realize it is rarely optimum to do so.
99. R. HARNSBERGER & N. THORSON, NEBRASKA WATER LAW AND ADMINISTRATION 9
(1984):
The scientists' principal point was that because almost all water supplies
are interrelated and interdependent, no one's rights could be adequately
protected when judges pigeonholed water into separate compartments
for decision-making purposes. For instance, vertical withdrawals from
well installations and the interception of runoff by reservoir storage fre-
quently have a seriously detrimental effect on stream flows. Likewise,
horizontal diversions from surface watercourses often result in a slow-
down of natural recharge to groundwater reservoirs. On a larger scale,
weather modification and other interferences with the atmosphere affect
the entire water cycle over vast areas.
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beyond the scope of this Article. We mention the interrelated nature
of water simply to alert policy makers to the parameters of the water
law question that should be kept in mind when devising policy. We
now turn to the situation in Nebraska with regard to groundwater.100
C. The Nature of Water Transfers
In most states, including Nebraska, any change in the place of use
or purpose of use of a water right will be considered a transfer. A
transfer can be temporary or permanent. Water rights from two dif-
ferent sources may be exchanged in whole or in part. The right to use
all or some portion of groundwater may be sold outright or leased.
Major, long distance physical transfers of water are quite likely to in-
volve significant exchanges of water or water rights.
Conceptually, the simplest form of water transfer is to physically
collect water at one point and move it by pipe or canal to another
point. Short-term, seasonal adjustments within an irrigation district
are often of this type.
As an example of a physical transfer of water-and ignoring, for
purposes of the example, legal and institutional barriers to transfers-
suppose the City of Los Angeles wanted to purchase Nebraska ground-
water. Los Angeles could purchase land in the Sandhills, install a well
field, withdraw groundwater, and pump the water uphill and over the
front range of the Rocky Mountains. Once water reached the western
slope, it could be transported by gravity through the extensive system
of reservoirs and canals that are built on the Colorado River system.
Eventually, some fraction of the water pumped from the Sandhills
wells would reach the diversion works of the Metropolitan Water Dis-
trict of Southern California located on the Arizona-California border.
Sandhills water, significantly diminished in volume by evaporation
and seepage, would eventually reach Southern California communi-
ties through a system of canals and aqueducts.
As the above example illustrates, simple transfers by pipe or canal
can be prohibitively expensive. Obviously, the greater the distance
the water is to be transferred, the greater the costs to transfer the
water-especially if the place to which the water is transferred is lo-
cated at a higher elevation than the place of origin. Although there
are notable examples of water being pumped uphill,0 projects involv-
100. The Sporhase decision provides one clear, and certainly pertinent, example of a
case where the interrelated nature of water must be remembered. The facts in
the case related to groundwater, the holding, however, also applies to transfers of
surface water.
101. The Central Arizona Project, for instance, takes water from the Colorado River
and pumps it uphill at extraordinary expense to Phoenix and Tucson. Mega-river
transfers and their effects are considered at some length in HIGH PLAINS ASSOCI-
ATES: CAMP DREssER & McKEE, BLAcK & VEATcH, ARTHUR D. LITTLE INC., Six-
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ing major uphill or long distance transfers are unlikely to be under-
taken without significant public subsidies.
The same Nebraska-Los Angeles water transfer that was described
above also could be accomplished through a system of exchanges that
would involve only minimal physical transport of water. For example,
the Metropolitan Water District of Southern California might agree to
construct a dam on the South Platte River to provide a new source of
drinking water for Denver. In exchange, Denver might agree to re-
duce its transmountain water diversions from the western slope and
transfer unused western slope water rights to Metropolitan. Western
slope water could then flow naturally down the Colorado River Sys-
tem to the California diversion works. Meanwhile, to offset injury
that would otherwise occur to users of Platte River water in Nebraska
as a consequence of Denver's increased use of Platte River water, Met-
ropolitan could install a well field in the Sandhills and pump water
back into the Platte. The effect of such a scheme would be to transfer
Nebraska groundwater to southern California, but the transfer would
be accomplished without any water physically being transported
across the Nebraska state line.
As the ability to accurately model hydrologic systems increases,
transfers by means of such exchanges become technically, if not eco-
nomically, feasible. A legislature seeking to regulate interstate water
transfers therefore must look beyond the regulation of the actual,
physical transfer of water across a state line. Before one can deter-
mine the options that such a legislature might have, however, it is nec-
essary to examine briefly the source of state authority to oversee
water transfers.
In Nebraska, water rights are appurtenant to the land.102 A
change in land ownership automatically results in a transfer of the
water right to the new landowner. Only limited transfers are permit-
ted apart from a sale of land.10s In other states, by contrast, water
rights are granted by permit and the water right transfers when the
permit is transferred. 04 In those states, a sale of land without a sale
of the water right transfers only the land, not the right to use the
water.
Most states favor voluntary reallocation of water and water rights
through a market mechanism, and have statutes in place to regulate
such transfers. 05 All western water transfer statutes (regardless
State High Plains-Ogallala Aquifer Regional Resources Study-A Report to the
U.S. Department of Commerce and the High Plains Study Council (March 1982).
102. NEB. REV. STAT. § 46-122 (1988).
103. See id. §§ 46-290 to 294.
104. Colorado, for instance, treats water rights as vested property rights which may be
transferred and conveyed in the same manner as other property rights.
105. For example, CAL. WATER CODE § 109(a)(West 1971) states that it is "the estab-
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whether the particular state transfers water by permit or with the
land) contain similar, though not identical, provisions. 06 Transfers
are subject to review by a state agency. An applicant for a transfer
must demonstrate that the amount of water use after transfer will be
no greater than the amount that has been used historically, that the
transfer will not harm existing users, and that the transfer is in the
public interest. Notice of a proposed transfer must be given to the
public so that interested parties can appear and protest the application
for transfer.10 7
D. Authority of the State to Oversee Interstate Transfers of Water
Whether interstate water transfers are viewed as a threat or as an
opportunity, nearly everyone would agree that such transfers should
not occur without state oversight. But what is the source of the state's
authority to regulate or oversee water transfers? In Sporhase v. Ne-
braska ex reL Douglas,s0 8 the United States Supreme Court rejected
the contention that Nebraska held groundwater in trust for the public
as reason to exclude groundwater exports from Commerce Clause
scrutiny. For the Court, state ownership was a legal fiction that re-
flected the importance of water to public welfare. At the same time,
however, the Court acknowledged that Nebraska's assertion of public
trust values gave it a heightened police power, or regulatory interest,
in water resources. One effect of Sporhase, then, is to raise again the
question of who "owns" or "controls" water in Nebraska. That is an
extraordinarily complex question.
1. Water as Property of the State
Was the Supreme Court in Sporhase correct in concluding that
public ownership of water is a legal fiction? Or does the state of Ne-
braska "own" water found within its borders in the same manner that
a landowner "owns" land? The question can be answered best by at-
tempting to trace title to water from the time that the geographical
area that is now Nebraska came under the jurisdiction of the United
States.
The land that became Nebraska was part of the Louisiana
lished policy of this state to facilitate the voluntary transfer of water and water
rights where consistent with the public welfare of the place of export and the
place of import." See also Gray, California Water Transfers Law, 31 ARIZ. L.
Rav. 745 (1989).
106. See generally Colby, McGinnis & Rait, Procedural Aspects of State Water Law:
Transferring Water Rights in the Western States, 31 ARIz. L. REV. 697 (1989).
107. In most states, protesters, who must themselves hold water rights, bear the bur-
den of proving that they will be harmed by the transfer. If the applicant and the
protesters cannot reach a mutually acceptable agreement, a hearing is held and a
state administrator issues a ruling. The ruling is subject to judicial review.
108. 458 U.S. 941 (1982).
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Purchase. When the treaty with France was signed in 1803,109 the fed-
eral government acquired title to all of the Louisiana territory, subject
to prior grants made by France and Spain,11 0 and subject to Indian
rights of occupancy. 111 When Nebraska was admitted to the Union in
1867, most land and water found within the state remained part of the
public domain and subject to the land disposition laws of the United
States. The state of Nebraska received only certain enumerated sec-
tions of land described in the Nebraska Enabling Act,112 and those sec-
tions of land were dedicated to particular purposes. Under the equal
footing doctrine,1 1 3 the state also received title to the bed and banks of
streams that were navigable in fact in 1867.114 But the vast bulk of
land and water found within the borders of Nebraska remained prop-
erty of the United States to be disposed of under a variety of federal
disposition laws, most notably the Homestead Act of 1862.115 Quite
clearly, the source of Nebraska's power to define and delimit water
rights cannot be derived from its title to water because, for the most
109. The United States Constitution does not authorize the acquisition of land, but it
does authorize the making of treaties. U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. Conse-
quently, in an attempt to avoid questions of constitutional authority to purchase
land, President Jefferson entered into a treaty with France on April 30, 1803.
The treaty was approved by the Senate on Oct. 17, 1803, and the United States
took possession of the vast Louisiana territory on December 20 of the same year.
110. The Louisiana territory was claimed by Spain until 1801 when it was transferred
to France in the secret Treaty of San Ildefonso. As a matter of international law,
a change in sovereigns has no affect on title to land that is held in private hands.
Thus, private land transfers that occurred prior to 1803 were respected by the
United States.
111. The right of native peoples to occupy acquired territory was recognized by the
United States Supreme Court in Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. 543 (1823), giving
rise to a unique form of property known as Indian title. See generally F. COHEN,
HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAw 486-93 (1982). Consequently, Indian claims
of occupancy had to be extinguished by treaty or conquest before the United
States acquired clear title to the land that was part of the Louisiana purchase.
112. Enabling Act of Congress, 13 Stat. 47 (1864). Sections 16 and 36 in every Ne-
braska township were granted to the state for support of the common schools.
The Act also granted Nebraska 20 sections of land for the purpose of erecting
public buildings in the state capital, 50 sections to support a penitentiary, and 80
sections to support a state university.
113. Article IV, section 3, clause 1 of the Constitution gives Congress power to admit
new states into the union. Most acts of admission declare that new states are
admitted "on an equal footing with the original States in all respects whatsoever."
In Coyle v. Oklahoma, 221 U.S. 559 (1911), the Supreme Court explained that
each new state was to be equal in power, dignity and authority with the original
thirteen states.
114. Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U.S. 212 (1845). The original 13 colonies held title to the bed
and banks of navigable waters as successors to the Crown of England. The Eng-
lish Crown, from the time of Magna Carta, had held such lands not in proprietary
capacity, but in trust for its subjects.
115. 43 U.S.C. § 161 (repealed 1976).
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part, Nebraska never received "title" to water from the federal
government.
2. Water Rights as Creatures of State Law
Although states do not "own" water in a conventional sense, they
regularly invoke their police powers1 6 to define the nature of private
water rights. They also use their police powers to regulate water use
by individuals who possess valid water rights. In developing state
water law, courts and legislatures have long struggled to reconcile the
fact that water is private property with the fact that water serves
many public uses. Whether because it is necessary for survival, or per-
haps because it serves so many diverse uses, water has always received
unique treatment in the law. This unique treatment results from state
use of the police power to strike the balance between public and pri-
vate rights to use water. That power remains even if the Sporhase
court was correct in describing "public ownership" as a legal fiction.
As described above, when Nebraska became a state, most of the
water and land found within the new state was retained as federal
public land. A series of federal statutes"17 and a definitive Supreme
Court ruling,s8 however, eventually established that by 1877, if not
before, water rights had been severed from land ownership on the
public domain.119 In other words, landowners who acquired federal
land patents after 1877 (or possibly earlier) acquired land only. They
did not acquire any federal water rights. As individuals began to use
water in the western states, they did so at the sufferance of the federal
government which retained a residual proprietary interest in the wa-
ters. As states acted to control water use by individuals, they also ac-
ted at federal sufferance. The end result, however, was that private
individuals looked to state law, not to federal law, to determine the
scope of their water rights. For our purposes, a potential interstate
transporter of water also must look to state law to determine what it is
that potentially is subject to transfer.
3. The Regulation of Water Use
In addition to the power to create private water rights, a power
derived from Congressional acquiescence, states have the power to
regulate the use of water by private individuals who possess water
116. The police power is the inherent power of a state to enact legislation concerning
the health, safety, peace, good order, morals, and general well being of the com-
munity. It is, in short, the power to regulate within the bounds established by
state and federal constitutions.
117. Act of July 26, 1866 (codified at 43 U.S.C. § 661); Act of July 9, 1870 (codified at 43
U.S.C. § 661); Desert Land Act of March 3, 1877 (codified at 43 U.S.C. §§ 321-29).
118. See California Or. Power Co. v. Beaver Portland Cement Co., 295 U.S. 142 (1935).
119. The principal case and the relevant statutes are discussed in the context of Ne-
braska law in R. HARNSBERGER & N. THORSON, supra note 2, at § 3.25 (1984).
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rights. Rights to use surface water and groundwater have long been
regulated. Common law courts in England and America, in accord
with civil law precedents, consistently held that water could not be
monopolized.120 Riparian landowners'21 were entitled to use a reason-
able share of the flow and, except for permitted diversions to meet
domestic uses, were to leave the stream undiminished in quantity or
quality;12 2 groundwater users were subject to a prohibition against ma-
licious use.123
Another characteristic of water rights is that they are subject to
redefinition as the state exercises its regulatory powers to respond to
increasing demands for the resource.1 2 4 As a consequence, the study
of water rights is the study of change. 25
4. Groundwater Rights in Nebraska
Groundwater is a common pool resource. Except in unusual cir-
cumstances, no single person is in a position to monopolize and control
a distinct source of groundwater supply.1 26 Consequently, when one
person withdraws water from the common pool, the amount of water
available for others whose land overlies the pool is diminished.127 Be-
120. See, e.g., Tyler v. Wilkinson, 24 F. Cas. 472 (C.C.D.R.I. 1827) (No. 14,312); Mason v.
Hill, 110 Eng. Rep. 692 (1833). See also Wiel, Waters: American Law and French
Authority, 33 HARv. L. REV. 133 (1919). But see Maass & Zobel, Anglo-American
Water Law: Who Appropriated the Riparian Doctrine?, 10 PUB. POL. 109 (1960).
121. At common law, a landowner who owned land abutting a stream acquired what
are called riparian water rights. Water acquired as part of a riparian right gener-
ally could not be used on land that did not abut the stream, nor could such water
be transferred out of the watershed. Annotation, Transfer of Riparian Rights to
Use Water to Nonriparian Land, 14 A.L.R. 330 (1921); R. HARNSBERGER & N.
THORSON, supra note 2, at 35-36 (1984). In Hudson County Water Co. v. Mc-
Carter, 209 U.S. 349 (1908), Justice Holmes noted that lower court opinions had
rested on the rule that a riparian owner has no right to divert waters for more
than a reasonable distance from the body of the stream, or for other than well-
known ordinary purposes, or in excess of a narrowly limited amount.
122. See generally R. HARNSBERGER & N. THORSON, supra note 2, at § 2.01 (historical
background of the riparian doctrine in the United States).
123. See, e.g., Greenleaf v. Francis, 35 Mass. 117 (1836).
124. For example, the riparian "natural flow" doctrine gave way to the doctrine of
"reasonable use," riparianism in the West gave way to prior appropriation, and
state constitutional diversion requirements were ignored to facilitate instream
flow appropriations. More recently, states have asserted the right to reallocate
water rights pursuant to public trust servitudes. E.g., National Audubon Soc'y v.
Superior Court of Alpine County, 33 Cal. 3d 419, 189 Cal.Rptr. 346, 658 P.2d 709,
cer denied, 464 U.S. 977 (1983).
125. As a corollary matter, states have great latitude to modify existing water rights
law without offending state and federal constitutional provisions that protect pri-
vate property. Thus, for example, states likely can restrict the amount of water
that can be pumped from a groundwater well, or the amount of surface water
that can be applied to an acre of land, without raising constitutional objections.
126. Nebraska's principal aquifer, the Ogallala, underlies parts of six states.
127. Groundwater pumping impacts other users in two distinct ways. In a highly lo-
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cause all withdrawals from a common pool are interconnected, it is
difficult to establish legal rules that govern such withdrawals. It is
even more difficult to derive a "groundwater property right" from the
rules that have been established.
As noted above, landowners in Nebraska acquire rights to use
groundwater by virtue of their ownership of land overlying an aquifer.
The right to withdraw groundwater is not absolute but is subject to
reasonable regulation under the state's police power. In areas of de-
clining groundwater tables, groundwater use can be significantly re-
stricted by state regulation under the Nebraska Groundwater
Management and Protection Act.128
To illustrate what rights a landowner currently has to the use of
groundwater, consider the following examples. First, most obviously,
a landowner may use groundwater as necessary for beneficial pur-
poses on his land. Second, less obviously, a landowner may use that
same amount of groundwater on land other than his overlying land so
long as no one is injured by the use. Third, although not specifically
authorized by statute,12 9 a landowner might transfer his right to use
groundwater to another. In most states, statutes specifically authorize
sale or lease of groundwater. In the absence of statutory authority a
Nebraska landowner who wanted to sell groundwater would likely
give the buyer easements to install new wells and a covenant not to
sue for any loss of water withdrawn from under his land. If the buyer
got similar covenants from all those claiming an interest in the under-
ground reservoir, an effective transfer would occur, albeit without a
direct sale of water.
The evolution of groundwater property rights in Nebraska has
been extensively documented previously and will not be repeated
here.1 3o Three points, however, should be emphasized. First, an over-
lying landowner's right to withdraw water is limited to the amount of
water that can be applied to reasonable and beneficial use on land that
he owns.1 31 Second, if the supply of available water is insufficient for
all users, each is entitled to a reasonable share of the whole. 32 Third,
calized setting, the cone of depression of two wells may intersect, causing at least
one of the wells to lose pumping capacity. This is known as a well interference
problem. Long term impacts of pumping, felt over a larger area, take the form of
reduced lift as the groundwater table is lowered. Water, while it may be physi-
cally present, can be withdrawn only at higher cost. Since early pumpers get
maximum lift advantage, an economic incentive exists to overpump the aquifer.
128. NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 46-656 to 674 (1988).
129. Compare with NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 46-290 to 294 (authorizing limited transfers of
surface water rights).
130. See R. HARNSBERGER & N. THORSON, supra note 2, at §§ 5.01-5.10 and authorities
cited therein.




given Congressional acquiescence in state water law, Nebraska
groundwater prior to capture is subject to complete plenary control of
the state. 3 3
E. Constitutional Protection for Private Water Rights
The United States Constitution limits the extent to which a state
can interfere with private property rights. This limitation may take
the form of requiring that property not be taken without due process
of law,134 requiring that just compensation be paid for any property
that is properly taken, 3 5 or prohibiting a state from discriminating
against the movement of items of property in interstate commerce. 13
6
At the same time, the state has a strong interest in regulating the use
of property. From a constitutional perspective, all property rights-in
water, corn, or automobiles, for example-have the same status. In
fact, however, rights to natural resources, and especially rights to
water, may appear to be given less constitutional protection than other
property rights. Not only does language in judicial opinions fre-
quently wax eloquent regarding a state's interest in controlling the
disposition of water, 3 7 but courts have regularly approved major mod-
ifications to water rights allocation schemes, only rarely sustaining
133. According to case law, prior to capture, landowners in Nebraska have no private
property interest in underlying groundwater. NEB. REV. STAT. § 46-656 (1988),
however, provides that "[elvery landowner shall be entitled to a reasonable and
beneficial use of the ground water underlying his or her land subject to the provi-
sions of Chapter 46, article 6, and the correlative rights of other landowners when
the groundwater supply is insufficient for all users." Although it could be argued
that the statute vests a groundwater property right in overlying landowners, a
better reading of the provision is that it merely expresses current legislative pol-
icy, a policy that is subject to change as conditions merit. Consequently, the legis-
lature probably could prohibit new wells from being drilled if conditions
warranted.
134. "No person shall ... be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law," U.S. CONST. amend. V, cl. 3, "nor shall any State deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law", U.S. CONST. amend. XIV,
§ 1, cl. 3.
135. "[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation,"
U.S. CONST. amend. V, cl. 4.
136. See generally Part IV, infra.
137. In Hudson County, Justice Holmes said:
[Few public interests are more obvious, indisputable and independent of
particular theory than the interest of the public of a State to maintain
the rivers that are wholly within it substantially undiminished, except
by such drafts upon them as the guardian of the public welfare may per-
mit for the purpose of turning them to a more perfect use. This public
interest is omnipresent wherever there is a State, and grows more press-
ing as population grows.... The private right to appropriate is subject
not only to the rights of lower owners but to the initial limitation that it
may not substantially diminish one of the great foundations of public
welfare and health.
209 U.S. 349, 356 (1908).
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constitutional challenges. 3 8
On close observation, however, judicial acquiescence in changed
water allocations is not evidence of a unique constitutional status for
water as property, but merely a reflection of the unique way in which
water rights are defined. Water rights normally are usufructuaryL3 9
and subject to some notion of "public trust."140 Moreover, many water
rights are conferred by permit, and hence, are subject to permit condi-
tions.141 Whether or not water has a unique constitutional status, one
thing is clear: states have great latitude in regulating water use and
redefining water rights.
F. Congressional Power to Regulate Groundwater Use in the United
States
1. Sources of Federal Power
As a matter of constitutional power, Congress has clear authority
to regulate groundwater use in the United States. In fact, the consti-
tutional scope of federal power probably allows Congress to allocate
groundwater supplies among states or even among individuals within
states.142 The source of federal power to regulate or allocate ground-
water resources is derived by implication from several sections of the
United States Constitution,143 including, among others, the Commerce
Clause,144 the Treaty Clause,145 the Taxing and Spending Clause,14
6
138. For example, the abolition of riparian rights in favor of appropriative rights has
regularly been sustained. E.g., Town of Chino Valley v. City of Prescott, 131 Ariz.
78, 638 P.2d 1324, appeal dismissed, 457 U.S. 1101 (1982); In re Waters of Long
Valley Creek Stream System, 25 Cal.3d 339, 158 Cal. Rptr. 350, 599 P.2d 656
(1979). See also R. HARNSBERGER & N. THORSON, supra note 2, at §§ 3.29-3.30
(1984).
139. Describing a water right as usufructuary means that normally a water right gives
its holder only a right to use water, not a right to possess water without use. Set
also note 69, supra.
140. Public trust literature is extensive. The seminal article is Sax, The Public Trust
Doctrine in Natural Resources Law: Effective Judicial Intervention, 68 MICH. L.
REv. 471 (1970). The origins of the doctrine are discussed and its application to
Nebraska law is assessed in R. HARNSBERGER & N. THORSON, supra note 2, at
§§ 6.09 to 6.11. See also J. SAX, DEFENDING THE ENVIRONMENT at 158-74 (1971).
141. Rights to appropriate surface waters in Nebraska are granted by permit. See gen-
erally NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 46-201 to 46-2,119 (1988). In most western states, per-
mits are also required to withdraw groundwater.
142. In important dictum in Sporhase, the Supreme Court of the United States reaf-
firmed leadership of the states in the area of water resources administration
while going out of its way to make clear that no constitutional obstacles prevent
federal preemption of groundwater management.
143. These grants of federal power are expanded by the Necessary and Proper Clause:
"The Congress shall have Power... [t]o make all laws which shall be necessary
and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Pow-
ers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any
Department or Officer thereof." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
144. "The Congress shall have power to... regulate commerce with foreign nations,
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the Property Clause,147 and the Jurisdiction Clause.148 Moreover, to
the extent that Congress exercises one of its enumerated powers, fed-
eral law preempts any inconsistent state law under the Supremacy
Clause.149
Although Congress has the power to regulate the use of water re-
sources, this power has little to do with the question of "ownership" of
the water. The real question is what governmental entity, if any, has
the authority to regulate water use. The answer to that question is
deceptively simple. With the following two caveats, a state may regu-
late use (and hence allocation) of water in any manner that it sees fit:
and among the several States, and with the Indian tribes .... " U.S. CONST. art. I,
§ 8, cl. 3. The Commerce Clause is the basic source of federal authority over navi-
gable waters. United States v. Appalachian Elec. Power Co., 311 U.S. 377 (1940).
Commerce Clause jurisprudence extends federal power far beyond traditional
notions of navigability, however. In United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes,
Inc., 474 U.S. 121 (1985), the Supreme Court sustained a Corps of Engineers regu-
lation that gave the Corps jurisdiction over any land that supports plant life
adapted to saturated soil conditions.
145. "The President... shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the
Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur
.... " U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. The treaty power has been cited as authority
for the United States to authorize improvements on international waterways.
Arizona v. California, 283 U.S. 423 (1931). The federal government has full power
to act to prevent a state from interfering with a treaty obligation. Sanitary Dist.
of Chicago v. United States, 266 U.S. 405 (1925).
146. "The Congress shall have Power to lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts, and
Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defense and general Wel-
fare of the United States...." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. The Central Valley
Project in California was sustained under this power. United States v. Gerlach
Live Stock Co., 339 U.S. 725 (1950).
147. "The Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and
Regulations respecting the territory or other property belonging to the United
States .... " U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2. The Property Clause underlies the
system of federal reserved water rights, Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 597-98
(1963), decree entered, 376 U.S. 340 (1964), and has been cited as the source of
authority for the federal government to produce and market hydroelectric power
at federal dams. Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288 (1936).
148. "The Congress shall have Power . .. [t]o exercise exclusive Legislation in all
Cases whatsoever, over such District... as may... become the Seat of the Gov-
ernment of the United States, and to exercise like Authority over all Places
purchased by the Consent of the Legislature of the State in which the Same shall
be, for the Erection of Forts, Magazines, Arsenals, Dock Yards, and other needful
Buildings...." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 17. Although the federal government
can acquire exclusive jurisdiction over an area by complying with the Jurisdiction
Clause, negotiated adjustments in jurisdiction are more common. See, e.g., Col-
lins v. Yosemite Park & Curry Co., 304 U.S. 518 (1938).
149. "This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in
pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Au-
thority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the
Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any thing in the Constitution or
Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding." U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
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(1) A state may not, in the guise of regulation, destroy constitutionally
vested rights without paying just compensation for the rights destroyed; and
(2) If a state pursues policies that are inconsistent with federal law or
policies, federal law will prevail.' 5 0
Of course the mere existence of federal legislative power does not
mean that Congress will decide to exercise that power. With respect
to the direct allocation of water generally, and particularly with re-
spect to the allocation of groundwater, Congress has traditionally de-
ferred to the states. In fact, in Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel. Douglasl5
the United States Supreme Court referenced some thirty-seven stat-
utes and interstate compacts that stood as examples of instances in
which Congress had explicitly deferred to state water law.152
Congressional reluctance to exercise its power with respect to
groundwater allocation decisions appears to be the result of a general
notion that groundwater is a resource of highly localized value.
Although most groundwater in storage moves through the soil, the
rate of movement typically is measured in feet per year. Thus, a sup-
ply of groundwater has some intrinsic linkage to the soil. Similarly,
high costs of transportation have meant that groundwater is most
likely to be used in the area where it is found, another factor favoring
local decisionmaking.
Congressional reluctance to act might change with the growing
awareness that the wider impacts of groundwater use may have been
underestimated. Only recently, for example, has the hydrologic
linkage between groundwater and surface water been fully appreci-
ated. In many instances, groundwater use in one location may affect
the long-term yield of an aquifer in another location or may affect the
flow of surface water in hydrologically linked streams. Similarly, pol-
lution of an aquifer over time may result in pollution of groundwater
in a relatively widespread area-a matter of particular concern given
the important contribution that groundwater makes to the nation's
drinking water supplies.153 Moreover, as transfers of water and water
150. The ultimate criterion for determining whether a particular state law has been
preempted is the intent of Congress. Congress may, of course, preempt state au-
thority by saying so in express terms. Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519
(1977). Even where state law has not been totally displaced by federal law, state
law will be preempted to the extent that it actually conflicts with federal law.
Such conflicts arise when "compliance with both federal and state regulations is a
physical impossibility," Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S.
132, 142-43 (1963), or where state law "stands as an obstacle to the accomplish-
ment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress." Hines v.
Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941).
151. 458 U.S. 941 (1982).
152. Id. at 958-59.
153. All but five of Nebraska's municipal and rural water delivery systems rely on
groundwater as the source of water supply. NEBRASKA NATURAL RESoURcES
COMMISSION, MUNICIPAL WATER NEEDS at 4-1 (1983).
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rights become more common, groundwater supplies increasingly may
be viewed as ways of augmenting depleted downstream surface water
supplies.154
Surface water allocation and use decisions are already influenced
significantly by a wide range of federal laws. Growing recognition
that groundwater use decisions also have effects that extend beyond
the immediate vicinity of the use undoubtedly increases the likelihood
of future federal actions that will similarly affect groundwater alloca-
tions and uses. To a limited extent federal activity already has
commenced.155
While Congress has the power to establish a national water re-
source policy, it also has the power to authorize certain kinds of state
regulation that, absent Congressional approval, would fall before a
Commerce Clause challenge. Congress could, for instance, give states
the power to prohibit transfers of water out of state. Or, stopping
short of permitting such outright prohibition, Congress might author-
ize states to adopt water transfer policies that are suspect under
Sporhase. As long as Congressional intent to authorize the state con-
duct is clear, such statutes would be effective to circumvent the
prohibitions of the Commerce Clause.
2. De Facto Allocations of Water Pursuant to Federal Law
While Congress generally has not acted directly to allocate water
resources among states or individuals,156 a number of federal statutes
result in de facto allocations, particularly of surface water supplies.
Among the most important of these statutes are the Endangered Spe-
cies Act,157 the Federal Power Act,158 the National Environmental
Policy Act,' 59 the Clean Water Act,160 the Wild and Scenic Rivers
Act,'61 the Wilderness Act,162 and the conservation features of federal
154. See, e.g., Templeton v. Pecos Valley Artesian Conservancy Dist., 65 N.M. 59, 332
P.2d 465 (1958).
155. The Safe Drinking Water Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-523, 88 Stat. 1660 (codified at
42 U.S.C. §§ 300f to 300j-10 (1988)), was passed in response to a growing awareness
of health problems associated with drinking water contamination. The Act ap-
plies to almost all of the nation's public water systems and provides special pro-
tection for groundwater quality. Among other things, the Act authorizes the
Environmental Protection Agency to set end-of-pipe standards for public drink-
ing water systems, to set standards for state underground waste injection control
programs, and to designate "sole source aquifers."
156. The single exception is the congressional allocation of Colorado River water
among Colorado River basin states pursuant to the Boulder Canyon Project Act,
Pub. L. No. 642, 45 Stat. 1057 (1928)(codified at 43 U.S.C. §§ 617-617t (1988)).
157. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531 to 1544 (1988).
158. 16 U.S.C. §§ 791 to 828 (1988).
159. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321 to 4370a (1988).
160. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251 to 1387 (1988).
161. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1271 to 1287 (1988).
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farm programs.1 63 Each of these statutes affects water use decisions in
a way that limits the freedom that a state otherwise would have to
dispose of water resources found within its borders. These statutes
affect water allocation decisions indirectly by (1) imposing planning
obligations; (2) establishing special obligations with respect to "critical
areas"; (3) mandating the allocation of water to "noneconomic" uses as
a condition to receiving a required permit or license; or (4) requiring
that water supplies be set aside to insure that preferred uses always
are satisfied. In all cases these statutes operate to increase the cost of
allocating water to new uses that are not favored uses within the par-
ticular statutory scheme.164
a. Statutes That Impose Planning Obligations
The archetypal federal planning statute is the National Environ-
mental Policy Act (NEPA).165 NEPA is at heart a federal environ-
mental full disclosure act. It is designed not to dictate any particular
course of action but to ensure that federal decisionmakers will ac-
knowledge and consider the environmental impacts of their actions.
NEPA's procedural requirements do not apply to all actions, or even
to all federal actions, but only to major federal actions that have a
significant impact on the quality of the human environment.1 6 6 On
their face, planning statutes like NEPA have nothing to do with the
allocation of water. On the other hand, many major water resource
use projects use federal financing or require federal permits or
licenses that trigger review under NEPA. Similarly, in states that
have their own NEPA-type statutes, review can be triggered by state
funding or permitting.
Once a NEPA review is triggered, the action agency must prepare a
detailed statement, known as an environmental impact statement
(EIS), that considers the impacts of the proposed actions, alternatives
to the proposed action, and the impacts of alternatives. The goal of an
EIS is to give the decisionmaker the information that he or she needs
to weigh the environmental costs of a proposed action against the
162. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1131 to 1136 (1988).
163. In 1985, Congress attempted to reduce the economic incentives to convert envi-
ronmentally sensitive lands into cropland by denying certain USDA farm pro-
gram benefits to farmers who produce crops on highly erodible land or on
wetlands. Food Security Act of 1985, 16 U.S.C. § 3801.
164. The federal statutes also suggest how states might indirectly impact intrastate
and interstate water use decisions and transfers in a way that minimizes the
chances of constitutional infirmities.
165. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321 to 4370a (1988).
166. National Environmental Policy Act § 102(2)(C), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C)(1988).
Many states have similar statutes that impose planning obligations on state deci-
sionmakers. E.g., California Environmental Quality Act, Cal. Pub. Res. Code
§§ 21000 to 21176 (West 1986).
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traditional economic benefits of a proposed action. In addition to pro-
viding additional information to decisionmakers and members of the
public, NEPA-type planning statutes increase the cost, often signifi-
cantly, of actions whose scope triggers planning review.
b. Statutes That Protect Critical Areas
Federal statutory provisions designed to protect environmentally
sensitive or "critical" areas include the application of "dredge and fill"
permit requirements to jurisdictional wetlands under section 404 of
the Clean Water Act,16 7 "sodbuster" and "swampbuster" provisions of
the federal farm programs, 68 and the "wellhead protection area" pro-
visions of the Safe Drinking Water Act.169 These statutes are aimed
directly at regulating land use, not water use decisions, but they neces-
sarily affect water use decisions. Each of the statutes contains criteria
for identifying critical areas that are the object of special protection.170
Critical area statutes operate to discourage land uses, and attend-
ant water uses, that are inconsistent with preserving the areas.' 7 ' Ex-
treme forms of critical area statutes include the Wilderness Act' 72 and
the "wild river" provisions of the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act. 73
These statutes go beyond discouraging activities that affect critical ar-
eas and instead prohibit any actions that are inconsistent with the
preservation goals of the statutes.
167. Clean Water Act § 404, 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (1988).
168. 16 U.S.C. § 3801 (1988).
169. 42 U.S.C. § 300h-7 (1988).
170. Examples of such criteria include:
(1) "Wetlands" defined to include all lands that support "vegetation
typically adapted for life in saturated soil conditions." 33 C.F.R.
§ 328.3(b) (1991).
(2) "Highly erodible land," defined in relation to soil type and slope of a
land parcel. 7 C.F.R. § 12.21 (1991).
(3) "Wellhead protection area," the surface and subsurface area sur-
rounding a public water supply wellfield through which contaminants
could move toward and reach the wells, defined in relation to the radius
of influence around the wellfield, the depth of drawdown of the water
table, the travel time of various contaminants through the soil, and other
factors. See 42 U.S.C. § 300h-7(e)(1988).
171. By discouraging intensive land use in environmentally sensitive areas, such stat-
utes often reduce local demands for water. Occasionally, such statutes operate to
effectively reserve some minimum supply of water in support of the desired land
use.
172. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1131 to 1136 (1988).
173. Pristine wild rivers, defined at 16 U.S.C. § 1273(b)(1)(1988), are given maximum
protection under the Act. See id. § 1280(a)(iii). Any designation under the Act,
however, operates to forbid any federal activities that would threaten the free
flowing condition of the river. Id. § 1278(a).
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c. Statutes That Allocate Water to "Noneconomic" Uses
The Federal Power Act' 74 gives the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission (FERC) broad authority to license and regulate hydro-
power facilities constructed on navigable waters of the United States.
Although section 27 of the Act contains a savings clause that preserves
state water rights law,'75 Congress in 1986 significantly curtailed the
effect of the savings clause and elevated consideration of environmen-
tal values in licensing and relicensing decisions.176 FERC now re-
quires its licensees to provide water to meet instream flow needs based
on the recommendations of state and federal fish and wildlife agen-
cies. Releases are required as a license condition even if state water
rights are adversely affected by the releases.177 Thus, traditional users
now are required to provide water for public uses if they wish to con-
tinue their private use.
d. Statutes That Allocate Water to Preferred Uses
The federal statute with the greatest potential to directly affect
water use and allocation decisions is the Endangered Species Act
(ESA).178 The ESA prohibits federal agencies from doing anything
that might jeopardize the continued existence of an endangered or
threatened species.179 In fact, federal agencies are under an affirma-
174. 16 U.S.C. §§ 791 to 828c (1988).
175. 16 U.S.C. § 821 (1988) provides that "[n]othing contained in this chapter shall be
construed as affecting or intending to affect or in any way to interfere with the
laws of the respective States relating to the control, appropriation, use, or distri-
bution of water used in irrigation or for municipal or other uses, or any vested
right acquired therein."
176. Federal Electric Consumers Protection Act, Pub. L. 99-495, 100 Stat. 1243 (1986).
Most Federal Energy Regulatory Commission licenses expire after 50 years and
must be renewed. Hundreds of projects licensed during the early days of the Fed-
eral Power Act are now facing relicensing.
177. Recently, the United States Supreme Court seemingly reaffirmed federal pre-
emption of inconsistent state law under the Federal Power Act without clearly
resolving the question of the degree to which state water rights could be affected
without triggering a constitutional compensation requirement. California v. Fed.
Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 495 U.S. 490 (1990).
178. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531 to 1544 (1988). Nebraska has a state counterpart to the federal
Endangered Species Act. See Nebraska Nongame and Endangered Species Con-
servation Act, NEB. REv. STAT. §§ 37-430 to 438 (1988). For a discussion of the
application of the Nebraska Act to a proposed interbasin water transfer, see
Little Blue N.R.D. v. Lower Platte North N.R.D., 210 Neb. 862, 317 N.W.2d 726
(1982). See also a. HARNSBFRGER & N. THORSON, supra note 2, at § 7.14 (1984).
179. One would be hard pressed to find a statutory provision whose terms
were any plainer than those in § 7 of the Endangered Species Act. Its
very words affirmatively command all federal agencies 'to insure that
actions authorized, funded, or carried out by them do not jeopardize the
continued existence' of an endangered species or 'result in the destruc-
tion or modification of habitat of such species .... ' ... This language
admits of no exceptions.
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tive duty to do all that they can to insure the continued existence of
the species 8 0. Section 7 of the ESA can be invoked to thwart any ac-
tivity that adversely affects an endangered species, provided the fed-
eral government has control of the activity.
Section 9 of the ESA potentially has even broader impact. It pro-
hibits any personL8 ' from "taking" an endangered species. "Take" is
defined to mean "harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap,
capture, or collect, or to attempt to engage in any such conduct."18 2
Large scale groundwater withdrawals as might be contemplated in
major interstate water transfer schemes have the potential to affect
surface water flows and reduce groundwater levels to the point where
significant habitat changes might occur. If the changed habitat ad-
versely affects an endangered species, the project normally cannot go
forward unless the adverse impact is avoided. 8 3 Often, a potential ad-
verse impact on an endangered species might be discovered because of
studies required by planning statutes such as NEPA. Once an adverse
impact is demonstrated, the Endangered Species Act requires substan-
tive alterations or revisions to the proposal.
G. Allocation of Water Among States
A state's police power is a fundamental part of a state's sover-
eignty. States invoke their police powers when they adopt rules gov-
erning the use and allocation of water. 8 4 When an interstate resource
is subject to the regulatory authority of several states, however, una-
voidable conflicts arise. Historically, three means have been used to
resolve water disputes that arise among states: interstate compacts;
congressional allocation; and equitable apportionment. While each
method of resolving interstate disputes will be briefly reviewed below,
it is important to note that interstate allocations have very little to do
with interstate transfers by private users. A Supreme Court equitable
Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 173 (1978)(emphasis in original).
180. "It is further declared to be the policy of Congress that all Federal departments
and agencies shall seek to conserve endangered species and threatened species
and shall utilize their authorities in furtherance of the purposes of this chapter."
Endangered Species Act § 2(c)(1), 16 U.S.C. § 1531(c)(1)(1988).
181. The term 'person' means an individual, corporation, partnership, trust,
association, or any other private entity; or any officer, employee, agent,
department, or instrumentality of the Federal Government, of any State,
municipality, or political subdivision of a State, or of any foreign govern-
ment; any State, municipality, or political subdivision of a state; or any
other entity subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.
Endangered Species Act § 3, 16 U.S.C. § 1532(13)(1988).
182. Id. § 3, 16 U.S.C. § 1532(19)(1988).
183. Limited exemptions are authorized under the Act. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 1536(e)-(p)
(1988).
184. Congressional acquiescence is a condition of a state's exercise of its police power
over water; to date the Congress has acquiesced.
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apportionment decree, for instance, might restrain an upstream state
from exercising its regulatory powers in a manner that would deny a
downstream state some specified flow of water in an interstate stream.
While the decree would effectively allocate to a state a share of the use
of the stream, it normally would not address how a state might further
divide use of its particular allocation. Once a state transfers a portion
of the state allocation to individual users, additional state regulation of
transfers is subject to Commerce Clause scrutiny.
1. Equitable Apportionment
The doctrine of equitable apportionment is used by the United
States Supreme Court to allocate interstate streams among states
when the flow of water is insufficient to satisfy all prospective uses.1 85
An equitable apportionment action is filed by one state against an-
other state in the United States Supreme Court. The case normally
will be assigned to a "special master" to build a factual record and
recommend disposition of the case.
The governing principle of equitable apportionment is equality of
right, not equality of amounts apportioned. Factors considered in-
clude the date water uses were initiated in each state, physical and
climatic conditions, consumptive use of water in various sections of the
river, character and rate of return flows, extent of established uses
and the economies built on them, the availability of storage water, the
efficiency of water use in the various states, and a comparison of bene-
fits to downstream users versus the damage to upstream users if re-
strictions are imposed on the upstream state. 8 6
Although no examples exist, there is no reason conceptually why
an interstate aquifer could not be the subject of an equitable appor-
tionment action, particularly if one state's prolific use of groundwater
threatened another state's groundwater conservation efforts. An equi-
table apportionment, however, is not an absolute allocation to a state;
rather it is an initial allocation that is subject to modification if private
users seek to transfer their right of use across state lines.
2. Interstate Compacts
If states can reach an agreement on use of an interstate resource
without resort to litigation, they can use an interstate compact to ce-
ment the terms of that agreement. Interstate compacts are in the na-
ture of treaties between or among states. Under the United States
Constitution, states may not enter into such arrangements unless Con-
gress consents.18 7 With Congressional consent, terms of a compact are
185. The doctrine was announced in Kansas v. ;Torado, 206 U.S 46 (1907).
186. See Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. 589, 618 (1945), modified, 345 U.S. 981 (1953).
187. "No State shall, without the Consent of Congress,... enter into any Agreement
or Compact with another State .... " U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3. The framers of
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federal law and override inconsistent state law in each of the compact
states.1 88 Moreover, apportionments of water by interstate compact
are binding on individual water users, whether or not they were par-
ties to the negotiations. 8 9
Compacts thus are very potent tools for implementing interstate
water policy. States might, for instance, negotiate an interstate com-
pact that banned interstate transfers of water. If approved by Con-
gress, the compact likely would be immune from attack under the
Commerce Clause.190 Compacts may be a particularly attractive vehi-
cle for managing interstate aquifers if the affected states can agree to a
management strategy and if they are willing to vest a compact com-
mission with sufficient management powers.
3. Congressional Allocation
Congress has the power to directly allocate interstate resources
among states. It has only exercised this power in one instance, how-
ever, and that is the allocation of the Colorado River pursuant to the
Boulder Canyon Project Act.19' In allocating an interstate resource,
Congress is free to require or prohibit interstate transfers. If Congress
is silent as to transfers, however, it is likely that courts would view the
Congressional allocation as merely an initial allocation, one that could
be subsequently modified by private transfers.
the Constitution were concerned that without such an approval mechanism,
groups of states might join together and amass political power at the expense of
the federal government. See generally Virginia v. Tennessee, 148 U.S. 503 (1893).
Although the Compact Clause seems to include all agreements between states,
some past agreements have been held valid without Congressional consent on the
theory that they did not affect the political power of the parties to the compact.
Of course interstate agreements about water resources affect federal interests in
navigation, power, reclamation, environment, and flood control, and it would in-
deed be foolhardy for a state to make a compact over interstate waters without
the express consent of the Congress. The consent either can precede or follow
the making of the compact. Even though the Compact Clause speaks only about
Congress, it generally is conceded that approval of the President is also required.
See King, Interstate Water Compacts 355, in WATER RESOURCES AND THE LAW
(1958). See also J. NowAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 300-
03 (1986).
The seminal article on compacts is Frankfurter & Landis, The Compact Clause
of the Constitution -A Study in Interstate Adjustments, 34 YALE L.J. 685 (1925).
188. West Virginia ex rel Dyer v. Sims, 341 U.S. 22 (1951).
189. Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92 (1938).
190. Intake Water Co. v. Yellowstone River Compact Comm'n, 590 F. Supp. 293 (D.
Mont. 1983), affirmed, 769 F.2d 568 (9th Cir. 1985), cert denied, 476 U.S. 1163
(1986).
191. Pub. L. No. 642, 45 Stat. 1057 (1928) (codified at 43 U.S.C. §§ 617 to 617t (1988), as
interpreted in Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963)). The extensive history
of the Colorado River litigation is documented in Meyers, The Colorado River, 19
STAN. L. REV. 1 (1966).
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H. State Authority After Sporhase-Conclusion
The United States Supreme Court in Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel.
Douglas192 rejected Nebraska's argument that, under Nebraska law,
water was not an article of commerce. Narrowly read, however, the
opinion applied only to water that was subject to private rights of cap-
ture. In the case of Mr. Sporhase, the private right of capture was
equal to the amount of water that he could legally use on the Ne-
braska portion of his farm. Under Nebraska common law, ground-
water in place beneath the surface of the land remains part of what
the civil law refers to as the "negative community." As such, it is
"owned" arguably by the public, or more correctly, by no one at all.
What are the implications of nonownership? First, a state has
great constitutional latitude to modify the rules under which capture
is permitted to take place. Although a landowner's groundwater prop-
erty right cannot be taken by a state unless just compensation is paid,
in the case of Nebraska groundwater there may be no "right" requir-
ing compensation. As the Nebraska Supreme Court said in its
Sporhase opinion, "[n]ot being at liberty to transport ground water
without public consent and having no private property right in the
water itself, appellants are deprived of neither liberty nor prop-
erty." 93 State restrictions on capture may also escape strict Com-
merce Clause scrutiny. Professor Frank Trelease, long regarded as
the foremost scholar in Western water law, distinguished between
1) appropriated waters that had been distributed by a state agency to
water users to be held as water rights, and 2) unappropriated waters
that remained under the complete control of the state or federal
government. 94
When a state is doling out unappropriated water, it may place restraints upon
itself; it may limit its grants of rights to develop its natural resources in such a
way as to ensure that at least the primary benefits of the first use are realized
within the state. But further economic activity by the water user in the
processing, sale, or transportation of goods or crops, or in the sale or transpor-
tation of water itself as a product, may not be regulated to keep the benefits of
that activity within the state.
19 5
Second, to the extent that Nebraska's regulations (1) are designed
to control the rate of groundwater exploitation, and (2) evenhandedly
apply to in-state and interstate uses or users, the regulations will prob-
ably survive scrutiny under negative Commerce Clause jurisprudence.
Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana'96 is instructive. In Common-
192. Sporhase v. Nebraska ex reL Douglas, 458 U.S. 941 (1982).
193. State ex reL Douglas v. Sporhase, 208 Neb. 703, 710, 305 N.W.2d 614, 619 (1981),
rev'd on other grounds, 458 U.S. 941 (1982).
194. Trelease, State Water and State Lines: Commerce in Water Resources, 56 U.
CoLO. L. REV. 347 (1985).
195. Id. at 351.
196. Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609 (1981).
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wealth Edison, the United States Supreme Court upheld a coal sever-
ance tax levied at as much as thirty percent of the contract sales price,
despite a showing that as much as ninety percent of the coal mined in
Montana was exported to other states and a Congressional finding
that Montana severance tax revenues were far in excess of the direct
and indirect costs to Montana that were attributable to coal produc-
tion. The majority found the tax facially neutral and concluded that
the level of taxation was not normally a matter for the courts. "Under
our federal system, the determination is to be made by state legisla-
tures in the first instance and, if necessary, by Congress, when particu-
lar state taxes are thought to be contrary to federal interests". 197
Justice White, concurring, questioned whether the Montana tax might
not prove in the long-run to be an intolerable and unacceptable bur-
den on commerce. Nevertheless, he voted with the majority, reason-
ing that:
Congress has the power to protect interstate commerce from intolerable or
even undesirable burdens. It is also very much aware of the Nation's energy
needs, of the Montana tax, and of the trend in the energy-rich States to ag-
grandize their position and perhaps lessen the tax burdens on their own citi-
zens by imposing unusually high taxes on mineral extraction. Yet, Congress is
so far content to let the matter rest.198
The long-run effect of Montana's high severance tax should be to
reduce demand for Montana coal. In that regard it is similar to a con-
servation measure. By analogy, one can argue that rules that define
the nature of the right to withdraw water will likely face less constitu-
tional scrutiny than rules that attempt to regulate the nature or loca-
tion of use once a withdrawal has been authorized. Similarly, greater
constitutional deference might be given to rules that attempt to re-
strict the transfer of water rights than to rules that attempt to restrict
the transfer of water.19 9 Thus, any attempt to prevent interstate leas-
ing of water would likely fail to pass constitutional muster. By con-
trast, attempts to restrict interstate transfer of water rights might,
under some circumstances, be sustained under the Commerce Clause.
Finally, a ban on new withdrawals, if implemented to control the rate
of resource extraction, would likely pass constitutional muster, even if
the primary impact of such a rule was on prospective interstate users.
A state should be free to adopt rules that control the rate of re-
source extraction within a state, so long as those rules do not overtly
discriminate against interstate commerce. In controlling the rate of
resource extraction, a state gives up present growth in favor of future
security. Such policies do not smack of the economic protectionism
that is the essence of Commerce Clause scrutiny. To the extent that
197. Id. at 628.
198. Id. at 637 (White, J., concurring).
199. See generally Trelease, Interstate Use of Water - "Sporhase v. El Paso, Pike &
Vermejo," 22 LAND AND WATER L. REV. 315 (1987).
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the effect of a state policy is to hoard a resource that is critical to the
health of the nation as a whole, Congress possesses the power to free
the resource from state control. In the absence of congressional action
it is unlikely that the United States Supreme Court would invalidate
nondiscriminatory state conservation policies under the Commerce
Clause. Once a state has made a decision to permit water use, how-
ever, any attempt to prevent the flow of water across state lines does
raise the evil of economic protectionism that the Commerce Clause
guards against. This does not mean, however, that the state cannot
adopt rules that insure that the full costs of interstate transfers will be
born by the transferor, at least to the extent that intrastate transfers
are subject to the same or similar reviews.200
IV. INTERSTATE V. INTRASTATE USERS:
CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS ON UNEQUAL
TREATMENT IN THE AFTERMATH OF
SPORHASE
A. The Commerce Clause
1. Background
Congress shall have Power... To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations,
and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes ....
U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
Prior to the Revolutionary War, each of the thirteen colonies had a
formal relationship with Great Britain and a quite informal relation-
ship with each other. A major undertaking prior to and during the
Revolutionary War was to get the colonies to bind themselves together
to achieve a common objective-independence from Great Britain.201
After independence was achieved, citizens in the thirteen states
continued to offer their primary allegiance to the state in which they
lived and not to the nation of which all states were a part.202 The
major political question facing the new states was the extent to which
they were willing to cede some of their power to a newly created fed-
eral government. Their first try at a federalist system, under the Arti-
cles of Confederation, was a dismal failure. The federal government
had too little power to operate for the common good. It lacked the
200. Virtually all states impose a "no injury" rule on water transfers. The definition
of injury varies greatly, however, from state to state. As a matter of economics,
the no injury rule is the vehicle for insuring that all external costs associated
with water transfers are internalized into the transfer process, so that if a trans-
fer occurs, it will be a transfer that enhances economic efficiency.
201. Recall the exhortation of Benjamin Franklin in displaying a picture of a snake
cut up in 13 pieces: 'e must all hang together or most assuredly we will all
hang separately."
202. Hence, when Patrick Henry talked about allegiance to his "country," he was talk-
ing about the Commonwealth of Virginia, not the United States of America.
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ability to speak for all the states in foreign affairs and the ability to act
as arbiter in commercial disputes and competition between and among
the states.
The next try at organizing a federal system resulted in the adop-
tion of the Constitution of the United States. Under the Constitution,
the federal government had broader and more far-reaching powers
than were given the federal government under the Articles of Confed-
eration. In the Constitution, the founding fathers attempted to enu-
merate specific powers to be exercised by the federal government
while reserving all other governmental powers to the states.
The states recognized that on some matters, notably foreign affairs,
they could function efficiently only by speaking with one voice. For
these matters, they ceded total power to the new federal government.
On other matters (domestic relations, criminal law, real property) the
states saw no likely conflict between and among themselves and,
therefore, no reason for a federal government to intrude. For these,
the states planned and expected that they would exercise exclusive
governmental power. Still other matters, governance of commercial
activity chief among them, were thought to require a division of re-
sponsibility between the states and the federal government. The
Commerce Clause was intended to allocate the authority to regulate
and tax commercial activity between the federal government and the
states.
In the first century and more of constitutional interpretation two
things were true regarding the exercise of federal power under the
Commerce Clause. First, the Commerce Clause was read to permit
the exercise of federal power only with regard to what clearly was
commercial activity. Within commercial activity, states could tax and
regulate local activities such as farming, mining, and management of
natural resources; the federal government had the power to tax and
regulate activities that crossed state lines as, for example, operation of
a ferry between two states.
For the founding fathers, the Commerce Clause was the constitu-
tional authority for Congress to enact laws regulating interstate com-
mercial activity. But from earliest times, the Commerce Clause also
has been used by the Supreme Court to strike down state statutes that
operate to usurp power that the Constitution reserves to the Con-
gress.203 This use of the Commerce Clause to limit state activity is
203. In Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat) 1 (1824), it was first argued that the grant
of power to Congress under the Commerce Clause was exclusive, and therefore,
inpliedly excluded states from regulating in the same area. Although the Court
decided the case on narrower grounds, Chief Justice Marshall replied to the argu-
ment in dictum. "There is great force in this argument, and the Court is not
satisfied that it has been refuted." Id. at 209.
"The court must defer to a congressional finding that a regulated activity af-
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known as the negative, or dormant, Commerce Clause.
2. Criteria Triggering Federal Commerce Clause Scrutiny
The Commerce Clause potentially limits state action only when a
state acts to tax or regulate private activity that is in interstate com-
merce. Several points deserve to be highlighted.
First, the Commerce Clause does not limit private commercial or
noncommercial activity. Consequently, a state may avoid scrutiny
under the Commerce Clause to the extent it acts as a market partici-
pant in a proprietary capacity. Second, the Commerce Clause in no
way limits the power of Congress to legislate in a way that discrimi-
nates against interstate commerce. Third, although the reach of the
Commerce Clause was at first limited to state regulation or taxing of
commercial activity in interstate commerce, today review is triggered
even when a state attempts to tax or regulate noncommercial activity.
Finally, the required nexus with interstate activity has been eroded
almost to the point of irrelevance. A succession of Supreme Court
cases has upheld Congressional power to regulate where the regulated
activity merely affects or depends on interstate commerce.204 Given
modem readings of the Commerce Clause, it is difficult to imagine any
activity that arguably could not satisfy the interstate nexus.
3. Negative Commerce Clause and Congressional Authority
Congress, not the states, has the ultimate power both to regulate
commerce between and among the states and to decide what type of
regulation, if any, is necessary or permissible. While states are prohib-
ited from unduly restricting the flow of interstate commerce, the fed-
eral government is not so prohibited. It can restrict the flow of
interstate commerce either directly by enacting federal regulatory leg-
islation or indirectly by authorizing state regulatory legislation.
In the first 100 years of our federal government, Congress rarely
fects interstate commerce, if there is any rational basis for such a finding." Hodel
v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 276 (1981). "Even
activity that is purely intrastate in character may be regulated by Congress,
where the activity, combined with like conduct by others similarly situated, af-
fects commerce among the States or with foreign nations." Fry v. United States,
421 U.S. 542, 547 (1975).
204. E.g., Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942)(wheat produced by a farmer for use
on the farm in excess of a federal production quota affects interstate commerce
because the excess production allows the farmer to sell more product, thereby
affecting national prices); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S.
241 (1964)(refusal of a local motel to rent rooms to blacks affects interstate com-
merce because the action potentially limits the interstate travel opportunities of
blacks); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964)(a restaurant that refuses to
seat blacks operates in interstate commerce even if none of its customers are in-




enacted legislation regulating interstate commerce. Arguably, the ab-
sence of federal regulation might have left states free to regulate in-
terstate commerce as they pleased. Instead, the United States
Supreme Court, from the earliest decided Commerce Clause cases,
read the Commerce Clause to limit state regulation of interstate com-
merce. The Supreme Court interprets the Commerce Clause as re-
serving the area of interstate commerce for the exercise of
Congressional power; that area remains reserved unless and until
Congress acts either to regulate or to authorize state regulation. In a
sense, then, the Supreme Court acts to preserve federal power and
federal legislative prerogatives not yet exercised. The reserved area
protected by the negative Commerce Clause may be ceded to the
states-but only by Congress.
A consequence of negative Commerce Clause theory is that the
Commerce Clause really encompasses two federal powers in the same
language-one an affirmative grant of power to Congress to regulate
commerce and the other a restraint on the power of the states to regu-
late commerce. When the Supreme Court invokes the negative Com-
merce Clause to invalidate a state statute (such as the reciprocity
provision in the Nebraska statute at issue in Sporhase), the Court sim-
ply says that the state statute is unconstitutional, and will continue to
be unconstitutional, unless and until Congress authorizes states to
legislate in that way. As the Court itself has described negative Com-
merce Clause analysis:
It would turn dormant [negative] commerce clause analysis entirely upside
down to apply it where the federal government has acted, and to apply it is
such a way as to reverse the policy that the federal government has elected to
follow. For the dormant commerce clause... only operates where the federal
government has not spoken to ensure that the essential attributes of na-
tionhood will not be jeopardized by states acting as independent economic ac-
tors. However, the federal government is entitled in its wisdom to act to
permit the states varying degrees of regulatory authority. 2 0 5
In acting pursuant to its Commerce Clause powers, Congress con-
stitutionally may exercise the following prerogatives:
(1) Congress itself may enact legislation to regulate interstate
commerce.
(2) Congress may prohibit state regulation of an area in interstate
commerce even if the Supreme Court decides that the particular state
regulation does not offend the negative Commerce Clause.
(3) Congress may permit state regulation of interstate commerce,
regulation that otherwise would be prohibited by the Supreme Court
of the United States as violative of the Commerce Clause. In permit-
ting such regulation Congress may either:
(a) grant the power outright with no strings attached;
205. Wardair Canada Inc. v. Florida Dep't of Revenue, 477 U.S. 1, 12 (1986).
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(b) grant the power but provide guidelines for the operation of
state regulation.
Normally, congressional approval will take the form of a federal
authorizing statute. It also may take the form of congressional ap-
proval of a compact among several states.
B. State Regulation of Interstate Commerce: What is Permitted, What
Prohibited?
1. Intentional Discrimination Against Interstate Commerce
a. Facially Discriminatory Legislation
Frequently state legislation involves intentional attempts to regu-
late or tax commerce in a way that insulates in-state activity from out-
of-state competition. When state legislation affecting commerce dis-
criminates on its face between local and out-of-state citizens or activ-
ity, that legislation almost automatically fails to pass Commerce
Clause scrutiny by the Supreme Court. Nothing the Supreme Court
recently has said suggests a retreat from this position. At best, a state
bears an extraordinary burden in seeking to uphold such a regulation
or tax policy against a Commerce Clause challenge.
Intentional discrimination evident on the face of a statute is
demonstrated by the facts of City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey.206 To
conserve landfill space, arguably a natural resource, New Jersey
passed a law prohibiting other states from sending their waste prod-
ucts to private landfills in New Jersey. This ban on import of waste
was unconstitutional on its face. The prohibition on transportation
could not be sustained on health and safety grounds because New
Jersey did not restrict the transport of waste generated within the
state. Nor was it constitutionally permissible for the state to discrimi-
nate against out-of-state users when acting to conserve a natural
resource.
b. Facially Neutral Legislation
Intentional discrimination also can occur with a statute that is neu-
tral on its face. The Supreme Court does not end its Commerce
Clause scrutiny once it finds no facial discrimination. Nor does it sim-
206. City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978). Laws that discriminate
on their face are subject to "a virtually per se rule of invalidity." Id at 624. See
also Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 471 (1981)(statute
which bans sale of milk in non-returnable plastic containers does not violate the
Commerce Clause because the burden on the out-of-state plastics industry is not
excessive in light of state interest of conservation). "At a minimum [facially dis-
criminatory statutes are subject to] the strictest scrutiny of any purported legiti-
mate local purpose and of the absence of nondiscriminatory alternatives."
Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 337 (1979).
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ply accept at face value a state's assertion of nondiscriminatory local
purposes to be served by a statute. Instead, the Court will evaluate
whether the stated local benefit is bona fide, or merely an attempt to
disguise a discriminatory economic protectionism purpose in neutral
language. 207
c. Reciprocity Clauses
State legislation that denies benefits to citizens of a second state
unless the second state confers similar benefits on citizens of the first
state is known as reciprocal legislation. Unless authorized by Con-
gress, reciprocal legislation-I'll let citizens of your state do that here
if your state lets my citizens do the same thing there-consistently has
been found to violate the Commerce Clause. In effect, a reciprocity
clause forces sister states to implement the policy choices of another
state or suffer discrimination against their citizens. The Supreme
Court routinely rejects any attempt by one state to use a reciprocity
clause to force its public policy choices on another state.2 08
Sporhase209 is a prime example of the ready ease with which the
United States Supreme Court invalidates reciprocity clauses. The Ne-
braska groundwater export statute2 10 provided that a permit would
not be issued unless certain specified statutory conditions were met,
and "the state in which the water is to be used grants reciprocal rights
to withdraw and transport ground water from that state for use in the
State of Nebraska." On the Sporhase facts, the reciprocity clause oper-
ated as an absolute ban on exports of water to Colorado because Colo-
rado did not grant reciprocal rights to Nebraska users. The Sporhase
reciprocity clause readily was struck down. In fact, it was the only
207. See Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Cottrell, 424 U.S. 366 (1976), involving a
Mississippi statute which provided that milk produced out-of-state could be
shipped into Mississippi only if the producing state participated with Mississippi
in a reciprocal inspection standards agreement. According to Mississippi, the rec-
iprocity clause was intended to guarantee safe milk for Mississippi consumers.
The statute, however, permitted out-of-state milk to be shipped into Mississippi
even though the production standards in the state of origin were lower than Mis-
sissippi's. The Supreme Court noted that "It]he reciprocity clause thus disserves
rather than promotes any higher Mississippi milk quality standards." Id. at 375-
76. The Court concluded, therefore, that the real reason for the state's regulatory
scheme was to protect the opportunity of Mississippi milk producers to sell in
other states.
208. E.g., Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Cottrell, 424 U.S. 366 (1976)(striking
down a reciprocity clause in a milk inspection statute). If Mississippi were al-
lowed "to insist that a sister State either sign a reciprocal agreement acceptable to
Mississippi or else be absolutely foreclosed from exporting its products to Missis-
sippi, [the rule] would plainly 'invite a multiplication of preferential trade areas
destructive of the very purpose of the Commerce Clause.'" Id. at 380 (quoting
Dean Milk Co. v. Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 356 (1951).
209. Sporhase v. Nebraska ex reL Douglas, 458 U.S. 941 (1982).
210. NEB. REV. STAT. § 46-613.01 (1978).
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part of the Nebraska statute in Sporhase that was expressly declared
unconstitutional.
2. Unintentional Discrimination Against Interstate Commerce
a. Legislation With a Discriminatory Effect
On occasion, a statute not only is neutral on its face but there is no
evidence of a legislative purpose to discriminate against interstate
commerce. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court will look at the statute to
decide whether its effect is to discriminate against interstate com-
merce. A facially neutral statute that produces a discriminatory effect
on interstate commerce is not automatically invalid, but many such
statutes are held unconstitutional.
The facts of Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Commis-
s/on 211 illustrate how facially neutral statutes can result in unconsti-
tutional discrimination against interstate commerce. In Hunt, a North
Carolina statute required that closed apple containers either bear la-
bels specified by the U.S. Department of Agriculture or be marked as
not graded. Apple growers in Washington challenged the North Caro-
lina statute on the theory that Washington had a state grading system
that was superior to that of the U.S.D.A. According to the Washing-
ton apple growers, the North Carolina statute burdened interstate
sales of Washington apples and also discriminated against them.
On its face the North Carolina statute did not discriminate against
interstate commerce because its requirements applied both to in-state
and out-of-state growers. The statute nonetheless had a discrimina-
tory effect: it forced Washington shippers to alter their labeling and
marketing practices. Increased costs for Washington growers in turn
shielded local North Carolina growers from competition. Because of
the discriminatory effect, the Supreme Court held North Carolina had
to "justify [the burden] both in terms of the local benefits flowing
from the statute and the unavailability of nondiscriminatory alterna-
tives adequate to preserve the local interests at stake."21 2 That North
Carolina could not do.213
b. The Bruce Church Test for State Regulatory Policy
Suppose in the New Jersey landfill case described above, the state
had not discriminated against out-of-state waste but instead had regu-
lated evenhandedly the transport of all waste products, whether gen-
211. Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333 (1977).
212. Id. at 353.
213. For a good discussion of Supreme Court treatment of state statutes that purpose-
fully discriminate, those that have a discriminatory effect, and those with neither
purpose nor discriminatory effect, see Farber, State Regulation and the Dormant
Commerce Clause, 3 CONST. COum. 395, 397-98 (1986).
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erated in state or out of state. Scrutiny under the negative Commerce
Clause still would be triggered because the state statute would "af-
fect" interstate commerce. The operative test for deciding whether to
invalidate state regulatory legislation that affects, but does not dis-
criminate against, interstate commerce comes from Pike v. Bruce
Church, a case decided by the Supreme Court in 1970.214
In Bruce Curch an Arizona statute required all cantaloupes grown
in Arizona and offered for sale to be identified as Arizona cantaloupes
and packed in closed containers bearing the name and Arizona address
of the packer. Bruce Church grew cantaloupes of exceptionally high
quality at its Parker, Arizona, ranch where it had no packing shed. It
transported them in bulk thirty-one miles to Blythe, California, where
it packed them in compliance with both Arizona and California stan-
dards. Contrary to the Arizona statute, however, the containers bore
only California address information and the cantaloupes were not
identified as Arizona cantaloupes. To comply with the Arizona statute
would have required a $200,000 capital outlay to pack an annual crop
worth $700,000. The Supreme Court held that the state's tenuous in-
terest in having the company's cantaloupes identified as originating in
Arizona could not constitutionally justify the requirement that the
company build an unneeded $200,000 plant in the state.
The Bruce Church Court articulated the following test to decide
whether a nondiscriminatory state statute nonetheless violates the
commerce clause:
Where the [state] statute regulates even-handedly to effectuate a legitimate
local public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are only inciden-
tal, it will be upheld unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly
excessive in relation to the putative local benefits. If a legitimate local pur-
pose is found, then the question becomes one of degree. And the extent of the
burden that will be tolerated will of course depend on the nature of the local
interest involved, and on whether it could be promoted as well with a lesser
impact on interstate activities.
2 15
As a practical matter, the Bruce Church test requires that the na-
ture and importance of the potential local benefit be balanced against
the burden imposed on interstate commerce. If the Supreme Court
214. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970). Bruce Church was cited in Hunt
v. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 350, 353 (1977),
which struck down a North Carolina law that required all apples marketed in the
state in closed containers to be graded according to United States standards.
Bruce Church was quoted in Raymond Bros. Motor Transp., Inc. v. Rice, 434 U.S.
429, 441-42 (1978), which held Wisconsin regulations on truck lengths unconstitu-
tional. Bruce Church was cited with approval in City of Philadelphia v. New
Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978), disapproving a New Jersey statute that prohibited
the import of liquid wastes collected outside New Jersey's territorial limits. And
then finally, in Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 331 (1979), Bruce Church was
characterized as "[t]oday's principle."
215. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
[Vol. 70:754
INTERSTATE TRANSFERS OF WATER
decides that the benefit to the state from the regulatory scheme is out-
weighed by the burden on interstate commerce, then the state statute
will be declared unconstitutional. If, by contrast, the local benefit
seems to outweigh in importance the burden on interstate commerce,
then a further inquiry must be made: whether the state purposes
could be accomplished through means that impose a lesser burden on
interstate commerce.
Whether a state could accomplish its purpose with a lesser burden
on interstate commerce depends on alternatives reasonably available
to a state. A reasonably available alternative is not one that requires a
state to take extraordinary measures or attempt new, unproven, and
costly methods to solve a problem.216
With regard to the nature of the local benefit, not all local interests
are equally strong. Health and safety concerns top the list of legiti-
mate state interests. By contrast, a state's interest in promoting its
local economy is least likely to succeed when balanced against burdens
on interstate commerce.
Under the Bruce Church test, a state has a clear and legitimate in-
terest in adopting nondiscriminatory water conservation measures,
particularly where the conservation measures are justified on health
or safety grounds. In fact, the Supreme Court in Sporhase acknowl-
edged the extraordinary degree of police power regulation that states
have asserted with respect to allocating water among potential users.
The Court also acknowledged that this long history of sovereign pre-
rogatives over water makes state claims regarding interest in the allo-
cation of water rights even more substantial than similar claims
regarding other natural resources.
c. The Complete Auto Transit Test for State Tax Policy
State taxes, as well as state regulation, can violate the Commerce
Clause. In Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady,217 the Supreme
Court announced a four part test to be used to assess the constitution-
ality of state taxes under the Commerce Clause. To be sustained, state
taxes must (1) be applied to an activity with a substantial connection
to the taxing state; (2) be fairly apportioned; (3) not discriminate
against interstate commerce; and (4) be fairly related to the services
provided by the state.
In 1985, the Attorney General of Colorado considered the constitu-
tionality of a $50 per acre-foot export fee that Colorado sought to im-
pose on water being transferred from Colorado to another state. The
Attorney General considered the Complete Auto Transit test in con-
216. Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 147 (1986).
217. 430 U.S. 274 (1977).
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cluding that the export fee was not constitutional.218 The opinion
states in part:
There is no question that section 37-81-104(1) on its face discriminates against
interstate commerce, since the $50 per acre-foot FEE is not a charge on all
water diverted, carried, stored, or transported in Colorado, but is only imposed
on water to be used outside the state. Therefore,... the statute can be upheld
only if it satisfies "strictest scrutiny" .... I conclude that Colorado cannot
meet this burden for the export FEE provision.... The imposition of a FEE
on exports ... is not narrowly tailored... to conservation purposes ... and is
certainly not the least discriminatory means to achieve them.... The statute
suffers from the same defect that was condemned in Philadelphia v. New
Jersey-it imposes the full burden of conserving the scarce resource on out-of-
state interests. Finally, it is unclear, in light of Commonwealth Edison Com-
pany v. Montana and the Complete Auto Transit test applied therein, that any
FEE that on its face discriminates against interstate commerce, no matter
what its justification, can withstand constitutional scrutiny.
C. Market Participant Theory: An Exception to the Negative Commerce
Clause
1. Background
The Commerce Clause limits a state only when it acts in its sover-
eign capacity to tax or regulate the activities of private enterprise in
interstate commerce. The Commerce Clause has nothing to say about
what private enterprise chooses to do independent of state regulation.
A state statute that requires flour mills operating in the state to use
only wheat that is produced in the state is unconstitutional under the
Commerce Clause because it discriminates on its face against out-of-
state wheat growers. By contrast, a privately owned flour mill on its
own may choose to use only local wheat. Because there is no activity
by the state to direct the flour mill to make that particular choice,
there is no Commerce Clause issue.
The market participant exception to the Commerce Clause recog-
nizes that a state does not always act in its sovereign, governmental
capacity when it enacts legislation. Sometimes a state acts as a propri-
etor, participating in the market like any private enterprise. When a
state acts as a market participant, it is treated for Commerce Clause
purposes as if it were a private enterprise. A state that owned and
operated a flour mill, for instance, could purchase all wheat locally
without offending the Commerce Clause.
Market participant status is illustrated by a recent case involving
the city of Boston.2 19 Boston sought to preserve city jobs for city resi-
dents by requiring that all construction projects funded in whole or in
part by city funds or by federal funds administered by the city22 0 be
218. AG File No. ONR 8504 066 Op. Colo. Att'y Gen. (1985).
219. See White v. Massachusetts Council of Const. Employers, 460 U.S. 204 (1983).
220. Discrimination in use of those funds provided by the federal government and sim-
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performed by a work force comprised of at least half Boston residents.
This home-town preference, one that clearly discriminated against
out-of-state workers, was held to not violate the Commerce Clause.
On the facts, Boston did not regulate the hiring practices of private
contractors. Instead, Boston spent its own money on its own construc-
tion projects. Boston, therefore, was a market participant, not a mar-
ket regulator.221 By contrast, a local ordinance requiring all
contractors to employ at least half Boston residents would clearly vio-
late the Commerce Clause.
When acting as a market participant, a state may control only its
direct relationship with a contracting partner. It may not control
what happens to a commodity after it reaches private hands. As an
example, a state that owns and operates a cement plant may restrict
sales to its own citizens, but it cannot prevent resale out of state, re-
quire that cement be used only in the state, or require that cement be
used only in construction projects that benefit the state.222 The latter
requirements are regulatory and governmental in nature, not the per-
missible actions of a proprietor.
2. Applicability to Natural Resources
While Sporhase made it clear that a general assertion of "state
ownership" of water is a legal fiction, not all state assertions of owner-
ship are fictional. Sometimes a state "owns" water rights in the same
way private individuals "own" water rights. A state may, for instance,
have a vested water right to irrigate state owned land. In addition, a
state may acquire water rights by eminent domain. If a water market
exists, a state also may compete for water by offering a better price or
by reserving to itself a statutory right of first refusal.
With regard to natural resources, however, it is not entirely clear
how far the Supreme Court will permit a state to go in acquiring rights
to a resource and then reserving or dispensing that resource for the
benefit only of its own citizens. There is language in at least two of
the cases in which the Supreme Court discussed the market partici-
pant exception that suggests that the Supreme Court will not permit a
state, even when acting as a market participant, to hoard a natural
ply administered by the city was authorized by federal regulations and, because so
authorized, also did not fall under the bar of the negative Commerce Clause. Id.
at 215.
221. An additional constitutional question regarding the Boston hiring scheme is
whether Boston violated the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Constitu-
tion. No Privileges and Immunities challenge was made in White. In a similar
case, involving Camden New Jersey's home-town hire policy, such a challenge
was made. United Bldg. and Const. Trades Council v. Mayor of Camden, 465 U.S.
208 (1984). For a discussion of Camden, see infra text accompanying notes 240-44.
222. See generally Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429 (1980).
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resource for the exclusive benefit of its own citizens.223 In any event,
the economic and political costs that would be faced by a state at-
tempting to acquire private property rights in natural resources un-
doubtedly will insure that the constitutional boundaries, whatever
they may be, will not be reached.
3. Legal Consequences of Market Participant Status
A state seeking to enter the market to avoid Commerce Clause in-
validation of an activity affecting interstate commerce should consider
its decision carefully as the market participant approach is not cost
free. Private enterprise is subject to federal antitrust laws, to federal
taxation, and to suits for damages filed by private citizens claiming
injury caused by an enterprise. Once a state enters the market as a
participant, it loses not only its antitrust exemption but almost cer-
tainly its sovereign immunity (in other words, its prerogative to refuse
to be sued). In addition, the state subjects itself to federal taxation of
the activity. If state actions are private for purposes of the Commerce
Clause, the actions probably are private for all other purposes. In
short, a state may not have its cake and eat it too.
The fiscal impacts on a state acting as a private enterprise are diffi-
cult to quantify absent a particular example, but the impacts might
well be substantial. Federal tax liability depends on (1) a Congres-
sional decision to tax the activity; and (2) the net, after-tax, benefit to
the state of operating the enterprise or managing the resource. The
impact from the loss of sovereign immunity depends on the degree to
which a state already permits itself to be sued and the likelihood, type,
and money amount of injury it likely would face with regard to its
activity. No state today holds itself always immune from lawsuits for
injury caused. Nebraska, for example, through its tort-claims act
waives sovereign immunity for claims of personal injury or property
damage caused by the negligent acts or omissions of state agencies or
employees.224 With respect to antitrust liability, a state's acquisition
of water rights might be categorized as an attempt to monopolize. In
that event, the loss of antitrust immunity225 could have significant fis-
223. South-Central Timber Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82 (1984)(four members of
Supreme Court rejected Alaska's claim to market participant status in part be-
cause the commodity at issue was timber, a natural resource); Reeves, Inc. v.
Stake, 447 U.S. 429 (1980)(majority rejected argument that cement is a natural
resource, noting specifically that South Dakota did not limit out-of-state access to
the natural materials needed to make cement).
224. NEB. REV. STAT. § 81-8,209 (1987).
225. Currently, states that are not acting as market participants are immune from
federal antitrust laws if two requirements are met:
(1) the state restraint on trade must be clearly articulated and affirma-
tively expressed as state policy; and
(2) the state must actively supervise the state policy.
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cal impact because successful litigants are entitled to damages equal to
three times the money amount of the actual injury caused by an anti-
trust violation.
D. Privileges and Immunities and Equal Protection
The Commerce Clause is not the only constitutional provision im-
plicated by state legislation that discriminates against interstate com-
merce. The Privileges and Immunities Clause and the Equal
Protection Clause also must be considered.
1. Privileges and Immunities Clause
The Citizens 2 2 6 of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immu-
nities of Citizens in the several States.
U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1.
As the Supreme Court has described it, there is a "mutually rein-
forcing relationship" between the Privileges and Immunities and the
Commerce Clauses regarding the management and use of natural re-
sources.227 Under the Commerce Clause, a state may not regulate to
save for the exclusive use of residents the benefits of a natural re-
source once the resource is removed from the ground by private
hands.228 Moreover, except possibly in times of serious shortage, the
Commerce Clause precludes a state from regulating the use of a natu-
ral resource owned by private citizens in a manner that prefers in-
state uses and users.
Whether a natural resource is intended for interstate commerce
also may be relevant in evaluating whether a preference for in-state
use by residents offends the Privileges and Immunities Clause.229 The
Privileges and Immunities Clause does not require a state to provide
citizens of other states the same services or entitlements that it pro-
vides to its own citizens. Only those interests fundamental to inter-
state harmony (not all state services or entitlements) are privileges
and immunities covered by the clause. Chief among covered interests
are the right to hold property and the ability to earn a living.230 To
California Retail Liquor Dealer's Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97
(1980)(quoting New Motor Vehicle Bd. of Cal. v. Orrin W. Fox Co., 439 U.S. 96
(1978).
226. The word "citizens" in the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Art. IV, § 2, is
read interchangeably with the word, "residents." The protection afforded citi-
zens (residents) is inapplicable to corporations, however. Western & Southern
Life Ins. Co. v. Board of Equalization, 451 U.S. 648, 656 (1981); Hemphill v. Orloff,
277 U.S. 537, 548-50 (1928).
227. Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518, 531 (1978).
228. Id at 532-33.
229. Id at 533.
230. Privileges and immunities include the "right of a citizen of one State to pass
through, or to reside in any other state, for purposes of trade, agriculture, profes-
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claim protection of the clause, however, a nonresident must be present
in the state that discriminates. 2 31 Finally, even when a particular in-
terest clearly is treated as a covered privilege and immunity, and even
when the out-of-state citizen is in the state that dispenses the privilege
and immunity, disparate treatment of citizens and non citizens is not
always forbidden. A state owes its primary governmental responsibil-
ity to its own citizens as they are the ones who pay the tax freight for
the services their state provides.
The fact that a natural resource is involved does not exempt state
activity from scrutiny under the Privileges and Immunities Clause. In
fact, if a state allows residents to purchase water rights, it is clear the
state cannot deny that right to nonresidents. A closer question, how-
ever, is whether nonresidents are equally entitled with residents to a
share of a state's initial distribution of water. Early cases suggest that
a state may restrict the use or disposition of state owned natural re-
sources to residents without violating the Privileges and Immunities
Clause.2 32 Although later cases call the early cases into question,233
Professor Trelease has argued that "territorial sovereignty" is suffi-
cient justification for a state to discriminate against nonresidents in its
initial disposition of resources. 234
While state ownership of property is a factor, "often the crucial
factor,"2 35 in deciding whether there has been a violation of the Privi-
leges and Immunities Clause, state ownership is not dispositive of the
question. Indeed, a state's attempt to discriminate against nonresi-
dents present in a state by limiting their use of state-owned natural
resources, at least after the first sale, lease, or grant occurs, likely con-
travenes the Clause.236
Despite the fact that a state's permission to use a natural resource
is a privilege and immunity protected by the Privileges and Immuni-
sional pursuits, or otherwise;" and the right "to take, hold and dispose of prop-
erty, either real or personal;..." Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546, 552 (C.C.E.D.
Pa. 1823) (No. 3,230).
231. See Austin v. New Hampshire, 420 U.S. 656, 660-61 (1975); Toomer v. Witsell, 334
U.S. 385 (1948).
232. See McCready v. Virginia, 94 U.S. 391 (1876)(upholding the power of Virginia to
restrict nonresidents from farming oysters on state lands underlying navigable
waters).
233. See Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385 (1948).
234. Trelease, supra note 199, at 323-25.
235. Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518, 529 (1978).
236. 1& at 530:
Alaska Hire extends to employers who have no connection whatsoever
with the State's oil and gas, perform no work on state land, have no con-
tractual relationship with the State, and receive no payment from the
State. The Act goes so far as to reach suppliers who provide goods or
services to subcontractors who, in turn, perform work for contractors
despite the fact that none of these employers may themselves have di-
rect dealings with the State's oil and gas or ever set foot on state land.
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ties Clause,237 it is unclear whether state statutes regulating interstate
water transfers trigger scrutiny under the Clause. Traditional an-
tiexport statutes apply equally to residents and nonresidents. An-
tiexport statutes do not discriminate against nonresidents in their in-
state use and enjoyment of a resource. It is unlikely that the Supreme
Court would extend privileges and immunities coverage to discrimina-
tion based solely on out-of-state use of a resource. Even if it were to
do so, however, it is not clear that the discrimination would violate the
clause.238
Discrimination will be upheld in a Privileges and Immunities
Clause challenge if: (1) there is a substantial reason for the difference
in treatment afforded in-state citizens as compared to out-of-state citi-
zens, and (2) the discrimination against out-of-state citizens is neces-
sary because these out-of-state citizens "constitute a peculiar source of
the evil at which the statute is aimed."2 3 9
The theory is illustrated by a case challenging a local-hire program
implemented by Camden, New Jersey.240 The Camden program was
very much like the Boston local-hire program involved in White v.
Massachusetts Council of Construction Employers.241 The Camden
program required that at least 40 percent of the employees of contrac-
tors and subcontractors working on city construction projects be city
residents.242 As in White, this scheme was upheld under the Com-
merce Clause because Camden was a market participant when it
awarded city contracts. Unlike White, however, the Camden local-
hire program was also challenged under the Privileges and Immuni-
ties Clause.
The Supreme Court noted that for public projects paid for by pub-
lic money, a city's right to hire its own citizens (as its right to dispense
a natural resource owned by it) might be the most important factor to
237. City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978)(landfills); Baldwin v. Fish
& Game Comm'n, 436 U.S. 371 (1978)(hunting).
238. On the other hand, the Privileges and Immunities Clause likely would operate to
prevent a state from denying operation of a preference statute to interstate uses.
For example, NEB. REV. STAT. § 46-613 (1988) provides that agricultural uses are
preferred over industrial uses. Thus, a Colorado irrigator using Nebraska
groundwater likely could assert a preference over a Nebraska industry that used
water from the same source, even if the Nebraska use were the more valuable
use.
239. United Bldg. & Const. Trades Council v. Mayor of Camden, 465 U.S. 208, 222
(1984)(quoting Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 398).
240. United Bldg. & Const. Trades Council v. Mayor of Camden, 465 U.S. 208 (1984).
241. White v. Massachusetts Council of Constr. Employers, Inc., 460 U.S. 204 (1983).
White is discussed supra in this'Part.
242. The Supreme Court made clear that the Privileges and Immunities Clause ap-
plies even if the state discriminates not solely against out-of-state citizens but,
instead, discriminates against both out-of-state and in-state, out-of-city residents.
United Bldg. & Const. Trade Council v. Mayor of Camden, 465 U.S. 208 (1984).
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be considered in deciding whether the Privileges and Immunities
Clause is violated.4 3 Camden's policy reasons for discriminating
against nonresidents were the high Camden unemployment rate and
the reduced property tax base resulting from the exodus of residents
from the city. Camden therefore argued that out-of-towners were a
prime source of Camden's fiscal problems since they live off Camden
without living in Camden. On the question whether Camden's reason
for discriminating sufficed under the Privileges and Immunities
Clause, the Supreme Court remanded to the trial court for fact find-
ings on Camden's decay.244
In deciding whether discrimination against nonresidents is neces-
sary, the Supreme Court will evaluate not only whether the nonresi-
dents are a "peculiar source of the evil" caused but whether their
different treatment is narrowly tailored to compensate the state for
the harm that they cause. For example, nonresidents can be charged a
higher fee than residents for fish and game licenses, but only if the fee
differential relates to the extra enforcement, conservation, and other
burdens created by the nonresidents, costs that residents pay through
state taxes.24 5
2. Equal Protection Clause
[No State shall] deny to any person 2 4 6 within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
Under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, a state may not deny the equal protection of its laws to persons
within the state and, therefore, subject to its laws.247 While the main
focus of the Privileges and Immunities Clause is to assure that state
legislation does not discriminate inappropriately against nonresidents,
the main focus of the Equal Protection Clause is to assure that state
actions do not inappropriately discriminate between classes of persons
who are similarly situated regardless of residence.2 4S Consistent with
the Equal Protection Clause, a state may provide differing treatment
243. Id. at 222.
244. The Camden program affected only employees working directly on city projects;
the program did not dictate beyond Camden's direct contracting partners. On
that basis, the Supreme Court distinguished the Camden program from the
Alaska-hire program that the Court invalidated under the Privileges and Immu-
nities Clause. Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518 (1978).
245. Baldwin v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 436 U.S. 371 (1978); Mullaney v. Anderson, 342
U.S. 415 (1952).
246. The word "person" in the Equal Protection Clause of the fourteenth amendment
includes within its scope corporations and other legal entities as well as living
persons. Western & So. Life Ins. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 451 U.S. 648, 660
(1981).
247. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
248. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 470 U.S. 869, 881 (1985).
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to distinct classes of persons provided the classifications are reason-
able. When a classification-such as state citizenship or residence-
does not involve race, nationality, or a fundamental right, then that
classification will be upheld if it is rationally related to achieving a
legitimate state purpose.249
The rational relationship test is the easiest for a state to meet. It
requires only that a legislature have a rational basis for believing that
a statute will promote the purpose for which it was enacted; the test
does not require that the purpose in fact was promoted. if it is "at
least debatable" that a statute could effect its purpose, the statute sat-
isfies the rational relationship test.2 50 In fact, it is difficult to show
that a state statute is not rationally related to a legitimate state pur-
pose. Consequently, the classifications normally applied to differenti-
ate among categories of water user (such as large-small, irrigator-
industrial, seasonal-continuous) are not likely to raise serious equal
protection questions even though all water users are not treated
equally.
One classification based on residence normally will fail even under
the rational relationship test, however. The Equal Protection Clause
makes it very difficult, if not impossible, to dispense state benefits in a
way that prefers long-standing residents as against more recent arriv-
als in a state.25 1 In other words, to paraphrase Gertrude Stein, a resi-
dent is a resident is a resident.
Despite the fact that the Equal Protection Clause prohibits state
discrimination between classes of similarly situated persons, it is un-
clear to what extent a state statute regulating interstate water trans-
fers raises an equal protection issue. A statute that treats in-state and
out-of-state water transfers differently, but that treats residents and
nonresidents alike regarding these transfers, does not appear to be a
statute that differentiates between classes of persons similarly situ-
ated, particularly when the focus of the clause is on equal treatment
"within" a state.
V. RESPONSES BY OTHER STATES TO THE SPORHASE
DECISION
A. State Law at the Time of Sporhase
On July 2, 1982, the date of the Sporhase252 decision, seventeen
249. As an example of a state classification scheme subject to the rational relationship
test, see Texaco v. Short, 454 U.S. 516 (1982)(for purposes of abandonment, it is
rational to classify mineral interests owners into those with 10 or more interests
in a county and those with fewer than 10).
250. Western & So. Life Ins. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 451 U.S. 648 (1971).
251. See, e.g., Hooper v. Bernalillo County Assessor, 472 U.S. 612 (1985); Zobel v. Wil-
liams, 457 U.S. 55 (1982).
252. Sporhase v. Nebraska ex reL Douglas, 458 U.S. 941 (1982).
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states and the District of Columbia had statutes to either limit or com-
pletely prohibit transfers of water out of state.2 53 The first such stat-
ute, enacted by California seventy-one years before Sporhase was
decided,25m absolutely prohibited any interstate transfer of water. The
California approach was followed by Colorado in 1915,255 and later in
the 1950s, by Nevada and New Mexico.25 6
Another statutory approach, first used by Montana in 1921,257 gave
discretionary power over interstate water transfers to either the state
legislature or to an administrative officer or agency. Wyoming, Ore-
gon, Nebraska, Oklahoma, and Texas eventually adopted statutes that
incorporated the Montana approach.
A third type statute was enacted by Arizona in 1919. The Arizona
model, followed by Idaho, Kansas, South Dakota, Utah, Washington,
and eventually Nebraska, permitted interstate transfers from a state
only to those states that granted reciprocal export privileges.25 8 It was
253. ALA. CODE, tit. 37, § 393 (1958); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 45-153B (1956); CAL.
WATER CODE § 1230 (West 1971); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 37-90-136 (1973), § 37-
81-101 (1981 Cum. Supp.); D.C. CODE ANN. § 43-1529 (1967); IDAHO CODE § 42-408
(1948); MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-1-121 (1981); NEB. REV. STAT. § 46-613.01 (1978);
NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 533.515, 533.520 (1979); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 72-12-19 (1978);
N.Y. CONSER. L. § 452 (McKinney 1967); OR. REV. STAT. § 537.810 (1977); R.I.
GEN. LAWs § 46-15-9 (1970); TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 7477b, § 2 (Vernon
Supp. 1968); UTAH CODE ANN. § 73-2-8 (1980); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§§ 90.03.300, 90.16.110, 90.16.120 (1962); WYO. STAT. § 4-3-1-115 (1977). See Note,
Interstate Transfer of Water: The Challenge to the Commerce Clause, 59 TEX. L.
REv. 1249, 1250 n.8, 1252-53 (1981). See Commerce Clause Limits State's Ability to
Stop Groundwater Exports: Supreme Court Overrules Nebraska Reciprocity
Rule, 12 ENvTL. L. REP. 10083 (1982); Amicus Curiae Brief of the National Agri-
cultural Land Center at 16, in Sporhase v. Nebraska, 458 U.S. 941 (1982).
The Senate Committee on Environmental and Public Works collected laws of
twelve Western states forbidding or limiting interstate and/or interbasin water
transfers. The Impact of the Supreme Court Decision in Sporhase versus Ne-
braska, Hearings before the Subcomm. on Water Resources of the Senate Comm.
on Environmental and Public Works, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982) (Serial No. 97-
H63). The laws of fourteen states can be found in Comment, Legal Impediments
to Interstate Water Marketing: Application to Utah, 9 J. ENERGY L. & POL'Y 237,
261-65 (1989).
254. Act of March 3, 1911, ch. 104, § 1, 1911 Cal. Stat. 271. The Act provided that "It
shall be unlawful for any person, firm, association or corporation to transport or
carry through pipes, conduits, ditches, tunnels, or canals, the waters of any fresh
water lake, pond, brook, river or stream of this state into any other state, for use
therein." The Act was repealed in 1917. The New Jersey law upheld in Hudson
County Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349, 353 (1908) was nearly identical to the
California statute.
255. Act of March 30, 1917, ch. 151, § 1, 1917 Colo. Sess. Laws 539.
256. Act of March 23, 1951, ch. 325, § 1, 1951 Nev. Stat. 543; Act of March 19, 1953, ch.
64, § 2, 1953 N.M. Laws 108.
257. Act of March 5, 1921, ch. 220, § 1, 1921 Mont. Laws 468.
258. Act of March 26, 1919, ch. 164, § 15, 1919 Ariz. Sess. Laws 278, 284.
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this portion of the Nebraska statute that was struck down by the
United States Supreme Court in Sporhase.
Over the years states periodically revised their export policies. At
the time of the Sporhase decision three of the seventeen western
states259 (California, North Dakota, and Texas) had no restrictions on
out-of-state transfers; four western states (Colorado, Idaho, Nevada,
and New Mexico) had absolute bars on such transfers; six western
states (Arizona, Oklahoma, Oregon, Montana, Nebraska, and Wyo-
ning) reserved to themselves a discretionary power to restrict trans-
fers; and the remaining four western states (Kansas, South Dakota,
Utah, and Washington), plus Nebraska, required reciprocity. Current
state statutes governing interstate transfers of water in the seventeen
contiguous western states, along with detailed commentary and analy-
sis, are set forth in the Appendix.
B. The New Mexico Litigation
1. El Paso I
a. Factual Background
Recent water rights litigation between El Paso, Texas and the state
of New Mexico provides important insights into how Sporhase may be
applied to other types of restrictive water transfer legislation. El
Paso, with a population of 450,000 is located on the Rio Grande in west
Texas across the border from New Mexico. El Paso is the economic
hub of an interstate region that includes southern New Mexico. As
the major trade center in the region, El Paso contains the principal
employers and eighty percent of the population. Moreover, metropoli-
tan El Paso is growing more rapidly than the area across the Rio
Grande in New Mexico, an area primarily used for irrigated
agriculture.
El Paso presently obtains water from the Rio Grande and from
wells in Texas, but these sources are insufficient to meet projected
future needs. Recognizing the need to develop an alternate water sup-
ply to meet the demands of its growing population, the city looked
across the border to New Mexico. In due course, El Paso filed 326
applications for groundwater appropriation permits with the New
Mexico state engineer, S. E. Reynolds. El Paso sought permission to
pump and export to Texas up to 296,000 acre-feet of groundwater an-
nually. Reynolds denied all of the permits because a New Mexico stat-
259. In water law, the western states are the 17 contiguous states with land on or west
of the 98th meridian. The states are Arizona, California, Colorado, Idaho, Kan-
sas, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Ore-
gon, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Washington, and Wyoming. See F. TRELEASE &
G. GOuLD, WATER LAW 13-14 (4th ed. 1986).
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ute, with very minor exceptions, prohibited all transfers of
groundwater outside the state.
b. Results of the Litigation
On September 5, 1980, in a case referred to as El Paso J260, El Paso
commenced proceedings in the United States District Court for the
District of New Mexico before Chief Judge Bratton. El Paso chal-
lenged the constitutionality of the New Mexico statute as well as other
statutes that the city felt were used by Reynolds as reason for the per-
mit denials. Twenty-five attorneys were listed as participating in the
litigation. At the conclusion of the trial, Judge Bratton enjoined
Reynolds from enforcing the New Mexico statute to prohibit out-of-
state water transfers.
Because the statute facially discriminated against interstate com-
merce, it was subject to the strictest scrutiny regarding whether it
served a legitimate local purpose, whether it was narrowly tailored to
meet that purpose, and whether there were any adequate nondiscrimi-
natory alternatives available. The New Mexico statute could not with-
stand strict scrutiny review and in any event Judge Bratton decided
that the Supreme Court in Sporhase authorized a state to discriminate
in favor of its own citizens in granting water permits "only to the ex-
tent that water is essential to human survival." 261
c. Key Issues Addressed by the Court
El Paso I involved an application for a new permit to withdraw
water from New Mexico aquifers. Sporhase, in contrast, concerned
the right of an existing water right holder to transfer water across
state lines. Several aspects of Judge Bratton's opinion in El Paso I are
of interest for the way in which he interpreted and applied parts of the
Sporhase opinion. Given the different factual situation, at each point
Judge Bratton may have read Sporhase more narrowly than was in-
tended by the United States Supreme Court.
i. Can state regulation favor local economies?
First, in his discussion of the Commerce Clause, Judge Bratton
pointed out the distinction between regulations designed to protect a
state's economy on the one hand and those designed to protect the
health and safety of the people on the other. Writing for the majority
in Sporhase, Justice Stevens had said that a discriminatory export re-
striction might be valid if it were narrowly tailored to a "legitimate
conservation and preservation interest."262 But he did not clearly
260. City of El Paso v. Reynolds (El Paso I), 563 F. Supp. 379 (D. N.M. 1983).
261. Id. at 389.
262. Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel Douglas, 458 U.S. 941, 958 (1982).
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state what he meant by "legitimate conservation and preservation" in-
terests. The issue in El Paso I was whether New Mexico could restrict
exports of groundwater solely to preserve groundwater to support fu-
ture economic growth in New Mexico.263 In striking down the statute,
Judge Bratton reasoned that the "legitimate conservation interest" re-
ferred to in Sporhase did not extend beyond what was needed to pro-
tect human health and safety; an interest in preserving the economy
of the state was not constitutionally legitimate. In Sporhase, however,
the Court stated that it was "reluctant to condemn as unreasonable,
measures taken by a State to conserve and preserve for its own citi-
zens this vital resource in times of severe shortage. Our reluctance
stems from the 'confluence of several realities.' ,2
ii. Does water have unique constitutional status?
The second aspect of El Paso I that is of interest is Judge Bratton's
comparison of water with other natural resources. New Mexico ar-
gued that its statute served a legitimate local purpose, that of conserv-
ing and preserving the state's "internal water supply."265 Judge
Bratton said this purpose was "unquestionably legitimate and highly
important" 266 and might justify a limited, non-discriminatory burden
on commerce, but "it cannot support a total ban on interstate trans-
portation of ground water."26 7 As he described the import of
Sporhase, a state has power:
'to shelter its people from menaces to their health or safety' but not 'to retard,
burden or constrict the flow of ... commerce for their economic advan-
tage.... .' [citation omitted] Thus, the Supreme Court held that a state may
discriminate in favor of its citizens only to the extent that water is essential to
human survival. Outside of fulfilling human survival needs, water is an eco-
nomic resource. For purposes of constitutional analysis under the Commerce
Clause, it is to be treated the same as other natural resources.
2 6 8
Notwithstanding Judge Bratton's opinion, however, Sporhase does
not lead necessarily to the conclusion that the Commerce Clause re-
quires water to be treated exactly the same as other natural re-
sources-oil, gas, fish, and wildlife, for example. In fact, Judge
Bratton's conclusion seems to contradict Justice Stevens' discussion of
four "realities" that made the Supreme Court "reluctant to condemn
as unreasonable, measures taken by a State to conserve and preserve
for its own citizens [water] in times of severe shortage." 269
The "four realities" that Justice Stevens cited in Sporhase tend to
263. El Paso I, 563 F. Supp. 379, 390 (1983).
264. Sporhase v. Nebraska ex reL Douglas, 458 U.S. at 956.
265. El Paso I, 563 F. Supp. 379, 388-89.
266. Id. at 389.
267. El Paso I, 563 F. Supp. 379, 389.
268. Id.
269. Sporhase v. Nebraska ex r L Douglas, 458 U.S. 941, 956.
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distinguish water from other natural resources. First, according to
Justice Stevens, a state's power to regulate the use of water in times of
shortage to protect the health of its citizens is at the core of its police
power.270 Second, use of interstate compacts and equitable apportion-
ment decrees to allocate water among states has created a "legal ex-
pectation" that state boundaries are relevant in the allocation of
scarce resources.271 Third, a state's claim of public ownership of water
is "logically more substantial" than are similar claims with respect to
other resources and may justify a "limited preference" in favor or its
own citizens.272 Fourth, given the importance of a state's conservation
efforts in maintaining groundwater supplies, groundwater has "some
indicia of a good publicly produced and owned in which a State may
favor its own citizens in times of shortage."273
iii. What is a "severe shortage" of water?
In El Paso I Judge Bratton interpreted Justice Stevens' discussion
of the four realities to mean that a "severe shortage" would not exist
unless supplies for drinking water, household uses, and fire protection
were threatened. While Judge Bratton undoubtedly was correct in as-
suming that the Supreme Court would not give an expansive reading
to the term "severe shortage", Judge Bratton's definition may be too
270. Id. at 956.
271. Id.
272. Id. at 956-57. This third reality arguably gives states a limited right to prefer their
own citizens when allocating water, even if the preference is used to protect the
economic health of the state. Immediately after he mentions the possibility of a
"limited preference," Justice Stevens cites Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518 (1978).
In an unanimous opinion in Hicklin, the U.S. Supreme Court struck down an
Alaska law that gave Alaska residents a hiring preference when seeking to work
on Alaska oil and gas pipelines. According to the Court, the law violated the
Commerce Clause and the Privileges and Immunities Clause. In discussing the
Commerce Clause, the Court cited three decisions that had held state regulation
of natural resources unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause, West v. Kan-
sas Natural Gas, 221 U.S. 229 (1911), Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553
(1923) and Foster Packing Co. v. Haydel, 278 U.S. 1 (1928). The three decisions
established "that the Commerce Clause circumscribes a State's ability to prefer
its own citizens in the utilization of natural resources found within its borders.
.. " Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U.S. at 533. Haydel, according to the Court, "limited
the extent to which a State's purported ownership of certain resources could
serve as a justification for the State's economic discrimination in favor of resi-
dents." Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U.S. at 533 (first emphasis added). Significantly,
the opinion suggests that the Commerce Clause doesn't prohibit economic prefer-
ences, it only limits the extent of such preferences. In citing Hicklin for the
proposition that alleged public ownership of water "may support a limited prefer-
ence," the Sporhase Court gives a strong signal that it would not reject automati-
cally an instate water preference to preserve a state's economy. See Comment,
Waterlaw - Discrimination Against Interstate Commerce in Ground Water for
Economic Reasons, 19 LAND & WATER L. REV. 471 (1984).
273. Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel Douglas, 458 U.S. at 957.
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narrow. Today, for example, certain environmental uses might be
considered essential, especially if diminished water supplies
threatened the health of endangered fish and wildlife populations.
iv. Can a state reserve water for future needs?
A final noteworthy aspect of El Paso I relates to the ability of a
state to reserve present water supplies to meet projected, future
shortages. New Mexico did not claim that its ban on interstate water
transfers promoted health and safety, or that New Mexico suffered a
current water shortage. Rather, New Mexico claimed that the state's
limited water supply was insufficient to meet future foreseeable
needs. According to the state engineer, by the year 2020 New Mexico
would face an annual state-wide consumptive use shortage of 626,000
acre-feet. The shortage predicted by the state, however, was based not
on minimal public health and safety needs, but rather on "public wel-
fare" requirements that included future economic consumptive uses.
Estimated statewide water demand for public health and safety pur-
poses was only 220,000 acre-feet per year, one tenth the estimated re-
newable annual water supply of 2.2 million acre-feet.
Judge Bratton refused to allow New Mexico to include projected
future uses by industry, energy production, and irrigated agriculture
in its calculation of projected shortages. In other words, Judge Brat-
ton refused to allow water needed to support the state's future eco-
nomic base to be removed from the constraints of the Commerce
Clause. To do so, he said, would be tantamount to economic
protectionism.2 74
Judge Bratton then considered what a state must show to justify
discrimination against interstate commerce. In Sporhase, Justice Ste-
vens suggested that a narrowly tailored statute that permitted only
274. El Paso I, 563 F. Supp. at 390. The U.S. Supreme Court rejects the notion that
certain levels of economic well-being are essential to human welfare. Baldwin v.
G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511 (1935)(striking down a New York statute that set
a minimum resale price for imported milk and rejecting an argument that whole-
some supplies of milk would be jeopardized if price competition drove producers
out of business or required producers to reduce expenditures on sanitation). Jus-
tice Cardozo, writing for a unanimous Court, said. "Economic welfare is always
related to health, for there can be no health if men are starving. Let such an
exception be admitted, and all that a state will have to do in times of stress and
strain is to say that its farmers and merchants and workmen must be protected
against competition from without, lest they go upon the poor relief lists or perish
altogether. To give entrance to that excuse would be to invite a speedy end of our
national solidarity." Id. at 523. See also H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc., v. Du Mond, 336
U.S. 525 (1949)(holding a New York statute limiting interstate commerce in milk
to promote local economic advantages violates the Commerce Clause and re-
jecting an argument that destructive competition would reduce the supply of




intrastate water transfers might be constitutional if an arid state as a
whole suffered from a water shortage and if "the intrastate transfer of
water from areas of abundance to areas of shortage is feasible regard-
less of distance."27 5 In El Paso I, New Mexico attempted to show that
locally abundant water near El Paso could be transported to other ar-
eas of New Mexico that were experiencing water shortages. Although
New Mexico had no present plan to transport groundwater away from
the El Paso area, evidence about technically feasible transportation
projects was introduced.
Judge Bratton was not persuaded. Even if transportation projects
were imminent, he said, discrimination could be justified under
Sporhase only if narrowly tailored to times and places of shortage.276
Moreover, to justify limitations in favor of future projects, a state must
demonstrate the present economic feasibility of the project.277 A state
cannot simply prove that it is possible to move the water over enor-
mous distances; engineers almost always can do that.
To place in context this final aspect of El Paso I, consider the doc-
trine of equitable apportionment. Briefly, equitable apportionment al-
locates shares in interstate waters to states or regions so they can plan
their futures. Professor Utton summarized the matter well in the fol-
lowing language:
Equitable apportionment is a doctrine which the courts have fashioned to
maintain the balance between states by "dividing the pie" of an interstate
stream between the states that share it. Thus, the doctrine assures each state
of a fair share and prevents any state, simply because it is upstream, bigger,
more economically advanced, or more aggressive, from taking more than its
share of the river. Under equitable apportionment, the court is called upon to
settle disputes between states "in such a way as will recognize the equal rights
of both and at the same time establish justice between them." In Nebraska v.
Wyoming, the court added that equitable apportionment demands "the deli-
cate adjustment" of the interests of the states.2 7 8
In El Paso I, groundwater was hydrologically connected to the Rio
Grande and the aquifer was under several states.279 Under Judge
Bratton's analysis, New Mexico could not restrain exports of ground-
water to protect its economic interests. By contrast, under principles
of equitable apportionment, New Mexico might well obtain an appor-
tionment of the aquifer that it could then manage to maximize eco-
nomic benefits to the state.
275. Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel. Douglas, 458 U.S. at 958.
276. El Paso I, 563 F. Supp. at 391.
277. Id.
278. Utton, In Search Of An Integrating Principle For Interstate Water Law: Regula-
tion versus The Market Place, 25 NAT. RESOURCES J. 985, 987 (1985).
279. El Paso I, 563 F. Supp. at 380.
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2. El Paso II
New Mexico reacted to El Paso I by doing three things. It appealed
Judge Bratton's decision to the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals; it re-
pealed the statute the judge found unconstitutional; and it enacted
new provisions to govern the transport of groundwater out of state.28 0
On appeal, New Mexico argued that its new statute made the El Paso
litigation moot and it urged dismissal. The Court of Appeals disagreed
and sent the entire matter back to Judge Bratton "for fresh considera-
tion of the respective rights and obligations of the parties in light of
whatever intervening changes of law and circumstances are rele-
vant."28 ' This new round of litigation is referred to as El Paso II.
Before the El Paso II trial began, New Mexico enacted yet another
statute. This one placed a two-year moratorium on all pending and
future applications to appropriate groundwater hydrologically con-
nected to the Rio Grande below Elephant Butte Reservoir.
In El Paso I Judge Bratton had before him the new interstate
transfer statute and the two-year moratorium. The transfer statute
was the first statute especially drafted and enacted to comply with
Sporhase. The new statute contrasts sharply with New Mexico's for-
mer explicit ban on all interstate transfers of water. It begins by stat-
ing that "under appropriate conditions," interstate transportation and
use of New Mexico's waters are not in conflict with the public welfare
of the state's citizens or conservation of its waters. Both surface and
groundwater are included in the term "public waters."
Under the new statute, a person desiring to take water from New
Mexico must apply for a permit from the State Engineer. Among
other things, the State Engineer is directed to determine whether the
withdrawal and transportation of water outside New Mexico will im-
pair existing water rights within New Mexico. If existing water rights
are impaired, then the State Engineer must deny the application. In
addition, before approval of an application, the State Engineer must
find that the proposed transfer of water out of state is neither contrary
to water conservation policies within the state nor otherwise detri-
mental to the public welfare of New Mexico's citizens. In making his
decision, the State Engineer must consider at least six factors:
(1) the supply of water available to the state of New Mexico;
(2) water demands of the state of New Mexico;
(3) whether there are water shortages within the state of New
Mexico;
(4) whether the water that is the subject of the application could
feasibly be transported to alleviate water shortages in the state of New
Mexico;
280. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 72-12B-1 (1978).
281. City of El Paso v. Reynolds (El Paso I1), 597 F. Supp. 694, 696-97 (D. N.M. 1984).
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(5) the supply and sources of water available to the applicant in
the state where the applicant intends to use the water; and
(6) the demands placed on the applicant's supply in the state
where the applicant intends to use the water.282
Under the statute, moreover, the State Engineer may condition a
permit to guarantee that the water, once transported out of New Mex-
ico, is used according to the same regulations and restrictions imposed
on in-state users.283
In considering the new statute, Judge Bratton first examined what
constitutes a legitimate local purpose under Sporhase. He made sev-
eral findings:
(1) Conservation of a scarce resource is a legitimate local
concern.28 4
(2) While the term "public welfare" is a broad term that includes
such matters as health, safety, recreational, aesthetic, environmental,
and economic interests, a legitimate public interest must be more than
economic to avoid a per se rule of invalidity. If the public welfare cri-
terion is used to promote a legitimate purpose with only an incidental
burden on interstate commerce, the Court must try to accommodate
the local and national interests, but if less burdensome alternatives
are available the state must use them.
(3) A state may favor its own citizens in times and places of
shortage. Whether the preference is reasonable depends on the prox-
imity in time of a projected shortage, the certainty it will occur, its
predicted severity, and whether alternative measures could prevent or
alleviate the shortage. In other words, a state cannot bar exports be-
cause it anticipates that at some later time there will be insufficient
water to meet all future uses. Instead, any preference for predicted
shortages must be limited to times and places where its exercise would
not place an unreasonable burden on commerce compared to the local
benefits.28 5
(4) The six criteria which the State Engineer is to consider when
acting upon an application to export are valid.
Judge Bratton concluded that the first four statutory criteria were
necessary to determine if there is a water shortage in New Mexico.
The final two criteria are valid because local benefits cannot be
weighed against the burdens on commerce without knowledge of the
export applicant's need for the water in comparison with the need of
the prospective in-state users.286
282. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 72-12B-1D (1978).
283. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 72-12B-IF (1978).
284. El Paso II, 597 F. Supp. 694, 698 (D. N.M. 1984).
285. Id. at 701.
286. Id. at 703.
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Judge Bratton also wrote that in determining whether a prefer-
ence for a state's own citizens is reasonable a court will consider the
extent to which a state claims public ownership of its waters and
whether the availability of water is partially the result of the state's
own efforts.28 7
Notwithstanding his approval of the statutory criteria, Judge Brat-
ton held that the New Mexico statute did not operate evenhandedly
within the meaning of Sporhase because New Mexico demanded that
all out-of-state transfers not be contrary to the state's water conserva-
tion standards or detrimental to the public welfare while putting simi-
lar restrictions on only one kind of in-state transfer.288 The difference
in treatment discriminated on its face against interstate commerce and
consequently was subject to strict scrutiny.28 9 New Mexico could not
meet the burden of proving that the disparate treatment served a le-
gitimate local purpose, that it was narrowly tailored to that purpose,
and that there were no adequate nondiscriminatory alternatives. 2 90
Judge Bratton also held unconstitutional the two-year moratorium
enacted by the New Mexico legislature on the Hueco and Mesilla Bol-
sons aquifers. Judge Bratton said that the moratorium was unconsti-
tutional regardless of its nondiscriminatory effect because it involved
a purpose to discriminate against interstate commerce. 29 ' New Mex-
ico had argued that the moratorium regulated evenhandedly because
it stayed new appropriations for use both in-state and out-of-state, but
the only thing that distinguished these aquifers from others in the
state was that El Paso had filed applications to take water from them
and transport it to Texas.
Several things should be noted about El Paso If. First, Judge Brat-
ton changed his position slightly from El Paso I by recognizing that
dictum in Sporhase suggests that, under certain circumstances, states
may discriminate against out-of-state users of water by giving their
citizens a limited preference. He also acknowledged that the term
"public welfare" contains some suggestion that states may preserve
287. Id. at 701.
288. Id. at 703-04. After E Paso I, New Mexico amended its statutes to add new con-
servation and welfare requirements that applied to both in-state and out-of-state
water transfers. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 72-5-23 (Supp. 1985). Attempts by one state
to impose conservation measures on another state also may be constitutionally
suspect, however. In an extreme case, such attempts would operate much as reci-
procity clauses, barring exports from a state of origin unless the importing state
adopted laws that matched the laws of the state of origin.
289. El Paso I, 597 F. Supp. 694, 704 (D. N.M. 1984).
290. Id.
291. Judge Bratton said that the balancing test in Bruce Church presupposes that a
statute has a legitimate purpose. That being so, evenhandedness cannot make
valid an illegitimate purpose. He added that the moratorium was clearly calcu-
lated to effectuate a protectionist purpose: "the complete blockage of interstate
commerce in water." Id. at 707.
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their water supplies both for the health of their citizens and for the
health of their economies.
In the end, Judge Bratton rejected three of El Paso's challenges to
the New Mexico statute and concluded: (1) a state's conservation ef-
forts or concerns for the public welfare of its citizens are not per se
discriminatory against interstate commerce; (2) "public interest" and
"conservation" are proper standards for evaluating a state's interests
because of longstanding usage and tradition and the fact that the
terms can be limited if necessary by the courts;292 and (3) under
Sporhase absolute evenhandedness is not always required because a
claim of public ownership may justify a "limited preference" for a
state's citizens and an arid state's conservation efforts may justify lim-
its on groundwater transfers out of state.
Judge Bratton upheld El Paso's fourth challenge to the statute. He
concluded that a state must evenhandedly evaluate in-state and out-of-
state applications to transfer water. Because the New Mexico statute
required the State Engineer to consider six factors when acting on ap-
plications for out-of-state transfers that he did not have to consider
with regard to most applications for in-state transfers, the statute put
the entire burden of conservation protection on interstate commerce.
That result, according to Judge Bratton, constituted illegitimate dis-
crimination against interstate commerce.
C. Legislative Studies in New Mexico
During the same session at which the New Mexico legislature en-
acted the state's new statute regarding interstate transfers of ground-
water, the legislature also enacted SB 300. SB 300 directed the
Governor, after consultation with the State Engineer and the Attor-
ney General, to appoint a committee to study the impact on the state's
water resources of "recent court decisions concerning water and inter-
state commerce."293 Judge Bratton's decision holding New Mexico's
embargo statute unconstitutional had been entered approximately two
months before passage of S.B. 300.
The committee's report to the Governor considered alternative
means of protecting New Mexico's water from out-of-state trans-
fers. 294 The Governor issued a report after evaluating the committee's
report. The Governor's Report recommended three possible methods
to keep New Mexico groundwater at home:
292. Id. at 702.
293. 1983 N.M. Laws, ch. 98.
294. Water Study Committee, Report to Governor Tony Anaya and the Legislative
Council Pursuant to Laws 1983, Chapter 98, reprinted sub. nom. Water Law
Study Committee, The Impact of Recent Court Decisions Concerning Water and
Interstate Commerce on Water Resources of the State of New Mexico, 24 NAT.
REsouRcEs J. 689 (1984)[hereinafter Governor's Report].
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(1) The state could appropriate available groundwater in an at-
tempt to create a state proprietary interest that would support a ban
on exports.295
(2) The state could seek congressional authorization of a state
embargo on interstate water transfers. 2 96
(3) The state could seek to allocate groundwater pursuant to an
interstate compact. It was recommended that New Mexico enter into
compact negotiations with Texas to clarify division of Rio Grande sur-
face water below Elephant Butte Dam and in that way clarify as well
the status of related groundwater. No compact has been entered into
to implement this recommendation.
A 1986 critique of the Governor's Report discussed the numerous
problems implicated in implementing the recommendations. 29 7 First,
an allocation procedure would have to be developed if the state be-
came the actual, rather than fictitious, owner of groundwater. This
practical problem was recognized in the Governor's Report. Second, if
the state has an illegitimate motive, such as economic protectionism,
the motive must be effectively disguised or "courts will be strongly
tempted to hold that the state's new scheme of ownership confers no
greater justification for an embargo than its old public trust."298
Third, although recent Supreme Court cases recognize that when a
state conducts a business enterprise the Commerce Clause need not
apply, still "it seems doubtful that the Court would allow a state to
295. Creating a proprietary interest in groundwater is an attempt to come within the
market participant exception to the Commerce Clause. For a discussion of this
exception see Part IV, supra.
The legislative committee recommended immediate funding of a study, but
not immediate implementation of the "state appropriation" option, which it re-
garded as a last resort if neither a federal solution nor an interstate compact
could be reached.
A study to carry out this recommendation of the Water Law Study Committee
was conducted as a joint venture between the Natural Resources Center at the
University of New Mexico School of Law and the Water Resources Institute at
New Mexico State University. See New Mexico Water Resources Research Insti-
tute and University of New Mexico Law School, State Appropriation of Unappro-
priated Groundwater: A Strategy for Insuring New Mexico a Water Future (Jan.
1986).
New Mexico Laws, ch. 98, sec.2, appropriated $125,000 from the general fund
to the office of the governor for the purpose of paying the expenses of the water
law study committee. New Mexico Laws, ch. 114, sec. 2, appropriated $200,000
from the general fund to the office of governor for additional studies.
296. For a discussion of the power of Congress to authorize exclusionary activity, see
Part IV, supra. The legislative committee urged the state to make every possible
effort to achieve federal legislation permitting New Mexico to keep its water re-
sources within the state's boundaries. No federal legislation implementing this
recommendation has been enacted.
297. Note, New Mexico Continues to Study Water Embargo Measures: A Reply to the
State Water Law Study Committee, 16 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 939 (1985).
298. Id. at 947.
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fashion a business for the purpose of discriminating against out-of-
state citizens." 299 Fourth, negotiated regional resolutions, although
theoretically appealing, will be difficult. Furthermore, a resolution in-
volving congressional action may be no easier. Congress has been re-
luctant to involve itself in state water law issues.3 00 Certainly
Congress has little experience in apportioning interstate water re-
sources. It did apportion one river, the Colorado, but lengthy litiga-
tion has been necessary to clarify what the congressional
apportionment meant.3 0 1 For all these reasons, the authors of the cri-
tique concluded that the best solution was for the parties directly in-
volved to negotiate the most expedient and fair resolution possible.
D. Conclusion
The New Mexico litigation suggests that states will face substantial
hurdles in attempting to draft legislation that complies with the dic-
tates of Sporhase, and at the same time gives a preference in water use
to in-state citizens. This is true even where a state is not attempting to
restrict the rights of existing water rights holders to transfer their en-
titlements across state lines, but rather only attempting to limit the
ability of out-of-state claimants to acquire new state water rights. A
number of factors, however, suggest that a state should have some lati-
tude to favor its own citizens in the initial distribution of water rights,
even though it would have little ability to restrict interstate transfers
of rights already distributed.
Most interstate water transfers have involved unappropriated
water, that is water that has not yet been devoted to beneficial use. In
most western states, but not in Nebraska, landowners must secure a
permit from the state before extracting groundwater. Professor
Trelease has argued that during the initial process of granting these
permits for water use, state officials can take whatever actions are
necessary to ensure that benefits resulting from the appropriation re-
main inside the state.302 Although the Trelease position is at odds
with the position taken by Judge Bratton in the El Paso litigation, it is
not without merit.
According to Professor Trelease, a state is deprived of its sover-
eignty unless the distinction between unappropriated and appropri-
ated water is made. This is true because water, as much as land, is
299. Id. at 952.
300. The critique gives several examples. Id. at 952-57.
301. Arizona v. California, 298 U.S. 558 (1936). Among other areas of dispute, Arizona
and California could not agree whether the apportionment was limited to the
main stream or whether the tributaries were included. See C. MEYERS & A.
TARLOCK, WATER RESOURcE MANAGEMENT 432-73 (2d ed. 1980).
302. Trelease, State Water and State Lines: Commerce in Water Resources, 56 U.
CoLo. L. REv. 347 (1985).
[Vol. 70:754
INTERSTATE TRANSFERS OF WATER
part of a state's assets which it should be free to retain or put into
private hands. Congress, of course, would have the power to overturn
state conservation decisions if state "hoarding" of water supplies be-
came a serious problem.3 03 Even if states cannot retain unappropri-
ated groundwater, he argues, they should at a minimum have the
ability to recoup lost benefits that result from out-of-state transfer of
resources.
Sporhase is right and B1 Paso is wrong. States can live with Sparhase's ruling
that a state cannot tell its citizens that they cannot sell out of state when it
permits them to sell within the state. This applies to both sales of water and
sales of water rights. A state cannot expect to prevent the interstate sale of
water rights to "preserve the neighborhood" any more than it could prevent a
steel mill from closing in a factory town or dictate the way of life to its rural
inhabitants. On the other hand, the states cannot live with El Paso. El Paso
would require a state to sit by and see other states deprive its people of future
opportunities for growth and development, while preserving only
"noneconomic" water for the public health and safety of stagnating communi-
ties. Without overruling Sporhzase, but with some clarifications in regard to
shortages and explanations of legitimate local interests, much water might be
saved within states on a territorial-opportunity cost theory, ... , without freez-
ing out neighboring cities. Neighboring cities might be put to more expense
either because they have to pay the opportunity costs or because they must
use available, though more expensive, sources in their own state.3 ° 4
An economic analysis would suggest that states ought to be able to
capture the secondary benefits they would have received if the water
had been used within the state rather than elsewhere. Unless the
state of origin is able to charge the importing state the value of lost
opportunities in the state of origin, all costs of the transfer are not
included. This argument applies only to unappropriated water, how-
ever. Once water has passed into private hands, normal market mech-
anisms in conjunction with the "no injury" rule should insure that the
state is adequately compensated for the transfer.3 05
The National Water Commission studied large scale water trans-
fers in 1973.306 According to the Commission, two conditions are nec-
303. "Hoarding has its opportunity costs too: saving water foolishly for small or specu-
lative future benefits could cause the loss of a generous present offer." Id. at 371.
304. Trelease, supra note 199, at 321.
305. In a market system, if advocates of a transfer are willing to pay sufficient com-
pensation to persons holding water or water rights to induce such persons to vol-
untarily give up their water or water rights, then the transfer should be approved
unless third parties, not participating in the negotiations, would be injured. As
among willing buyers and sellers, each will be better off after the transfer than
before the transfer. The buyers will receive water at what they believe to be a
reasonable cost, and the sellers will receive more for their water than they could
earn if they put the water to beneficial use themselves. If water is unappropri-
ated, however, no market exists to police the transaction. Consequently, unless
states can charge for opportunities forgone, present out-of-state uses will have an
unfair economic advantage over future in-state uses.
306. NATIONAL WATER COMMIssION, Water Policiesfor the Future (1973). The major
background studies on interbasin transfers submitted to the National Water
1991]
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
essary before a proposed out-of-state transfer proposal is considered
desirable from an economic point of view. First, it should be the least-
cost alternative for supplying the necessary quantity of water to the
users.30 7 If lower cost and equally reliable sources of supply can be
found, those should be used. Second, the benefits in the new uses
must be greater than the sum of the costs of construction, operation,
and maintenance, plus the net opportunity costs of foregone uses in
the area of origin, all discounted to a common time basis.308 Environ-
mental costs also should be included in the computation.
VI. PITFALLS TO AVOID IN LEGISLATIVE DRAFTING AND
CONSTITUTIONAL LITIGATION
A. Drafting Considerations
As should be clear from the preceding Parts, the Commerce Clause
generally prohibits a state from regulating items of commerce in a way
that discriminates against out-of-state users. No matter how a state
attempts to get there, it will find its path blocked by the Supreme
Court.
On the other hand, state legislative action that affects, but does not
discriminate against, interstate commerce will be upheld if it meets
the Bruce Church test. The legislation will be upheld if it furthers an
important state policy; it operates even-handedly; and, of reasonably
available legislative alternatives, it is the one producing the least im-
pact on interstate commerce.
Even a legitimate policy objective, however, can fail if not drafted
properly. As legislatures well know, there often are several ways to
translate a policy objective into statutory language. For purposes of
the Commerce Clause some statutory approaches will pass constitu-
tional muster and others will not. What we emphasize here is the par-
amount importance of recognizing and avoiding doomed alternatives
and language and recognizing and incorporating those approaches that
predict the most chance for withstanding a Commerce Clause
challenge.
A recent case involving the states of Ohio and Indiana is illustra-
Commission were R. JOHNSON, LAW OF INTERBASIN TRANSFERS, MAJOR INTER-
STATE TRANSFERS: LEGAL ASPECTS (Report No. NWC-L-71-008, Prepared for the
National Water Comm'n Legal Study No. 7, July 26, 1971), and D. MANN, IN-
TERBASIS WATER TRANSFERS: POLITIcAL AND INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS (Report
No. NWC-SBS-72-037, Prepared for the National Water Comm'n, March 1972).
See also Weatherford, Legal Aspects of Interregional Water Diversion, 15 UCLA
L. REv. 1299 (1968).
307. NATIONAL WATER COMMISSION, supra note 306, at 319-20.
308. Id. at 325, 328, 330-331. See also MacDonnell & Howe, Area-of-Origin Protection
in Transbasin Water Diversions: An Evaluation of Alternative Approaches, 57
U. COLO. L. REv. 527 (1986).
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tive. Each state had precisely the same policy objective-to provide an
incentive for local production of ethanol. Ohio gave fuel dealers a
sales tax credit for each gallon of ethanol sold-but only if the ethanol
either was (1) produced in Ohio (an example of facial discrimination
against interstate commerce) or (2) produced in a state that gave a
similar credit for Ohio-produced ethanol (an example of a reciprocity
clause). Indiana, by contrast, gave a direct subsidy to Indiana produ-
cers of ethanol. Ohio's plan was struck down as economic protection-
ism; Indiana's plan was constitutional because it did not regulate
interstate commerce, but instead merely encouraged in-state business.
To assure the best chance that a statute will be upheld, the legisla-
ture at an absolute minimum should avoid reciprocity clauses or direct
language that favors in-state uses. In addition, the following points
should be kept in mind.
1. Know the Character and Dimensions of Water Use
To assure the most effective policy choices-and to assure that stat-
utory language provides optimum implementation of a policy choice-
we believe that a legislature should obtain and consider carefully the
data regarding water use in the state-who?, where?, how much?,
when?, how?-as well as the likely uses of water out of state-who?,
where?, how much?, when?, how?, how transferred? A legislature
then may determine where it perceives a problem in the use or trans-
fer of water, if indeed it perceives a problem at all. Some concerns
may be too minimal or too remote to warrant legislative consideration.
Some options, although constitutional, may provide so little benefit as
to not be worth the cost.
2. Draft to Achieve a Constitutional Water Policy
Once a legislature has satisfied itself as to the character and dimen-
sions of water use, it then may evaluate how a statute drafted in neu-
tral language nonetheless might enhance local uses. We do not
suggest that a subterfuge will work; the Supreme Court will look past
neutral language to evaluate a legislature's "true" purpose as well as
whether a neutral statute nonetheless has a discriminatory effect.
Given a legitimate policy objective, however, states have some flexibil-
ity in deciding how to achieve their objectives, and alternatives might
vary in their effect on interstate transfers. We do suggest, therefore,
that, while the Court will look closely to evaluate the impact on inter-
state transfers, it likely will uphold a particular legislative solution if
it furthers a clearly legitimate purpose in a responsible way, particu-
larly if the purpose may not be achieved as well in another fashion.
There is nothing in Commerce Clause theory that requires a state to
disadvantage its own citizens or, when presented with an array of
choices to achieve a water policy, to affirmatively avoid a choice that
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better achieves a conservation goal simply because it also discourages
interstate transfers.
One example illustrates how familiarity with local patterns of
water use could lead to an even-handed statute that nonetheless dis-
couraged interstate transfers. Assume that after study a legislature
determines it likely that most applications for large-scale water trans-
fers and large-scale new water rights will come from out-of-state
users. A statute that requires preparation of an environmental impact
statement before any large-scale transfer is approved, or any large-
scale new water right is granted, would be even-handed because it
would apply to every large-scale project without regard to whether the
water would stay in state or be transferred out of state. Such a statute
also would further a clearly legitimate state purpose, preventing un-
necessary environmental harm.
Without doubt the Supreme Court would recognize that large-scale
projects impact the environment to a greater degree than smaller
projects. It also appears probable that the Supreme Court would rec-
ognize as legitimate a legislative determination that the more limited
benefits of formal environmental reviews of small projects would not
be cost justified. Thus, while the Supreme Court would evaluate
closely the discriminatory effect of a policy that requires environmen-
tal review only for large-scale projects, it would likely sustain the stat-
ute as a reasonable and efficient accommodation of legitimate state
purposes.
To meet the Bruce Church test and demonstrate that a state does
not have an illegitimate, discriminatory motive, water transfer legisla-
tion should: (1) generally not discriminate between in-state and out-
of-state uses; (2) discriminate only if the state is prepared to and can
establish that it faces a severe water shortage and that its regulation
creates only a limited, in-state preference in use of water; (3) treat
water in a comprehensive statutory fashion so as to withstand argu-
ments that concern is focused only on situations in which a user seeks
to take state water elsewhere. Moreover, where possible, state stat-
utes governing the use of surface and groundwater and in-state and
out-of-state transfers should use the same language to describe the
permissible scope of use and the degree of state control. It is easiest to
demonstrate evenhanded operation when the language describing the
operation is parallel.
3. Provide a Comprehensive Approach
A Legislature should give serious consideration to enacting a com-
prehensive, all-encompassing, and consistent water code that governs
water use and conservation. A comprehensive scheme is the best and
most forceful demonstration of a state's serious and sincere commit-
ment to water conservation and responsible management.
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4. Keep Statements Consistent With Policy
A state's stated purpose in enacting legislation in, for example, a
preamble is not conclusive as to a non-discriminatory intent because
the purpose stated may not be the real one. In any event, a pure in-
tent cannot save a statute that fails the Bruce Church test. Nonethe-
less, stating a neutral, constitutionally acceptable purpose can do no
harm and may constitute one useful datum in an overall showing that
no discrimination was involved. Conversely, stating an impermissible
purpose in a preamble surely will harm a state"s chance to have a stat-
ute upheld under the Commerce Clause.
Legislative intent outside that stated in the preamble may also be
influential with a court. Testimony at hearings-and particularly
comments by legislators-committee reports, and floor debates may
be cited in briefs and considered by a court. Some day a judge may
hold a statute unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause and cite
to such statements as part of the proof that the legislative purpose was
discriminatory even though the legislation was neutral on its face.
Legislators must be careful how they couch their own statements
and ever-vigilant to challenge and correct testimony at hearings and
statements during legislative debate that suggest that a statute repre-
sents an attempt to hide in neutral language an illicit purpose to cir-
cumvent the Commerce Clause. Imprudent statements may return to
haunt the state's attorney when defending the statute in a subsequent
court case.
B. Constitutional Litigation
We wish we could say that a well-thought-out, comprehensive ap-
proach to water policy, coupled with careful selection of legislative
language and a "pure" legislative record, will assure that no court
challenges ever are brought. But nothing in life is certain except
death, taxes--and, probably, court challenges. Even when the
Supreme Court ultimately upholds a statute under the Commerce
Clause, the holding is the result of litigation that lasted several years.
We are prepared to make one guarantee and one prediction, however.
What can be guaranteed is that properly drafted legislation stands the
best possible chance of withstanding Commerce Clause and other con-
stitutional challenges. This might well be considered quite a step for-
ward, considering that legislation encompassing a legitimate policy
objective often is drafted in language offering little or no chance of
success in court. What can be predicted is that legislation drafted
properly to withstand Commerce Clause scrutiny should result in
fewer lawsuits being brought than would be brought with less care-
fully drafted legislation.
A major job of a lawyer is to evaluate for a client the likelihood of
success of a court challenge. A statute that optimally meets all consti-
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tutional arguments likely to be raised against it is a statute that should
prompt from a lawyer a discouraging assessment of the likelihood of a
client's success in court. As a consequence, some potential plaintiffs
will choose not to sue after evaluating the litigation costs compared to
the likelihood of success. These same litigants, by contrast, would
have a different assessment of costs and likelihood of success if the
statute, for example, contained a reciprocity clause certain to be
struck down.
Some lawsuits will continue to be brought, however. First, lawyers
must have a firm grip on the operative law properly to assess the like-
lihood of a successful court challenge. Because constitutional law,
substantive water law, and technical water issues are exceedingly
complex, many lawyers will not have the expertise properly to evalu-
ate the merits of a claim. Second, a litigant may choose to proceed
even with little likelihood of success if the matter is sufficiently criti-
cal to him. Third, lawyers may believe they can persuade a court to
reverse itself on operating legal principles, or a shift in membership
on the United States Supreme Court may open the possibility of a new
direction to be taken by the Supreme Court.
A change in the membership on the United States Supreme Court
is the most difficult factor to assess when predicting future develop-
ment in this area of the law. What seems clear is that the Court is at
the high-water level of Commerce Clause scrutiny. In other words, if
a state statute meets this Court's interpretation of the Bruce Church
test, it certainly will meet the interpretation of the Court 10 or 15
years hence.
Judicial hostility toward intentional discrimination against inter-
state commerce (particularly with regard to limited natural resources)
and the Court's asserted negative Commerce Clause power seem with
us for the long run. On the other hand, there may be some Commerce
Clause areas where a change of one or two votes will have a dramatic
impact. Of all justices, Brennan and Marshall were the most adamant
and ardent supporters of a far-reaching, nationalist interpretation of
the Commerce Clause. Justices Souter and Thomas are likely to be
more moderate. Justice Blackmun, also adamant in support of broad
Commerce Clause scrutiny, is the oldest currently sitting justice and
the most likely to be the next to leave the Court. His replacement also
may be more moderate in approach than he. A different majority
might adjust current Commerce Clause theory to provide more oppor-
tunity for constitutional state regulation. Possible changes include
(1) clearer acceptance of the possibility of asserting the market partici-
pant exception in cases involving natural resources; and (2) less strin-
gent scrutiny of state statutes that avoid facial discrimination. Justice
Scalia, in fact, presently takes the position that the only room for
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Supreme Court negative Commerce Clause scrutiny is with respect to
facial discrimination.
When a statute is challenged in court, the same legal acumen and
careful structuring of the state's case is necessary that was accom-
plished in drafting the statute being challenged. There must be an
assurance that pertinent evidence gets into the record, and that re-
quires a firm grasp of what needs to be proved to prevail. Legal argu-
ments at trial, and particularly on appeal, must be constructed with
care. High stakes constitutional litigation is not an area where a state
should attempt to economize in procuring legal services.309
VII. AN ASSESSMENT OF POLICY OPTIONS
AFTER SPORHASE
A. Findings and Implications
1. Finding:
The United States Supreme Court consistently has construed the Commerce
Clause of the United States Constitution to forbid discrimination against arti-
cles in interstate commerce even when Congress has not legislated in the area.
In Sporhase, the Supreme Court held that water is an article of commerce.
Implications:
Absent an extraordinary situation,31 0 water transfer legislation
that, on its face, puts out-of-state users at a disadvantage over in-state
users will be held unconstitutional. Examples of unconstitutional leg-
islative provisions include:
a. An absolute prohibition on transfer of water out-of-state while
permitting in-state water transfers;
b. Discrimination against out-of-state transfers by:
(i) Charging a higher fee to transfer water out-of-state than
is charged for transfers or use in-state unless such fees are cost
justified;
(ii) Requiring legislative approval for transfers of water out-
of-state (where no legislative approval is required for in-state
transfers);
(iii) Taxing transfers of water out-of-state (where no tax is
levied on in-state transfers), unless the tax is justified on a cost
basis;
c. A reciprocity provision;
309. Nebraska might want to consider a consultative water law task force, similar to
that of New Mexico, to suggest draft language for legislation, to review legislative
proposals, and to advise or handle court challenges. This, of course, would re-
quire adequate financing. See supra note 295.
310. See Finding 5 regarding the implications for state regulation in a water short area.
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d. Any other restrictive provision that applies only to interstate
transfers.
In our judgment, even a statute narrowly tailored to comply with the
dicta in Sporhase runs a substantial risk of being invalidated if restric-
tions applied to interstate transfers are not similarly applied to in-
state transfers.
2. Finding:
While states are prohibited from unduly restricting the flow of interstate com-
merce, the federal government is under no such burden. Actions that would
be constitutionally suspect if initiated by a state can be removed from constitu-
tional scrutiny by an act of Congress.
Implications:
If a state wants to prevent the transport of water out of state, its
only completely safe option is to get approval from Congress. If Con-
gress approves, the most egregious form of economic protectionism
will escape constitutional scrutiny. Congressional approval can take
the form of:
a. Approving an interstate compact. If two or more states agreed
to an interstate management scheme, even one that included an
absolute ban on out-of-state transfers, and if the Congress ap-
proved that interstate compact, then all states and individuals
would be bound by the anti-transfers provisions, even states and
residents of states that were not parties to the compact
negotiations.
b. Authorizing (Or Validating) State Legislation. Congress could
pass legislation that authorizes states to engage in discriminatory
practices or validates state action already undertaken. For a fed-
eral statute of this kind to be effective, Congress must be very
clear in its authorization to the states. Obviously, the best and saf-
est way to assure that Congressional intent is clear is for the fed-
eral statute to state the authorization in express terms.
Additionally, Congress could legislate to preempt state water law.
If it did so, it could establish as national policy a ban on interstate
exports of water, or such other limitations on exports as Congress
might determine are consistent with the national interest. Such fed-
eral policies would be constitutional notwithstanding their discrimina-
tory effect.
3. Finding:
While state legislation that facially discriminates against interstate commerce
bears an almost per se presumption of unconstitutionality, legislation that reg-
ulates evenhandedly to effectuate a legitimate local public interest will be sus-
tained despite incidental effects on interstate commerce if, on balance, the
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local benefits outweigh the burden on interstate commerce and the state could
not achieve these benefits through means that impose a lesser burden on in-
terstate commerce.
Implications:
The most available mechanism for establishing a water transfer
policy consistent with the Commerce Clause likely lies in legislation
that meets the Bruce Church test. Under Bruce Church, conservation
of a natural resource such as water, particularly when coupled with
health or environmental concerns, clearly is a significant local inter-
est. In fact, the Supreme Court in Sporhase acknowledged that the
long history of sovereign prerogatives over water makes state claims
of "public ownership" of water even more substantial than similar
claims regarding other natural resources.
As a practical matter, the Bruce Church test requires valuing the
nature and importance of policies designed to conserve water or insure
efficient use of water against the burden that such policies impose on
interstate commerce. Not only must the state interest outweigh in im-
portance the burden on interstate commerce, but (1) its operation
likely must not entail a complete exclusion of nonresidents; and
(2) the Supreme Court must be persuaded that in any event the state
could not have achieved its purpose through a reasonably available al-
ternative that would have imposed a lesser burden on interstate com-
merce. A reasonably available alternative is one that neither requires
a state to take extraordinary measures to implement it, nor obligates a
state to attempt new, unproven, or extremely costly solutions to per-
ceived problems.
The fact that even-handed regulation will be upheld despite some
incidental impact on interstate commerce means that the impact of
legislation need not fall with equal impact on in-state and out-of-state
users. While the Court will look closely to evaluate the difference in
effect, it likely will uphold legislation where the legislative scheme
achieves a clearly legitimate purpose in a way that may not be
achieved as well in another fashion.
Examples of "classification" strategies that would likely meet the
Bruce Church test include:
a. Imposing more cumbersome transfer procedures on proposed
large volume transfers. (Large volume transfers merit more in-
depth review because they have more potential impacts than small
volume transfers.)
b. Imposing more cumbersome transfer procedures on municipal
transfers. (Municipal transfers merit more in-depth review be-
cause municipal demands are less seasonal than agricultural de-
mands and the percentage of water physically consumed varies
between municipal and agricultural uses.)
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c. Imposing more cumbersome transfer procedures on long dis-
tance transfers, or out-of-basin transfers. (Long distance transfers
and out-of-basin transfers create greater impacts than short dis-
tance transfers even if the impacts of transport are ignored, be-
cause local return flows are eliminated.)
d. Imposing more cumbersome transfer procedures on transfers
out of environmentally sensitive areas. (Transfers out of environ-
mentally sensitive areas, for example the Nebraska Sandhills with
its wet meadows and perched water tables, merit special consider-
ation to assure that a proposed withdrawal or transfer does not
threaten sensitive resources.)
More cumbersome transfer procedures include (1) more stringent or
formalized environmental review procedures; (2) preparation of cost/
benefit analyses; (3) expanded opportunities for public input; (4) more
extensive regulatory reviews; and (5) placing the burden of proof of
meeting statutory requirements for transfer on an applicant seeking a
permit to transfer.
Two additional considerations are worth noting:
(1) A state should exercise care in choice of statutory language, in
legislative policy and purpose statements, in committee hearings, and
in legislative debate to avoid explaining proposed legislation in terms
of economic protectionism or in terms that suggest a purpose to dis-
criminate against out-of-state uses.
(2) Where possible, statutes governing the use of surface and
groundwater and in-state and out-of-state transfers and other uses
should use the same language to describe the permissible scope of use
and the degree of state control.
4. Finding:
Sporhase put to rest the notion that western states' claims of public ownership
of water could defeat Commerce Clause scrutiny. Thus, it appears that state
control over water found within its borders normally will be evaluated in the
context of sovereignty, not property. While a state may enter the market as a
participant, holding water as a private landowner, it likely faces a heavy bur-
den to show that it has done so.
Implications:
Generally a state acting as a market participant can announce the
terms on which it is willing to do business with others. A state that
owned water, for instance, could announce that it would entertain of-
fers to purchase water only from residents of the state. As long as the
residents were not prohibited from reselling water to out-of-state in-
terests, the state's policy would not offend the Commerce Clause.
Sporhase, however, seems to establish a presumption that a state acts
in its governmental capacity when regulating water resources. Thus, a
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state will not automatically have available to it the market participant
exception to the Commerce Clause. A state seeking to avail itself of
market participant status must demonstrate that it holds water as a
private landowner, not a governmental regulator.
With respect to limited amounts of water, such a demonstration is
possible. The state as owner of the fee interest in certain lands would
have the same overlying rights to pump groundwater as a private land-
owner. Even if groundwater was freely transferrable, however, land-
owners would be under no compunction to enter into voluntary
exchanges. Consequently, any fee owner, including the state, could
refuse to sell water or could refuse to sell water to out-of-state
interests.
Apart from the above limited circumstances, however, the only
way a state could insure that it could act as a market participant would
be to purchase or condemn outstanding water rights. In theory, a state
could acquire all water rights in a state and then reallocate them as it
saw fit. When acting in a proprietary capacity, however, the state
would be subject to antitrust laws. Any attempt to acquire ownership
of substantially all of the water in the state would be subject to attack
as an illegal attempt to monopolize. Moreover, even if a state suc-
ceeded in acquiring property rights to virtually all of the water in a
state, caselaw suggests that the market participant exception would be
unavailing to the extent that a state sought to hoard water for its own
residents.
The market participant exception does offer states greater options
with respect to water not already allocated to private use. Unallocated
water could be allocated to the state for specific purposes much as it is
allocated to private parties for specific purposes. With respect to its
share of water, the state would be empowered to act as a market par-
ticipant. As holder of an instream appropriation, for instance, the
state would possess a right that it could hold or market as it saw fit.
Similarly, with a facilitating groundwater property rights system in
place, a state might acquire a right to water in place beneath the soil to
support wetlands designated as critical habitat. As a private water
right holder the state would be a market participant. Sometimes a
state can accomplish a particular purpose by becoming a market par-
ticipant or by exercising governmental power. Instream flow protec-
tion is an example. A state can act as a proprietor and seek an
appropriation for instream flows, or a state can exercise governmental
power to preclude granting any additional private appropriation per-
mits on a particular reach or stream. Although both procedures effec-
tively allocate water to instream uses, the former approach gives the
state market participant status while the latter approach does not.
Even in the limited circumstances described above, however, the
market participant exception is not likely to be of great significance
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absent significant changes in Nebraska's water rights system. Very lit-
tle unappropriated surface water remains in the state and ground-
water rights are, for the most part, tied to land ownership.
5. Finding:
Sporhase did not, however, suggest that a state was powerless to influence the
movement of water across state lines. In fact, the Court suggested that a state
in a water short area could effectuate a limited preference for its own citizens.
Implications:
The obvious implication from this finding is that a state may be
able to implement some level of protectionist legislation if it is regu-
lating with regard to a demonstrably water short area. Certainly
transfer procedures may be more cumbersome in water short areas,
such as Nebraska's groundwater control areas, than in areas of rela-
tive abundance. Consequently, even small-scale, short-distance trans-
fers could merit in-depth review if the proposed transfer was out of a
control area. This is particularly true if the proposed transfer would
threaten the management strategy or aquifer life that had been set for
the area. For example, although the matter is not without constitu-
tional risk, it may be that Nebraska could require even more, and
more detailed, justification for interstate transfers out of groundwater
control areas than for intrastate transfers because, after an interstate
transfer, return flows at the surface and deep percolation into under-
ground aquifers would no longer be subject to Nebraska law and Ne-
braska management strategies. Although the loss of jurisdiction over
return flows would not justify a prohibition on interstate transfers, it
might well permit Nebraska to subject such transfers to special
scrutiny.
6. Finding:
To be able to establish a limited preference for Nebraska's citizens in a water
short area it is required, of course, that Nebraska establish that in fact the
area is water short. It will be difficult for Nebraska to prove an area is water
short unless it explicitly recognizes the legitimacy and importance of all uses
of water, public and private. The more uses that are recognized, the more the
need to regulate uses to assure conservation of the water supply. All else be-
ing equal, states with sophisticated, comprehensive planning efforts will be in
a better position to resist the water claims of outside users than states that
adopt a laissez faire attitude toward water use.
Implication:
A state's interest in water resources generally depends in part on
the number of uses that a state recognizes as legitimate and acts to
protect. The more uses that are recognized by Nebraska, therefore,
the greater the likelihood that another state's use of water from an
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interstate resource will result in legally cognizable injuries to Ne-
braska interests. In other words, if a state's legal and institutional sys-
tem demonstrates that excess water is available, that water will
undoubtedly be fair game for thirsty states. The best way to demon-
strate Nebraska's interest in seemingly available water supplies is to
engage in sophisticated and comprehensive water planning that recog-
nizes the interrelationship of various sources and uses of water--do-
mestic, agricultural, municipal, industrial, recreational, aesthetic,
habitat, and environmental. While Nebraska would not be foreclosed
from establishing a hierarchy of uses, it nonetheless should also seek
to enhance all legitimate uses of water. In close cases, comprehensive
planning could tip the balance in favor of the legitimacy of state regu-
lation in the face of a Commerce Clause challenge.
7. Finding:
States long have exercised sovereign prerogatives with respect to allocation of
water among potential users and after Sporhase likely will continue to have
great latitude to modify existing property rights systems and to reallocate
water If necessary. Similarly, when a state chooses to create a new private
right in water-as compared to regulating an existing right-it has great
power to announce the conditions under which it will provide the private
right.
Implications:
Whether because of historical accident, recognition of public trust
duties, or the fact that water rights are mere usufructs, states have
extraordinary and unprecedented constitutional latitude to adjust the
allocation of water among uses and users as supply and demand condi-
tions change over time. As caselaw has developed, for instance, it ap-
pears that only in the most unusual circumstances would a state face
serious constitutional impediments if it sought to modify an existing
system of water rights to respond to modern exigencies.
8. Finding:
Absent reallocation of existing private water rights, a state's regulatory oppor-
tunity regarding water already in private hands probably is limited to policing
a "no injury" rule.
Implications:
Once a state allows the private use of water, whether by permit or
common law, under Sporhase it places water into the stream of com-
merce. For water in the stream of commerce, a state likely may regu-
late only to the extent that it polices a "no injury" requirement. Thus
if state groundwater law gave an irrigator the right to pump 200 acre
feet of groundwater per year, this right could be transferred to an out-
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of-state user as long as the transferror was willing to give up all rights
to pump additional water for his own use. While the state could not
prohibit the transfer, it could limit the amount of the transfer to the
amount historically consumed by the transferring party, say 100 acre
feet per year, so that the net impact on the aquifer would be no
greater after the transfer than before. The state also could assess fees
covering the costs of administering the "no injury" rule. Finally, of
course, there is no reason why the state could not compete for the
water by offering a better price, or by instituting a statutory right of
first refusal.
Similarly, when a state creates a new private water right and
grants the water right to its own citizens, it is afforded great constitu-
tional latitude to impose conditions by which it will grant the new
right. When it provides a water right to its citizens at no cost (either
by state permit or by common law decree), it does so with the under-
standing that the state will benefit from the economic activity that use
of the water generates. By contrast, if an out-of-state entity were also
to acquire a water right at no cost, the state would receive no compen-
sating benefit. At a minimum, then, it seems that a state could consti-
tutionally charge an out-of-state user a fee measured by the value of
instate benefits foregone as a consequence of using the water out-of-
state. Such a fee would recognize that there is no requirement that a
state exercise its sovereign powers for the benefit of noncitizens. In
fact, a state that had established a reasonable aquifer life as a conser-
vation measure would be under no obligation to issue a new right that
would interfere with its conservation goals. Reasonable conservation
efforts need not be upset. A disappointed out-of-state user would be
left with the option of pursuing purchases of vested water rights from
private users or, in the case of an interstate resource, seeking an equi-
table apportionment of the resource.
9. Finding:
Sophisticated legislation to facilitate transfers probably offers Nebraska the
maximum protection against large transfers out of state. This seeming para-
dox is explained by the fact that transfer legislation is the most constitution-
ally supportable way of insuring that the state does not inadvertently
subsidize out-of-state water uses. At the same time, it appears that significant
changes would be needed in the underlying structure of Nebraska water law
to maximize Nebraska's ability to capitalize on the water resources found
within its borders, changes that may or may not be cost effective or politically
palatable.
Implications:
Water transfers and water markets are now important and well
accepted features of the law of most western states. Water transfers
are seen as a way to reallocate water to more valuable uses without
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constructing expensive, and often environmentally objectionable, new
water projects. In interstate litigation, Nebraska regularly urges up-
stream states to use water more efficiently rather than to construct
projects that would deplete the flow of water into Nebraska. Unless
Nebraska is willing to permit market driven reallocations of water,
however, it runs a substantial risk that arguments for upper state effi-
ciencies will fall on deaf ears.
Moreover, Nebraska can better position itself to resist out-of-state
water grabs if it legislatively authorizes water transfers. The empha-
sis in any transfer is on assuring that all costs associated with the
transfer are defrayed. In legislation, Nebraska can assure that the full
costs of a transfer are borne by an applicant. Policies that facilitate
transfers, but which appropriately insure that the full costs of such
transfers will be borne by the transferee, may well discourage an ap-
plicant from pursuing a transfer. They nonetheless are legitimate,
evenhanded conditions on transfer that should survive scrutiny under
the Commerce Clause.
In formulating the parameters of a "no injury" rule, the state has
many defensible options available to it. Many statutes contain amor-
phous language to the effect that any proposed transfer must be in the
public interest. A generalized public interest standard, however, is no
standard at all. Far more effective are detailed criteria that must be
evaluated before a transfer can be approved. Examples of such crite-
ria include:
a. Benefits to the applicant if the transfer is approved;
b. Benefits to the state if the transfer is approved;
c. Benefits to the state by the use of water within the state that
will be foregone by the proposed transfer;
d. Benefits presently and prospectively derived from the return
flow of water in intrastate use which will be eliminated by the
proposed use;
e. Direct harm to other water users if the transfer is approved;
f. The effect on public health and the local availability of drink-
ing water supplies;
g. The effect on environmentally sensitive areas and state conser-
vation goals;
h. The effect on fish and game resources;
i. The effect on public recreational opportunities;
j. External costs and benefits to the local community if the
transfer is approved;
k. The supply and alternative sources of water available to the
applicant in the state where the water is to be used;
1. The demands on the applicant's supply in the state where
the water is to be used;
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m. Whether the water to be transferred feasibly could be
transported to alleviate water shortages in Nebraska;
n. Whether the proposed use is a beneficial use of water;
o. The extent to which a proposed plan of design, construction
and operation of any works or facilities used in conjunction
with carrying water from the point of proposed diversion is
sufficiently detailed to enable all persons to understand the
impacts of the proposed transfer; and
p. Whether the proposed use will be detrimental to the public
welfare of the citizens of Nebraska.
To avoid constitutional difficulties, any public interest or public wel-
fare inquiry as part of a "no injury" proceeding cannot be a thinly dis-
guised effort to prevent an interstate transfer from taking place.
Instead, its focus should be on insuring that all costs of the proposed
transfer are, in fact, offset by benefits from the transfer.
10. Finding:
Critical area designation and other land use planning tools offer attractive
possibilities for indirectly influencing the location and type of water use.
Implications:
A number of areas in Nebraska merit consideration for special pro-
tection because they have unique characteristics or because they are
particularly sensitive to developmental interests. The Sandhills re-
gion, which overlies Nebraska's most abundant water supplies, is a re-
gion unique in all the world. Moreover, the Sandhills environment is
particularly sensitive to development. Other environmentally sensi-
tive areas that are highly dependent on local water supplies include
the Central Platte River Valley, the Niobrara River Valley, the Rain-
water Basin, and Nebraska's conjunctive use zones in the Central Ne-
braska Public Power and Irrigation District's irrigation use area.
Many of Nebraska's environmentally sensitive areas are also areas of
significant national interest. Given the national significance, a statute
that restricted water transfers out of sensitive areas, or required spe-
cial procedures for securing the right to transfer water out of sensitive
areas, would likely be sustained if challenged under the Commerce
Clause-at least so long as Nebraska established a close link between
the need to restrict transfers and the environmental or other values
that were the subject of special interest.
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VIII. APPENDIX: EXPORT STATUTES OF THE
WESTERN STATES
A. Arizona
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 45-291 to 45-294 (1989).
Prior to the Sporhase decision, the Arizona Director of Water Re-
sources had discretion to decline issuance of a permit if the point of
diversion was in Arizona and the place of beneficial use was in another
state. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 45-165 (1987).
In 1989, Arizona amended its laws regarding the export of water.
The new legislation makes transport of water out of the state subject
to approval by the Director of the Department of Water Resources
unless an out-of-state transfer is required by interstate compact, fed-
eral law, or international treaty. 1989 Ariz. Sess. Laws Ch. 168, § 3.
See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 45-292(a) (1989). Under the new law, in
considering whether to approve an application for water export, the
Director shall consider the water conservation goals of the state, the
potential harm to public welfare, the amount of water existing at the
source, supply and demand within the state in general, the feasibility
of using the same water to alleviate water shortages within the state,
the availability of alternative sources of water in the other state, the
demands placed on the applicant's supply in the other state, and
whether the proposed use is consistent with certain other provisions of
Arizona law relating to the transport and use of water.
The extant applicable statutes include the following-
ARTICLE 11. EXPORTATION OF WATER FROM THIS STATE
Article 11, consisting of §§ 45-291 to 45-294, was added by Laws
1989, Ch. 168, § 3, effective Sept. 15, 1989.
Historical Note
"Laws 1989, Ch. 168. § 1,
provides:
The legislature finds that
there is a chronic shortage of
water in this state, that main-
taining an adequate and reliable
supply of water is critically im-
portant and essential to social
stability and to the public
health, safety and welfare and
that reasonable controls on the
transportation of water from
this state are a proper exercise
of the police power of this state.
The legislature also finds that
under appropriate conditions
the out-of-state transportation
and use of water from this state
does not conflict with the public
welfare of citizens of this state




§ 45-291. Definition of person
In this article, unless the context otherwise requires, "person"
means an individual, public or private corporation, company, part-
nership, firm, association, society, estate, trust, any other private or-
ganization or enterprise, the United States, any state, territory or
country or a governmental entity, political subdivision or municipal
corporation organized under or subject to the constitution and laws
of the United States, this state or any other state.
Added by Laws 1989, Ch. 168, § 3.
§ 45-292. Approval required to transport water out of state;
application; criteria; hearing
A. A person may withdraw, or divert, and transport water
from this state for a reasonable and beneficial use in another state if
approved by the director pursuant to this article. A person shall not
transport water from this state unless approved by the director, but
this article does not apply to or prohibit transporting water from
this state as required by interstate compact, federal law or interna-
tional treaty.
B. An application to transport water from this state for use in
another state shall be filed with the director and shall include:
1. The name and address of the applicant's statutory agent in
this state for service of process and other legal notices.
2. The legal basis for acquiring the water to be transported.
3. The purpose for which the water will be used.
4. The annual amount of water in acre-feet for which the appli-
cation is made.
5. The proposed duration of the permit, not to exceed fifty
years with an option to renew.
6. Studies satisfactory to the director of the probable hydro-
logic impact on the area from which the water is proposed to be
transported.
7. Any other information which the director may require.
C. The director shall approve or reject the application. If the
director approves the application, he may prescribe terms and con-
ditions for the approval. In determining whether to approve the
application the director shall consider:
1. Whether the proposed action would be consistent with con-
servation of water, including any applicable management goals and
plans.
2. Potential harm to the public welfare of the citizens of this
state.
3. The supply of water to this state and current and future
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water demands in this state in general and the proposed source area 
in particular. 
4. The feasibility of intrastate transportation of the water that 
is the subject of the application to alleviate water shortages in this 
state. 
5. The availability of alternative sources of water in the other 
state. 
6. The demands placed on the applicant's supply in the other 
state. 
7. Whether the proposed action is prohibited or affected by 
other law, including §§ 45-165 and 45-172 and chapter 2 of this title. 
D. This article does not authorize and the director shall not ap-
prove transporting from this state water allocated to this state by 
federal law or interstate compact. 
E. The director shall fix a time and place for a hearing on the 
application and shall give notice of the hearing by publication once 
a week for· three consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circu-
lation in the county or counties from which the applicant proposes 
to transport the water. The hearing shall be conducted by the di-
rector or his designee in the area from which water is proposed to 
be transported. Any interested person, including the department, 
may appear and give oral or written testimony on all issues 
involved. 
Added by Laws 1989, Ch. 168, § 3. 
§ 45-293. Compliance monitoring,3ll reports and notices; 
jurisdiction 
A. The director shall monitor compliance with the terms and 
conditions prescribed for transporting and using the water out of 
this state and shall revoke his approval for any material violation of 
the prescribed terms and conditions. 
B. A person transporting water under this article shall provide: 
1. Written continuing consent for the director or the director's 
agent to perform on-site inspections of the transportation facilities 
and the use of the water. 
2. Written periodic reports as required by the director. 
3. Written notification of any changes in use of water trans-
ported from this state. 
C. By applying for approval to transport water from this state 
under this article, a person submits to the jurisdiction of this state 
311. Section 45-401 et seq. 
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for that purpose and shall comply with all relevant provisions of the 
law of this state. 
Added by Laws 1989, Ch. 168, § 3. 
§ 45-294. Limited nonapplicability 
Nothing in this article is intended to prescribe nor shall it be 
interp~ted to prescribe the terms, conditions or rules for the trans-
portation of water where the point of diversion or withdrawal and 
the point of use are both within the state of Arizona. 
Added by Laws 1989, Ch. 168, § 3. 
B. California 
CALIF. WATER CODE §§ 1230 to 1232 (West 1971). 
In 1911 California enacted ~ absolute prohibition on out-of-
state water transfers. The statute was repealed in 1917. 
California's present laws regulate out-of-state appropriations of 
water in interstate streams. See CALIF. WATER CODE §§ 1230 to 
1232 (West 1971}.The subject is outside the scope of this study. 
C. Colorado 
COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 37-81-101 to 37-81-104 (1990). 
At the time of the Sporhase litigation, Colorado prohibited ex-
port of its groundwater. COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-90-136 (1973}(re-
Pealed, L. 83, p. 1413, § 5, effective June 3, 1983), provided as 
follows: 
For the PurpOses of aiding and preserving unto the state of Colorado and 
all its citizens the ~ of all ground waters of this state, whether tributary 
or nontributary to a natural stream, which waters are necessary for the 
health and prosperity of all the citizens of the state of Colorado, and for the 
growth, maintenance, and general welfare of the state, it is unlawful for 
any perSOn to divert, carry, or transport by ditches, canals, pipelines, con-
duits, or any other manner any of the ground waters of this state, as said 
waters are in this section defined, into any other state for use therein. 
Mter Sporhase was decided by the United State Supreme Court, 
Colorado amended its statutes governing out-of-state transfers. 
The extant applicable Colorado statutes are: 
37-81-101. Diversion of water outside state - application re-
quired - special conditions - penalty.(l}(a} The general assembly 
hereby finds and declares that the locatioh and availability of water 
in this state v¢es greatly from place to place and that the .state as a 
whole suffers a shortage of water. The general assembly further 
recognizes that, because of Colorado's unique location at the head-
waters of four of the nation's major western rivers and because. all 
the major river systems in Colorado flow out of the state, and that, 
in order to insure the availability of these scarce water resources for 
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the use of citizens of the state of Colorado, compacts have been en-
tered into with the downstream states on all the major rivers
originating in Colorado.
(b) It is also recognized that it has been the continuing histori-
cal policy of the state of Colorado to conserve and prevent waste of
its water resources to provide adequate supplies of water necessary
to insure the continued health, welfare, and safety of all of its citi-
zens. Accordingly, the general assembly hereby determines that,
for the purpose of conserving the scarce water resources of this
state and to thereby insure the continuing health, welfare, and
safety of the citizens of this state, it is unlawful for any person, in-
cluding a corporation, association, or other entity, to divert, carry,
or transport by ditches, canals, pipes, conduits, natural streams, wa-
tercourses, or any other means any of the water resources found in
this state into any other state for use therein without first comply-
ing with this section and section 37-81-104.
(2) To effectuate the purposes of subsection (1) of this section
and section 37-81-104, no person may divert, carry, or transport any
surface or ground water from this state by ditches, canals, pipes,
conduits, natural streams, watercourses, or other means without
meeting the requirements for obtaining a permit to construct a well
if the source of water is to be ground water or if a well permit is not
required without first obtaining an adjudication from the water
court for the right to use water outside the state. In the case of a
well for which a permit has been issued for a use of ground water
within Colorado, a change of use for a use outside the state must be
approved by the water court or, if it is designated ground water, the
change must be approved by the Colorado ground water commis-
sion. A person desiring to divert, carry, or transport any water
outside Colorado shall file an appropriate application therefor and
comply with the requirements of this section in addition to any
other requirements, terms, and conditions provided or authorized
by law pertaining to such application.
(3) Prior to approving an application, the state engineer,
ground water commission, or water judge, as the case may be, must
find that:
(a) The proposed use of water outside this state is expressly
authorized by interstate compact or credited as a delivery to an-
other state pursuant to section 37-81-103 or that the proposed use of
water does not impair the ability of this state to comply with its
obligations under any judicial decree or interstate compact which
apportions water between this state and any other state or states;
(b) The proposed use of water is not inconsistent with the rea-
sonable conservation of the water resources of this state; and
(c) The proposed use of water will not deprive the citizens of
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this state of the beneficial use of waters apportioned to Colorado by
interstate compact or judicial decree.
(4) Any diversion of water from this state which is not in com-
pliance with this section shall not be recognized as a beneficial use
for purposes of perfecting a water right to the extent of such unlaw-
ful diversion or use.
37-81-102. Officials charged with enforcement. It is the duty of
the state engineer, the division engineers, and the water commis-
sioners of this state to see that the waters of the state are available
for the use and benefit of the citizens and inhabitants of the state
for its growth, prosperity, and general welfare, and it is the further
duty of said officials to prevent the waters thereof from being di-
verted, carried, conveyed, or transported by ditches, canals, pipes,
conduits, natural streams, watercourses, or other means into other
states for use therein unless there is specific authorization therefor,
as provided in section 37-81-1001. Upon its being brought to the
knowledge of the state engineer of Colorado that any person, corpo-
ration, or association is unlawfully carrying or transporting any of
such waters into any other state for use therein, or is intending so to
do, it is his duty to immediately call the matter to the attention of
the attorney general, in behalf of and in the name of the state, who
shall apply to any district court or to the supreme court of the state
of colorado for such restraining orders or injunctions, both prelimi-
nary and final, as may be necessary to enforce the provisions of this
section and section 37-81-101, and jurisdiction is conferred upon said
courts for such purposes.
37-81-103. Effect of apportionment credits upon diversions of
water from state. (1) For the purpose of evaluating applications
made pursuant to section 37-81-101, no water occurring in any aqui-
fer or being a part of or hydraulically connected to any interstate
stream system may be diverted or appropriated in Colorado for a
use which contemplates or involves the transportation of such
water into or through another state or states through which such
interstate stream system flows, for use of such diverted water in
such other state or states whether as a vehicle or medium for the
transportation of another substance, or for any other use, unless the
amount of water so diverted or appropriated and transported
through or into such other state or states is credited as a delivery to
such other state or states by Colorado, of water to which such other
state or states may be or claim to be entitled from such interstate
source under an existing interstate compact or otherwise. Water
mixed with other substances in the process of forming a slurry for
the purpose of transporting any substance as a suspended solid shall
not be deemed to have lost its character as water.
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(2) the burden shall be upon the claimant or other person
seeking to divert or appropriate water or seeking a water right
based upon a claimed diversion or appropriation coming within the
provisions of subsection (1) of this section to prove that a means
exists and is accepted by each state, including Colorado, through
which said stream system and said diverted water flows or will flow
by which the credit required in this section will be entered and rec-
ognized by each such state.
(3) This article shall not be applicable to water contained in
agricultural crops, animal and dairy products, beverages, or
processed or manufactured products or to products transported in
cans, bottles, packages, kegs, or barrels.
37-81-104. Fee for diversion - fund created. (1) to effectuate the
purposes of this article, the general assembly hereby authorizes a
fee of fifty dollars per acre-foot to be assessed and collected by the
state engineer on water diverted, carried, stored, or transported in
this state for beneficial use outside this state measured at the point
of release from storage or at the point of diversion.
(2) All moneys collected pursuant to subsection (1) of this sec-
tion shall be credited to the water diversion fund, which fund is
hereby created. The general assembly shall annually appropriate
all moneys in said fund for water projects for the state. Said appro-
priation shall be consistent with part 13 of article 3 of title 2, C.R.S.
D. Idaho
IDAHO CODE § 42-401 (1990).
42-401. Applications for use of public waters outside the state.
(1) The state of Idaho is dedicated to the conservation of its
public waters and the necessity to maintain adequate water supplies
for the state's water requirements. The state of Idaho also recog-
nizes that under appropriate conditions the out-of-state transporta-
tion and use of its public waters is not in conflict with the public
welfare of its citizens or the conservation of its waters.
(2) Any person, firm or corporation or any other entity in-
tending to withdraw water from any surface or underground water
source in the state of Idaho and transport it for use outside the state
or to change the place or purpose of use of a water right from a
place in Idaho to a place outside the state shall file with the depart-
ment of water resources an application for a permit to do so, subject
to the requirements of chapter 2, title 42, Idaho Code.
(3) In order to approve an application under this chapter, the
director must find that the applicant's use of water outside the state
is consistent with the provisions of section 42-203A(5), Idaho Code.
In addition, the director shall consider the following factors:
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(a) The supply of water available to the state of Idaho;
(b) The current and reasonably anticipated water demands of
the state of Idaho;
(c) Whether there are current or reasonably anticipated water
shortages within the state of Idaho;
(d) Whether the water that is the subject of the application
could feasibly be used to alleviate current or reasonably antici-
pated water shortages within the state of Idaho;
(e) The supply and sources of water available to the applicant
in the state where the applicant intends to use the water; and
(f) The demands placed on the applicant's supply in the state
where the applicant intends to use the water.
(5) By filling an application to use waters outside the state, the
applicant shall submit to and comply with the laws of the state of
Idaho governing the appropriation and use of water and any future
changes to the water right.
(6) The director is empowered to condition the permit to in-
sure that the use of water in another state is subject to the same
regulations and restrictions that may be imposed upon water use in
the state of Idaho.
(7) Upon submittal of the application, the applicant shall desig-
nate an agent in the state of Idaho for reception of service of process
and other legal notices.
(8) The director may, as a condition to the approval of an appli-
cation under this chapter, require that the applicant shall file a cer-
tificate from the proper officer or official of the state where the
water shall be used, showing to the satisfaction of the director that
the intended use would be beneficial, and that the intended appro-
priation is feasible.
[I.C., s 42-401, as added by 1990, ch. 141, s 3, p. 316.]
HISTORICAL NOTES
Legislative Intent. Section 1 of S.L. 1990, ch. 141 read: "It is the
intent of the legislature that passage of this act shall not affect ex-
isting appropriations of water that are used outside the state of
Idaho nor affect the provisions of any interstate compact."
E. Kansas
KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 82a-726, 820.-1502 to 82a-1504 (1989).
82a-726. Diversion and transportation of water for use in an-
other state; approval by chief engineer; conditions. Any person in-
tending to divert and transport water produced from a point or
points of diversion located in this state for use in another state,
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shall make application to the chief engineer of the division of water
resources of the state board of agriculture for a permit to appropri-
ate water for beneficial use or file an application for change in point
of diversion, place of use, type of use or any combination thereof. If
the chief engineer of the division of water resources finds that the
diversion and transportation of such water complies with the Kan-
sas water appropriation act, and amendments thereto, the provi-
sions of K.S.A. 82a-1501 to 82a-1506, inclusive, and amendments
thereto, and any other state law pertaining to such diversion, trans-
portation and use of water, the chief engineer shall approve such
application upon such terms, conditions and limitations that the
chief engineer shall deem necessary for the protection of public in-
terest, including an express condition that should any such water be
necessary to protect the public health and safety of the citizens of
this state, such approved application may be suspended, modified or
revoked by the chief engineer for such necessity.
History: L. 1976, ch. 435, § 1; L. 1984, ch. 380, § 1; July 1.
82a-1502. Same; approval considerations; emergency transfers,
conditions; no approval, when. (a) No person shall make a water
transfer in this state unless and until the transfer is approved pur-
suant to the provisions of this act. No water transfer shall be ap-
proved which would reduce the amount of water required to meet
the present or any reasonably foreseeable future beneficial use of
water by present or future users in the area from which the water is
to be taken for transfer, unless (1) the panel determines that the
benefits to the state for approving the transfer outweigh the bene-
fits to the state for not approving the transfer; (2) the chief engineer
recommends to the authority and the authority concurs that an
emergency exists which affects the public health, safety or welfare;
or (3) the governor has declared that an emergency exists which
affects the public health, safety or welfare. Whenever an emer-
gency exists a water transfer may be approved on a temporary basis
for a period of time not to exceed one year under rules and regula-
tions adopted by the chief engineer. The emergency approval shall
be subject to the terms, conditions and limitations specified by the
chief engineer.
(b) No water transfer shall be approved under the provisions
of this act if such transfer would impair water reservation rights,
vested rights, appropriation rights or prior applications for permit
to appropriate water.
History: L. 1983, ch. 341, § 2, May 12.
82a-1503. Same: applications for transfer, contents, hearing,
conduct; hearing panel, composition; matters considered. (a) Any
person desiring to make a water transfer shall file, with the chief
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engineer, an application in the form required by rules and regula-
tions adopted by the chief engineer. If the application is found to be
insufficient to enable the panel to determine the source, nature and
amount of the proposed transfer, it shall be returned for correction
or completion or for any other necessary information. This act
shall not be construed as to exempt the applicant from complying
with the provisions of the Kansas water appropriation act or the
state water plan storage act, whichever is applicable.
(b) No water transfer shall be approved unless the applicant
has adopted and implemented conservation plans and practices.
Such plans and practices shall be consistent with the guidelines for
conservation plans and practices developed and maintained by the
Kansas water office pursuant to subsection (c) of K.S.A. 74-2608,
and amendments thereto. Prior to approval of an application for a
water transfer, the panel shall determine whether such plans and
practices are consistent with the guidelines adopted by the Kansas
water office.
(c) Within 60 days of receipt of a sufficient application for a
water transfer pursuant to this act, the chief engineer shall convene
and conduct a hearing thereon. At such hearing, the panel shall
consider the application and determine whether to approve the pro-
posed water transfer in accordance with the provisions of the Kan-
sas administrative procedure act.
If it is determined to be in the best interest of the state, the chief
engineer may convene and conduct such a hearing within 60 days of
receipt of (1) an application to appropriate water pursuant to the
Kansas water appropriation act or (2) a proposed contract for the
sale of water from the state's conservation storage water supply ca-
pacity even though such diversion and transportation of water is
not a water transfer as defined by K.S.A. 82a-1501, and amendments
thereto.
(d) The panel shall consist of the chief engineer, the director
and the secretary or the director of the division of environment of
the department of health and environment if designated by the sec-
retary. The chief engineer shall serve as the chairperson of the
panel. All actions of the panel shall be taken by a majority of the
members thereof. The panel shall have all powers necessary to con-
duct the hearings, make its findings and implement the provisions
of this act. The hearing shall be conducted in a prudent and timely
manner.
(e) To determine whether the benefits to the state for approv-
ing the transfer outweigh the benefits to the state for not approving
the transfer, the panel shall consider all matters pertaining thereto,
including specifically:
(1) Any current beneficial use being made of the water pro-
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posed to be diverted, including minimum desirable streamflow
requirements;
(2) any reasonably foreseeable future beneficial use of the
water;
(3) the economic, environmental, public health and welfare
and other impacts of approving or denying the transfer of the
water;
(4) alternative sources of water available to the applicant and
present or future users for any beneficial use;
(5) the proposed plan of design, construction and operation of
any works or facilities used in conjunction with carrying the water
from the point of diversion. The plan shall be in sufficient detail to
enable all parties to understand the impacts of the proposed water
transfer; and
(6) conservation plans and practices or the need for such plans
and practices of persons protesting or potentially affected by the
proposed transfer. Such plans and practices shall be consistent with
the guidelines for conservation plans and practices developed and
maintained by the Kansas water office pursuant to subsection (c) of
K.S.A. 74-2608, and amendments thereto.
(f) Any person shall be permitted to appear and testify at any
such hearing upon the terms and conditions determined by the
chief engineer.
(g) In addition to notice to the parties, notice of any such hear-
ing shall be published in the Kansas register. Such notice shall be
published at least 15 days prior to the date of the hearing.
(h) The record of the hearing and findings of fact shall be pub-
lic records and open for inspection at the office of the chief engi-
neer. Certified transcripts of the hearing shall be provided at the
expense of those requesting same. A transcript shall be provided to
the chairperson of the authority.
History: L. 1983, ch. 341, § 3; L. 1986, ch. 392, § 6; L. 1988, ch. 356,
§ 351; July 1, 1989.
82a-1504. Same; decision of panel; review of legislature.
(a) The panel shall render an order either approving or disapprov-
ing the proposed water transfer. The panel's order shall include
findings of fact relating to each of the factors set forth in subsection
(d) of K.S.A. 82a-1503 and amendments thereto. The panel may or-
der approval of a transfer of a smaller amount of water than re-
quested upon such terms, conditions and limitations as it deems
necessary for the protection of the public interest of the state as a
whole.
(b) An order of the panel disapproving the transfer shall be
deemed a final order. An order of the panel approving a transfer
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shall be deemed an initial order. The authority shall be deemed the
agency head for the purpose of reviewing an initial order of the
panel and shall review all such initial orders.
(c) If the authority approves the water transfer and if there is
no judicial review pending therefrom, the chief engineer shall sub-
mit the same to the legislature for review as provided for in K.S.A.
82a-1301 et seq., and amendments thereto. Absent legislative disap-
proval, the chief engineer shall issue the order .approving the
transfer.
History: L. 1983, ch. 341, § 4; L. 1988, ch. 356, § 352; July 1, 1989.
F. Montana
MONT. CODE. ANN. §§ 85-2-311 (1989), 85-2-316 (1991).
The Montana statutes, in brief, provide as follows:
MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-2-311 (1989). Criteria for issuance of a
permit.
Appropriations for use outside of Montana require clear and
convincing evidence that:
1. The applicant has complied with the applicable in-state cri-
teria and procedures.
2. The proposed use is not contrary to water conservation in
Montana.
3. The proposed use is not detrimental to the public welfare of
Montana citizens.
In making its determination of whether the proof regarding
items 2 and 3 is clear and convincing, the department of natural
resources and conservation is to consider the following:
a. Whether there are present or projected water shortages
within Montana,
b. Whether the water to be taken could feasibly be transported
to alleviate water shortages in Montana,
c. The supply and sources available to the applicant in state
where the water is to be used.
d. The demands on the applicant's supply in the state where
the water is to be used.
MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-2-316 (1991) specifies the same conditions
for reservations of water. MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-2-402 (1991) speci-
fies the same conditions for making changes in an appropriation
right.
G. Nebraska
NEB. REV. STAT. § 46-613.01 (1988).
46-613.01. Ground water; transfer to another state; permit; De-
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partment of Water Resources; conditions. The Legislature recog-
nizes and declares that the maintenance of an adequate source of
ground water within this state is essential to the social stability of
the state and the health, safety, and welfare of its citizens and that
reasonable restrictions on the transportation of ground water from
this state are a proper exercise of the police powers of the state.
The need for such restrictions, which protect the health, safety, and
general welfare of the citizens of this state, is hereby declared a
matter of legislative determination.
Any person, firm, city, village, municipal corporation, or any
other entity intending to withdraw ground water from any well or
pit located in the State of Nebraska and transport it for use in an-
other state shall apply to the Department of Water Resources for a
permit to do so. In determining whether to grant such permit, the
Director of Water Resources shall consider:
(1) Whether the proposed use is a beneficial use of ground
water;
(2) The availability to the applicant of alternative sources of
surface or ground water;
(3) Any negative effect of the proposed withdrawal on surface
or ground water supplies needed to meet reasonable future de-
mands for water in the area of the proposed withdrawal; and
(4) Any other factors consistent with the purposes of this sec-
tion that the director deems relevant to protect the interests of the
state and its citizens.
Issuance of a permit shall be conditioned on the applicant's com-
pliance with the rules and regulations of the natural resources dis-
trict from which the water is to be withdrawn. The applicant shall
be required to provide access to his or her property at reasonable
times for purposes of inspection by officials of the local natural re-
sources district or the Department of Water Resources.
The director may include such reasonable conditions on the pro-
posed use as he or she deems necessary to carry out the purposes of
this section.
Source: Laws 1967, c. 281, § 5, p. 761; Laws 1969, c. 9, § 69, p. 144;
Laws 1984, LB 1060, § 1.
H. Nevada
NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 533.515 to 533.524 (Michie 1991).
533.515 Permits for appropriation if point of diversion or place
of intended use is outside state.
1. No permit for the appropriation of water shall be denied be-
cause of the fact that the point of diversion described in the applica-
tion for such permit, or any portion of the works in such application
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described and to be constructed for the purpose of storing, conserv-
ing, diverting, or distributing such water, or because the place of
intended use, or the lands to be irrigated by such water, or any part
thereof, may be situated in any other state, when such state autho-
rizes the diversion of water from such state for use in Nevada; but
in all such cases where either the point of diversion or any of such
works or the place of intended use, or the lands, or part of the lands
to be irrigated by means of such water, are situated within the State
of Nevada, the permit shall issue as in other cases.
2. The permit shall not purport to authorize the doing or re-
fraining from any act or thing, in connection with the system of
appropriation, not properly within the scope of the jurisdiction of
the State of Nevada, and the state engineer thereof, to grant.
533.520 No permit to be issued for change of use or transfer of
water or water rights beyond borders of state; applicability of
section.
1. It is hereby declared to be contrary to the economic welfare
and against the public policy of the State of Nevada to change the
place of use or transfer, or to permit a change of the place of use or
transfer, of water or water rights for use beyond the borders of the
State of Nevada, as to any water appropriated and beneficially used
in the State of Nevada for irrigation or other purposes prior to or
after March 23, 1951, and no permit or authorization shall be issued
or given for such change of use or transfer.
2. This section shall not apply to nor is it intended to affect
waters or water rights as to such waters as shall have been prior to
March 23, 1951, and which now are diverted in Nevada and which
were prior to March 23, 1951, and now are used for domestic or in-
dustrial purposes beyond the borders of the State of Nevada.
533.522 Appropriation from interstate steams: Appropriation
in this state for beneficial use in another state. Upon any stream
flowing across the state boundary, an appropriation of water in this
state for beneficial use in another state may be made only when,
under the laws of the latter, water may be lawfully diverted therein
for beneficial use in this state.
533.524 Appropriation from interstate streams: Right of appro-
priation having point of diversion and place of use in another state.
Upon any stream flowing across the state boundary, a right of ap-
propriation having the point of diversion and the place of use in
another state and recognized by the laws of that state shall have the
same force and effect as if the point of diversion and the place of use
were in this state if the laws of that state give like force and effect
to similar rights acquired in this state.
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I. New Mexico
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 72-12B-1 (1985).
New Mexico banned the export of groundwater for many years.
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 72-12-19 (1978). After the prohibition was de-
clared invalid in City of El Paso v. Reynolds, 563 F. Supp. 379, 392
(D. N.M. 1983), the New Mexico legislature enacted the following
statutes:
72-12B-1. Applications for the transportation and use of public
waters outside the state.
A. The state of New Mexico has long recognized the impor-
tance of the conservation of its public waters and the necessity to
maintain adequate water supplies for the state's water require-
ments. The state of New Mexico also recognizes that under appro-
priate conditions the out-of-state transportation and use of its
public waters is not in conflict with the public welfare of its citizens
or the conservation of its waters.
B. Any person, firm or corporation or any other entity in-
tending to withdraw water from any surface or underground water
source in the state of New Mexico and transport it for use outside
the state or to change the place or purpose of use of a water right
from a place in New Mexico to a place out of that state shall apply
to the state engineer for a permit to do so. Upon the filing of an
application, the state engineer shall cause to be published in a news-
paper of general circulation in the county in which the well will be
located or the stream system from which surface water will be
taken, at least once a week for three consecutive weeks, a notice
that the application has been filed and that objections to the grant-
ing of the application may be filed within ten days after the last
publication of the notice. Any person, firm or corporation or other
entity objecting that the granting of the application would impair or
be detrimental to the objector's water right shall have standing to
file objections or protests. Any person, firm or corporation or other
entity objecting that the granting of the application will be contrary
to the conservation or water within the state or detrimental to the
public welfare of the state and showing that the objector will be
substantially and specifically affected by the granting of the appli-
cation shall have standing to file objections or protests. Provided,
however, that the state of New Mexico or any of its branches, agen-
cies, departments, boards, instrumentalities or institutions, and all
political subdivisions of the state and their agencies, instrumentali-
ties and institutions shall have standing to file objections or pro-
tests. The state engineer shall accept for filing and act upon all
applications filed under this section in accordance with the provi-
sions of this section. The state engineer shall require notice of the
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application and shall thereafter proceed to consider the application
in accordance with existing administrative law and procedure gov-
erning the appropriation of surface or ground water.
C. In order to approve an application under this act, the state
engineer must find that the applicant's withdrawal and transporta-
tion of water for use outside the state would not impair existing
water rights, is not contrary to the conservation of water within the
state and is not otherwise detrimental to the public welfare of the
citizens of New Mexico.
D. In acting upon an application under this act, the state engi-
neer shall consider, but not be limited to, the following factors:
(1) the supply of water available to the state of New Mexico;
(2) water demands of the state of New Mexico;
(3) whether there are water shortages within the state of New
Mexico;
(4) whether the water that is the subject of the application
could feasibly be transported to alleviate water shortages in the
state of New Mexico;
(5) the supply and sources of water available to the applicant in
the state where the applicant intends to use the water; and
(6) the demands placed on the applicant's supply in the state
where the applicant intends to use the water.
E. By filing an application to withdraw and transport waters
for use outside the state, the applicant shall submit to and comply
with the laws of the state of New Mexico governing the appropria-
tion and use of water.
F. The state engineer is empowered to condition the permit to
insure that the use of water in another state is subject to the same
regulations and restrictions that my be imposed upon water use in
the state of New Mexico.
G. Upon approval of the application, the applicant shall desig-
nate an agent in New Mexico for reception of service of process and
other legal notices.
J. North Dakota
N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-04-06 (1985).
North Dakota has no explicit prohibition against transferring
water outside the state. It does however have statutes that,
.although not directed on their face at the interstate export, would
pertain to the issue. For instance, before issuing a permit to appro-
priate water in North Dakota the state engineer must find the pro-
posed use is beneficial. N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-04-06 (1985).
"Beneficial use" is defined to mean "a use of water for a purpose
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consistent with the best interests of the people of the state." Id.
§ 64-04-01.1
See generally Grant, The Future of Interstate Allocation of
Water, 29 RocKy MTN. MiN. L. INST. 977, 1002-04 (1983).
K. Oklahoma
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 82, § 1085.2 (West 1990).
§ 1085.2 Authority of Oklahoma Water Resources Board
In addition to any and all other authority conferred upon it by
law, the Oklahoma Water Resources Board shall also have
authority:
1. Generally to do all such things as in its judgment may be
necessary, proper or expedient in the accomplishment of its duties.
2. To make such contracts and execute such instruments as in
the judgment of the Board are necessary or convenient to the exer-
cise of any of the powers conferred upon it by law. Provided, how-
ever, no contract shall be made conveying the title or use of any
waters of the State of Oklahoma to any person, firm, corporation or
other state or subdivision of government, for sale or use in any
other state, unless such contract be specifically authorized by an act
of the Oklahoma Legislature and thereafter as approved by it.
L. Oregon
OR. REV. STAT. § 537.810 to 537.870 (1989).
In Oregon consent of the legislature is necessary for out-of-state
transfers of water. The legislature may attach any conditions it
desires in order to protect Oregon natural resources.
The extant applicable Oregon statutes are:
537.810 Diversion or appropriation of waters from basin of ori-
gin without legislative consent prohibited; terms of consent; excep-
tions. (1) No waters located or arising within a basin shall be
diverted, impounded or in any manner appropriated for diversion or
use beyond the boundaries of that basin except upon the express
consent of the Legislative Assembly. In the event the Legislative
Assembly shall give its consent to any such request it may attach
thereto such terms, conditions, exceptions, reservations, restrictions
and provisions as it may care to make in the protection of the natu-
ral resources of the basin and the health and welfare of the present
and future inhabitants of the basin within which the water arises or
is located.
(2) Subsection (1) of this section shall not apply to appropria-
tions or diversions of less than 50 cubic feet per second out of the
basin of origin.
(3) Subsection (1) of this section shall not apply to appropria-
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tions or diversions within the Klamath River Basin as defined in
ORS 542.620 or within the Goose Lake Basin as defined in ORS 542-
520, so long as those statutes remain in effect.
(4) This section shall not apply to an appropriation or diversion
by a city to facilitate regional municipal water service if the city has
historically transported water between the basin of origin and pro-
posed receiving basins identified in the application. [Amended by
1989 c.936 § 7]
537.820 Application of provisions to waters forming common
boundary between states. ORS 537.801 to 537.860 shall also apply to
the waters located within the boundaries of this state of any river,
stream, lake or other body of water serving as part of the common
boundary of this state and any other state and over which this state
has concurrent jurisdiction, except that said sections shall not apply
to the diversion, impoundment or appropriation of waters for the
development of hydroelectric energy, flood control, irrigation or
other uses in waters forming a boundary of the state in cases where
such waters are not to be diverted from the drainage basin wherein
such waters are located.
537.830 Filing upon or condemnation of waters without legisla-
tive permission prohibited. No person, or agency of any state or of
the United States, shall attempt to condemn any waters within the
boundaries of this state for use outside the basin of origin without
first complying with the requirements of ORS 537.801 to 537.810
and this section [Amended by 1989, c.936 § 8]
537.835 City of Walla Walla, Washington, may appropriate, im-
pound and divert certain waters from Mill Creek. (1) Pursuant to
the provisions of ORS 537.810, consent is hereby given to the City of
Walla Walla, a municipal corporation of the State of Washington, to
appropriate, impound and divert certain waters from Mill Creek, a
tributary of the Walla Walla River, located in Township 6 North,
Range 38, E.W.M., Umatilla County, Oregon, for the beneficial use
of both the State of Oregon and within the City of Walla Walla,
State of Washington, subject to the following terms and conditions:
(a) The City of Walla Walla shall pay the entire cost of con-
structing and maintaining this project; and
(b) The City of Walla Walla shall employ only residents and
inhabitants of the State of Oregon in the construction and mainte-
nance of the project.
(2) The Water Resources Commission may from time to time
direct that a designated portion of the impounded waters shall be
held in the State of Oregon for fire protection, for use by Oregon
residents, for wildlife habitat needs, and to maintain proper stream
flow during the summer months.
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(3) Prior to commencing construction, the City of Walla Walla
shall make application for such appropriation, impoundment and
diversion to the Water Resources Commission and such appropria-
tion, impoundment and diversion shall be allowed upon such addi-
tional terms, conditions, reservations, restrictions and provisions,
including minimum stream flow, as the Water Resources Commis-
sion shall impose for the protection and benefit of the State of Ore-
gon. [1975 c.732 § 2, 1985 c.673 § 76]
537.840 Legislative consent; filing of certified copy; appropria-
tion rights and procedure. Upon receiving legislative permission to
appropriate waters under ORS 537.801 to 537.860, the permittee,
upon filing in the Water Resources Department a certified copy of
the Act, certified to by the Secretary of State, may proceed to obtain
an appropriation of waters in the manner provided by the laws of
this state for the appropriation of waters for beneficial use, subject
to all existing rights and valid prior appropriations and subject to
the terms, conditions, exceptions, reservations, restrictions and pro-
visions of such legislative consent. [Amended by 1985 c.673 § 77]
537.850 Suits to protect state interests; right of redress to pri-
vate persons. In the event of any violation or attempt to violate any
of the provisions of ORS 537.801 to 537.860, the Governor shall
cause to be instituted such suits and actions as may be necessary to
protect and defend the sovereign rights and interests of the state in
the premises. Persons are given right of redress against such viola-
tor at private suit or action under any appropriate remedy at law or
in equity.
537.855 Domestic water supply district permitted to divert
water out of state; conditions. (1) Pursuant to the provisions of
ORS 573.810, consent is hereby given to any domestic water supply
district formed under ORS chapter 264 to permit the diversion of
water for use on property a portion of which is within a state adjoin-
ing Oregon, subject to the following conditions:
(a) The majority of the property is within Oregon.
(b) The property is developed with economic benefit to Oregon
as well as to the adjoining state, in the judgment of the domestic
water supply district.
(c) The costs of the diversion are borne by the developer or
owner of the property.
(d) The developer employs only residents of Oregon in the con-
struction necessary for the diversion of water.
(2) The diversion of water under this section shall be subject to
additional terms, conditions, reservations, restrictions and provi-
sions as the Water Resources Commission shall impose for the pro-
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tection and benefit of the State of Oregon. [1985 c.572 § 2; 1987 c.15
§ 1151]
537.860 Vested rights protected. ORS 573.810 to 537.850 shall
not affect any valid prior appropriation or water right existing on
May 12, 1951.
537.870 Out-of-state municipalities; acquisition of land and
water rights in Oregon. Subject to the limitations imposed by ORS
573.801 to 537.860, any municipal corporation of any state adjoining
Oregon may acquire title to any land or water right within Oregon,
by purchase or condemnation, which lies within any watershed
from which the municipal corporation obtains or desires to obtain
its water supply.
M. South Dakota
S.D. CODIFIED LAws ANN. §§ 46-1-13 and 46-5-20.1 (1987).
S.D. CODIFIED LAws ANN. § 46-1-13 (1987) provides, in pertinent
part, that "[a] water right may be granted... to persons for use of
water within this state, subject to the principle of beneficial use
S.D. CODIFIED LAws ANN. § 46-5-20.1 (1987) provides:
Legislative approval required for large-scale appropriation - Em-
inent domain powers denied for unauthorized appropriation. Any
application for appropriation of water, pursuant to this chapter, in
excess of ten thousand acre feet annually shall be presented by the
water management board to the Legislature for approval prior to
the board's acting upon the application and all powers of eminent
domain shall be denied any common carrier appropriating over ten
thousand acre feet of water per annum which has not obtained such
prior legislative approval. Legislative approval does not mandate
approval by the water management board and does not constitute
an issuance of a water permit. This section does not apply to appli-
cations by the South Dakota conservancy district or applications for
the approval of water permits for energy industry use.
Legislative approval does not mandate commission approval.
See 77 Op. Att'y Gen. 10 (1977).
N. Texas
1965 Tex. Gen.Laws 1245, repealed by Act of April 2, 1971, ch. 58,
1971 Tex. Gen. Laws 658.
In Altus v. Carr, 255 F. Supp. 828 (W.D. Tex.), aff'd per curium,
385 U.S. 35 (1966), a three-judge district court held Texas' absolute
embargo statute unconstitutional. After the decision the Texas leg-
islature repealed the law.
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0. Utah
UTAH CODE ANN. § 73-3a-108 (Supp. 1991).
73-3a-108. The state engineer shall approve an application for an
out-of-state transfer if he finds that the proposed appropriation is
consistent with Utah's reasonable water conservation policies or
objectives, is not contrary to the public interest, and does not impair
the ability of the state to comply with its obligation under any inter-
state compact or judicial decree that apportions water between
Utah and other states. In reviewing the first two criteria, the state
engineer shall consider the following factors:
(a) the supply and quality of water available to the state of
Utah;
(b) the current and reasonably anticipated water demands
of the state of Utah;
(c) whether there are current or reasonably anticipated
water shortages within Utah;
(d) whether the water that is the subject of the application
could feasibly be used to alleviate current or reasonably antici-
pated water shortages within Utah;
(e) the alternative supply and sources of water available to
the applicant in the state where the applicant intends to use the
water; and
(f) the demands placed on the applicant's alternate water
supply in the state where the applicant intends to use the water.
P. Washington
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 90.03.300 (Cum. Supp. 1991).
Diversion of water for out-of-state use-reciprocity. Reciprocity
is required, but the 1990 Cumulative Annual Pocket Part to the
Washington statutes notes the Sporhase decision and states that in
1982 the Supreme Court of the United States held that Nebraska's
reciprocity provision imposed an impermissible burden on inter-
state commerce.
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 90.16.110 (1987).
Water for use outside the state. Municipalities that straddle the
state line are governed by the same appropriation procedures as a
municipality totally within the state.
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 90.16.120 (1987).
Reciprocity. Reciprocity is required for all provisions of the





WYO. STAT. § 41-3-115 (SUPP. 1991).
§ 41-3-115. Applications for use of water outside the state.
(a) The legislature finds, recognizes and declares that the
transfer of water outside the boundaries of the state may have a
significant impact on the water and other resources of the state.
Further, this impact may differ substantially from that caused by
uses of the water within the state. Therefore, all water being the
property of the state and part of the natural resources of the state,
it shall be controlled and managed by the state for the purposes of
protecting, conserving and preserving to the state the maximum
permanent beneficial use of the state's waters.
(b) None of the water of the state either surface or under-
ground may be appropriated, stored or diverted for use outside of
the state or for use as a medium of transportation of mineral, chem-
ical or other products to another state without the specific prior ap-
proval of the legislature. Provided, however, neither approval by
the legislature nor compliance with the application procedures
under subsection (m) through (r) of this section shall be required
for appropriations that will transfer or use outside the state less
than one thousand (1,000) acre-feet of water per year.
(c) No holder of either a permit to appropriate water or a cer-
tificate to appropriate water, nor any applicant for a right to appro-
priate the unappropriated water of this state, may transfer or use
the water so appropriated, certificated or applied outside the state
of Wyoming without prior approval of the legislature of Wyoming.
(d) through (k) Repealed by Laws 1985, ch. 4, § 1.
(m) Notwithstanding subsection (d) through (k) of this section,
applications for the appropriation of water for use out of state shall
be submitted to the state engineer. The application shall contain
sufficient information to enable the state engineer to fully analyze
the proposed appropriation. Within sixty (60) days of receipt of the
application, the state engineer shall determine if the application is
complete and acceptable. If the application is unacceptable, the
state engineer shall notify the applicant as to what is needed so an
acceptable application may be submitted.
(n) Upon determination that the application is acceptable, the
state engineer shall cause to be made, at the applicant's expense, a
comprehensive review of the application. The state engineer shall
have no more than one hundred twenty (120) days to complete this
review.
(o) Upon completion of the state engineer's review, the state
engineer shall issue a preliminary analysis of the application. The
analysis shall address the factors set forth in subsection (r) of this
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section, contain a summary of the application and any other infor-
mation the state engineer deems relevant. The preliminary opin-
ion, or a reasonable summary, shall be published, at the applicant's
expense, for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general
circulation in the county where the proposed appropriation of water
is located. At the conclusion of the publication period, the state en-
gineer shall hold a public hearing, at the applicant's expense, in the
county where the proposed appropriation is located.
(p) In rendering a final opinion, the state engineer shall con-
sider all comments received at the public hearing and those re-
ceived in writing within twenty (20) days of the public hearing.
(q) The state engineer shall render a final opinion and submit
it to the legislature within one hundred twenty (120) days of the
public hearing. The final opinion shall address all factors set forth
in subsection (r) of this section and shall contain a recommendation
that the legislature grant or deny the proposed out-of-state use.
(r) The legislature shall consider the proposed appropriation
following receipt of the state engineer's opinion and recommenda-
tion. Notwithstanding subsections (d) through (k) of this section,
legislative consent for the proposed appropriation of water for use
out of the state shall be based upon consideration of the factors nec-
essary to assure meeting the state's interests in conserving and pre-
serving its water resources for the maximum beneficial use.
Factors to be considered by the legislature shall include the
following:
(i) The amount of water proposed to be appropriated and the
proposed uses;
(ii) The amount of water available for appropriation from the
proposed source, and the natural characteristics of the source;
(iii) The economic, social, environmental and other benefits to
be derived by the state from the proposed appropriation;
(iv) The benefits to the state by the use of the water within the
state that will be foregone by the proposed appropriation;
(v) The benefits presently and prospectively derived from the
return flow of water in intrastate use which will be eliminated by
the proposed out-of-state use;
(vi) The injury to existing water rights of other appropriators
that may result from the proposed use;
(vii) Whether the use formulated and carried out promotes or
enhances the purposes and policies of the state's water development
plans and water resources policy, and that the use will not unrea-
sonably interfere with other planned uses or developments for
which a permit has been or may be issued;
(viii) Whether the proposed use will significantly impair the
state's interest and ability to preserve and conserve sufficient quan-
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tities of water for reasonably foreseeable consumptive uses and
other beneficial uses recognized by law to include but not limited to
domestic, livestock, agricultural, municipal and industrial purposes;
(ix) Whether the proposed use will adversely affect the quan-
tity or quality of water available for domestic or municipal use;
(x) Whether, to the greatest extent possible, the correlation
between surface water and groundwater has been determined, to
avoid possible harmful effects of the proposed use on the supply of
either.
(s) Nothing in this act shall be construed to interfere with com-
pacts, court decrees and treaty obligations.
R. Commentary on the statutes of Montana, New Mexico,
Nebraska, Oregon, Utah, Wyoming
The statutes reproduced in this Appendix illustrate the wide va-
riation in state oversight of interstate water transfers.
We briefly discuss the laws of Montana, New Mexico, Nebraska,
Oregon, Utah and Wyoming to illustrate the diversity of statutory
solutions and also to point out some provisions that are unconstitu-
tional because they discriminate on their face against applicants for
out-of-state transfer permits.
Oregon, for example, requires legislative approval for out-of-
state ground water transfers,312 but provides that municipalities in
an adjoining state may acquire water rights within Oregon by
purchase or condemnation.313 The necessary legislative approval
may be conditioned upon whatever terms, restrictions and reserva-
tions the legislature may care to make to protect the present and
future welfare of the state and its citizens.31 4 Legislative approval
statutes are not necessarily per se invalid absent an automatic ban
on out-of-state transportation of groundwater and provided that
legislative restrictions are tailored to legitimate conservation pur-
poses under the doctrine of the Sporhase case. As a general proposi-
tion, a legislative body probably should not expend the time and
energies of its members on complex matters of water law and hy-
drology, but there may be a point at which a legislature itself de-
cides that the volumes of water involved are so large and the long
range implications so vast that it wants to act on the application
itself after consultation with various state officials.
If a legislature takes an even handed approach and meets the
requirements set out by the Supreme Court in Bruce Church, legis-
lative approvals of out-of-state water transfers have a chance of sur-
312. OR. REV. STAT. §§ 537.810 to 537.870 (1989).
313. OR. REv. STAT. § 537.870 (1989).
314. O. REv. STAT. § 537.810 (1989).
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viving a constitutional challenge. Of course, to pass Supreme Court
review a state would be on firmer ground if its statute provide that
the legislature approve both intrastate and interstate diversions.
After Sporhase, Wyoming and New Mexico enacted new stat-
utes. The Wyoming law requires that the legislature approve all
proposals to obtain a new appropriation or to transfer an existing
right for use outside of the state, unless the amount requested is
less than 1,000 acre-feet per year.315 Applications for out-of-state
use are submitted to the State Engineer who makes, at the appli-
cant's expense, a comprehensive review within 120 days and then
issues a preliminary analysis. Public hearings are held and a final
opinion submitted by the engineer to the legislature which renders
its decision "based upon consideration of the factors necessary to
assure meeting the state's interests in conserving and preserving its
water resources for maximum beneficial use."316
The statute then enumerates ten such factors. These include a
balancing of the economic, social and environmental effects derived
from the export against the benefits foregone by use of the water
elsewhere; whether the out-of-state use promotes Wyoming water
development purposes and policies without unreasonably interfer-
ing with other planned uses or developments that have or will have
use permits; and whether the use will significantly impair the
state's ability to conserve and preserve sufficient quantities of water
for its own consumptive uses.3 17
All the factors look inward only and appear to be drafted more
for the purpose of protecting the economic health of the state's
economy than toward protecting the physical health of Wyoming
citizens. Thus, the problem faced by the New Mexico statute in E
Paso 11318 is likely to arise if the Wyoming statute is challenged. On
the other hand, it has been argued that "[t]he evidence does not
show that the Wyoming statute discriminates against interstate
commerce by forbidding or placing an undue burden on out-of-state
transfers. Rather, the Wyoming approval statute appears to show a
demonstrable, legitimate state interest which only incidentally in-
terferes with interstate commerce." 319
New Mexico's post-Sporhase statute was tailored to Justice Ste-
vens' observations in Sporhase regarding the constitutionality of
legislative criteria that restrict out-of-state transportation of a
315. WYo. STAT. § 41-3-115(b) (Supp. 1991).
316. WYO. STAT. § 41-3-115(r) (Supp. 1991).
317. Id
318. City of El Paso v. Reynolds (El Paso H), 597 F. Supp. 694 (D. N.M. 1984).
319. Comment, Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel. Douglas: State Control of Water under




state's groundwater. Any person wanting to export water for use
outside New Mexico must apply to the State Engineer for a permit
approving the withdrawal. 20 The State Engineer publishes notice
of the permit application and considers any objections that may be
filed; he must find, before granting a permit, that the withdrawal
and transportation of water for use outside New Mexico will not
impair existing rights and is neither contrary to the conservation of
water or detrimental to the public welfare of the state's citizens.32 '
In making his decision, the State Engineer shall consider, but is not
limited to, the following factors:
1. the supply of water available to New Mexico;
2. water demands of New Mexico;
3. whether there are water shortages within New Mexico;
4. whether the water that is the subject of the application could
feasibly be transported to alleviate water shortages in New Mexico;
5. the supply and sources of water available to the applicant in
the state where the applicant intends to use the water; and
6. the demands placed on the applicant's supply in the state
where the applicant intends to use the water.3 22
The statute provides that by filing an application to transport
New Mexico water out of the state, the applicant agrees to submit
to the New Mexico laws governing the appropriation and use of
water.3 23 The State Engineer is empowered to condition the permit
to guarantee that the water, once in the other state, is used accord-
ing to the same rules and regulations imposed on in-state users.324
As held in El Paso II, the defect in the New Mexico statutory
scheme was that New Mexico demanded that out-of-state transfers
not be contrary to the state's conservation standards or detrimental
to the public interest while placing no similar restrictions on in-
state transfer applicants.325
Before 1985 the Montana statutes prohibited export of water
from the state without consent of the legislature. Its 1985 statute
provides that no person may appropriate water in Montana without
receiving a permit from the Department of Natural Resources and
320. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 72-12B-1(B) (1985).
321. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 72-12B-1(C)(1985).
322. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 72-12B-l(D)(1985).
323. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 72-12B-l(E)(1985).
324. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 72-12B-1(F)(1985).
325. City of El Paso v. Reynolds (El Paso II), 597 F. Supp. 694, 703-04 (D. N.M. 1984)
("By requiring the State Engineer to consider the interests of conservation of
water and the public welfare of the citizens of New Mexico when acting on appli-
cations to export water from domestic and transfer wells but not when acting on
applications for in-state transfers and domestic wells, S.B. 295 discriminates on its
face against interstate commerce.").
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Conservation. 26 The new statute is unconstitutional because 1) ad-
ditional and more onerous substantive criteria are applied to appli-
cants requesting out-of-state groundwater permits than to
applicants requesting in-state permits;32 7 and 2) a greater burden is
imposed on applicants for out-of-state use than on applicants for in-
state use.328
Nebraska's statutes also impose more onerous substantive crite-
ria on out-of-state transfers than on in-state transfers. The Director
of Water Resources is required to consider the following criteria
when acting on an application to export ground water from the
state:
1) whether the proposed use is beneficial;
2) the availability to the applicant of alternative sources of sur-
face or ground water;
3) any negative effect of the proposed withdrawal on surface or
ground water supplies to meet reasonable future demands for water
in the area of the proposed withdrawal; and
4) any other factors necessary to protect the interests of the
state and its citizens.
If a permit is issued, the exporter is required to comply with the
rules and regulations established by the natural resources district
from which the water is withdrawn.
Neb. Rev. Stat § 46-233.01 governs applications to appropriate
Nebraska surface waters for use in another state. The criteria that
the Director of Water Resources must consider are much more ex-
tensive than the criteria used when acting on applications to export
groundwater. The surface water standards are:
1) whether there is unappropriated water in the source of
supply;
2) whether the appropriation would be detrimental to the pub-
lic interest;
3) whether denial is demanded by the public interest; and
4) whether the proposed use is beneficial.
In deciding whether the application is demanded by the public
interest, the Director must consider five factors: The economic, en-
vironmental and other benefits of the proposed use; any adverse
economic, environmental and other impacts of the proposed use;
any current beneficial uses being made of the unappropriated
326. MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-2-302 (1991). For an excellent discussion of the Montana
law, see Eaton, Commerce Clause Scrutiny of Montana's WaterExport Statutes, 7
PUB. LAND L. REv. 97 (1986).
327. MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-2-311(3)(b)(ii)(1991). This defect is the same Achilees
heel that was the downfall of the New Mexico statutes in El Paso II.
328. MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-2-311(3)(b)(1991).
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water; the economic, environmental and other benefits of not al-
lowing the appropriation and preserving the water supply for bene-
ficial uses within the state; and alternative sources of supply. In
addition the Director can consider other factors that are deemed
relevant to protecting the interests of the state and its citizens. The
application shall be deemed in the public interest if the overall ben-
efits to Nebraska are greater than the adverse impacts to Nebraska.
Under Sporhase and El Paso I and II, the constitutional question
is whether applicants for out-of-state use must fulfill standards that
in-state applicants need not meet. The standards for interbasin
transfers specified in Neb. Rev. Stat. § 46-289 and for intrabasin
transfers set forth in Neb. Rev. Stat. § 46-294 do not require the Di-
rector to consider, as in the case of ground water transfers to an-
other state, "any negative effect of the proposed withdrawal on
surface or ground water supplies needed to meet reasonable future
demands for water in the area of the proposed withdrawal." Nor is
such a standard required under the Municipal and Rural Domestic
Ground Water Transfers Permit Act. Neb. Rev. Stats. §§ 46-638 to
650. For example, a municipality such as Lincoln or Omaha can
transport water from anywhere in the state if the Director of Water
Resources finds that the withdrawal and transportation of the
groundwater is reasonable, not contrary to the conservation and
beneficial use of ground water, and not detrimental to the public
interest. Neb. Rev. Stat. § 46-642. But a municipality in Colorado or
Kansas seeking to use Nebraska water would have to show the
availability of alternative supplies and any negative effect of the
proposed withdrawal on water supplies needed to meet reasonable
future demands for water in the area of the proposed withdrawal.
This would appear to conflict with the ratio decidendi of the
Sporhase decision and of El Paso II.
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